1. Fisheries management; problems - solutions Sarah B. M. Kraak University College Cork Marine Institute Ireland

2. Problems in fisheries management

3. Fig. from Fulton et al. 2011. Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management. Fish & Fisheries.

4. The regulations are viewed by the fishers as opposing rather than supporting their interests and this manifests itself as a reduced compliance to the letter as well as the spirit of the regulations. sustainability

5. Solon (Athenian statesman and lawmaker, c. 638 BC–558 BC). He was challenged by the problem how his countrymens greed could be kept within bounds by means of laws. He resolved that he should frame his laws in such a way as to make it to everybodys advantage to follow them to the letter and the spirit.

6. perverse incentives By-catch limits / catch composition rules as percentage: – E.g. a lower cod percentage may be achieved by increasing the catches of other species … promoting use of smaller mesh gears…

7. perverse incentives Landings quota rather than catch quota (discarding is legal): – discarding of overquota catch in mixed demersal fisheries.

9. Fishing effort Species A Species B

10. Fishing effort Species A Species B

11. Fishing effort Species A Species B

12. Fig. modified from Ulrich et al. 2011. Reconciling single-species TACs in the North Sea demersal fisheries using the Fcube mixed-fisheries advice framework. ICES Journal of Marine Science

13. Real Time Incentives (RTI) Each vessel gets an (annual) quota of RTI credits; – RTI-credits or RTIs can be seen as fishing-impact equivalents Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

14. Real Time Incentives The fisher is free to fish where and when he wants, given the tariffs… No catch/landings QUOTA Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

15. Real Time Incentives 0.1 RTI 0.5 RTI 1 RTI 2 RTIs 5 RTIs Closed Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

16. Discards of vulnerable sharks and rays/skates Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

17. Discards of vulnerable sharks and rays/skates Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

18. Real Time Incentives RTI system does not prescribe and forbid allows fishers to fish wherever and whenever they want costs internalized and have to be paid by the fishers (in reduced fishing opportunities) Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

19. Real Time Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science

56. Advantage Costs of overfishing and other costs to ecosystem are internalized: fishers have to take them into account in their business decisions – no perverse incentives Kraak et al. 2012. 21st century fisheries management: A spatiotemporally explicit tariff-based approach combining multiple drivers and incentivising responsible fishing. ICES Journal of Marine Science