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Dr Giacomo Benedetto Jean Monnet Chair in EU Politics
Route to reform of the EU’s budget revenue FAIRTAX H2020 conference : Vienna, 19 September 2016 Dr Giacomo Benedetto Jean Monnet Chair in EU Politics
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Contents Structure of the Budget Crisis and challenges History and Packages British rebate and its lessons Reform of Own Resources
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Multiannual Financial Frameworks Own Resources: Revenue
Structure of EU budget 1 Multiannual Financial Frameworks Annual Budgets Own Resources: Revenue Traditional Own Resources VAT call rate of 0.3 GNI % transfer Rebates
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De facto budget, not 1% GDP, c. 3% GDP
Structure of EU Budget 2 Outside the Budget: The Juncker Fund (EFSI): leverage European Stability Mechanism (ESM) European Development Fund (EDF) Trust funds De facto budget, not 1% GDP, c. 3% GDP Not all net balances the same – contrast agriculture and research
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Crisis of the Budget Redistribution vs. Public Goods
Need for flexibility for emergencies Ambition for digital and energy markets Emergency of: Euro crisis and Greece Migration Brexit Net Balance, British-type demands Budget vetoes and delays But British rebate abolishes itself?
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Budget packages 1970: permanent finance for agriculture, some power for European Parliament , enlargement to UK 1984: rebate for UK, VAT call rate to 1.4%, enlargement to Spain and Portugal 1988: after Single European Act, double of ERDF spending, increase spending from 1.0 to 1.3% GNP, cap VAT contribution at 55% GNP, 5-7 year planning periods
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Interinstitutional conflict
Commission and EP in Luxembourg Treaty wanted power to set own resources without votes of national parliaments, with only 2/3 majority in Council Commission in 1975 Brussels Treaty wanted to give EP power to set VAT call rate by 3/5 majority Commission and EP wanted EEC to be able to borrow
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British rebate 1984: 1 EP demands: Commission proposal:
rebate only in form of extra spending (support of Commission) annual approval of rebate by Council and EP (support by Commission) 3-year sunset clause and one-off payment new revenue to be decided by EP-Council co-decision Commission proposal: Rebate only if EAGGF (agriculture) > 33% spending Rebate to be 33% of net contribution, NOT 66%
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British rebate 1984: 2 Council decision:
Rebate in unconditional cash, NOT through budget spend Value: 66% (not 33%) of net contribution Permanent but conditional on 1.4% VAT call rate and enlargement to Spain and Portugal Any change set by unanimity and ratification in national parliaments No incentive to reduce agricultural spending No sunset clause – other than minimum 1.4% VAT call rate Over time, smaller rebates for Germany, Austria, Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden. Net balance mentality enshrined.
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Relaunch the EU with a new budget?
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High Level Group on Own Resources
Own Resources Reform 1 High Level Group on Own Resources Escape net balance; find EU taxes? EU responsiveness through independence of budget? Interparliamentary conference on own resources, 7-8 September 2016 Report published in December 2016 Avoid pitfalls like the British rebate, consider historic advice of EP and Commission, use sunset clauses if necessary
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Reflection of single market: CIT, VAT, Carbon Tax
Own Resources reform 2 Reflection of single market: CIT, VAT, Carbon Tax Harmonized tax bases, technical ease: VAT and maybe CIT Technical difficulty: FTT Political difficulty: VAT Steering effects: FTT, Carbon Tax Political demand: FTT, Carbon Tax, CIT
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Own Resources reform 3 Rebates on gross contributions not net contributions, carbon tax effect disproportionate on less prosperous member states Rebate for Poland, Czech Republic and others: Call it a fund, to co-finance existing policy Or forget co-financing, make it conditional only on not cross-subsidy of coal or carbon intensive sectors
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Aviation tax rather than kerosene tax
Own Resources reform 4 Aviation tax rather than kerosene tax Aviation benefits from single market Environmental/climate change impact: Pigovian effect (Krenek and Schratzenstaller 2016) No significant tax on flights, could be collected NOT via national treasuries A Carbon-based Flight Ticket Tax (Krenek and Schratzenstaller 2016)? Or a flight tax levied by an EU agency? Unfair impact on geographically isolated countries: Malta, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Finland?
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