1. Responsibility to Protect: Darfur
Jan Lee Amari Madoka Teo Si Jia Yukina Yoshida

2. Agenda Historical Background Complications in Intervening in Darfur
Timeline of Significant Events
Failures of the International Community
R2P Evaluation
Current Situation

3. Historical Background
Geography
Sudan is the largest country in Africa, bordering the Red Sea
Darfur is a region in western Sudan, roughly the size of France, with a population of around 6 million before the conflict broke out

4. Historical Background
Sudan
Has always been a troubled region
Gained independence in 1956
Since then, it has been through a series of civil wars, mostly between its northern and southern regions
Conflicts are fuelled by:
Oil
National self-determination
Religion

5. Historical Background
Recent Political History
General Omar al-Bashir staged a military coup in 1989
National Islamic Front (NIF) took power
NIF renamed as National Congress Party (NCP)
Intensified war with the South
Neglect of Darfur worsened

6. Historical Background
Darfur
Diverse make-up
Over 90 tribes
Main parties:
Northern portion (arid) of Darfur: Arab tribes living as nomadic herders
Southern portion (arable) of Darfur: African tribes (Fur, Maasalit, Zaghawa, etc.) living as farmers

7. Historical Background
Setting the Stage for Genocide
Since the 1980s, drought, famine, and desertification have beset Darfur
Caused the competition for land between herders and farmers
Traditionally, conflicts were resolved by respected local councils peacefully
When Omar al-Bashir took power, these councils were abolished
Persistent neglect of the region continued

8. Historical Background
The Trigger
2003: Two Darfuri rebel movements began attacking the government for neglecting the region and rising tensions between farmers and nomads
Sudan Liberation Army (SLA)
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)
Khartoum (capital of Sudan) responded by unleashing the Janjaweed (devils on horseback) onto Darfur
Killed, raped, and pillaged
Conflict continues to this day

10. Complications in Intervening in Darfur
Darfur was the first test case of R2P
Justification of intervention in Iraq
Geostrategic interests overshadowing conflict
North-South conflict

11. Timeline of Significant Events
Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
Apr 8, 2004
Rushed agreement
Resolution 1556
July 22, 2004
Called for disarmament of the Janjaweed
Labelled ‘genocide’
Sept 9, 2004
US Congress Colin Powell called Darfur a genocide
UN International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur
Sept 2004
Sudanese government and the Janjaweed committed crimes against humanity
Resolution 1591
Call to cease ‘offensive military flights’

12. Followed by the leak of a UNSC report
UN pledged support for AMIS
NCP softens stance against UN mission
Feb 2006
Followed by the leak of a UNSC report
Darfur Peace Agreement
May 5, 2006
Only signatories were Khartoum and Minni Minawi’s faction of SLM
Resolution 1706
Aug 31, 2006
Appeal for the consent for an UN takeover, Chapter VII
Nov 2006, agreed to AU-UN hybrid force
Resolution 1769
July 31, 2007
UNAMID
UN Security Council Resolution 1706 authorised a UN mission of at least 20,600 troops and police to deploy to
Darfur with a Chapter VII mandate allowing use of force to protect threatened civilians, UN personnel, humanitarian
workers and the DPA.1
The Sudanese government’s consent is only “invited” to this deployment, not formally required,2

13. Failures of the International Community
Inadequacy of Peace Agreements
Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement
Talks were rushed through
Became the basis for diplomatic efforts in Darfur
Many aspects of the agreement were lacking, particularly, the ceasefire mandate and civilian protection mandate
Darfur Peace Agreement
Concluded hastily as well
Ignored the counsel of security advisers

14. Failures of the International Community
Support for AMIS
Relied on European and N. American funding as African nations lacked the necessary resources
Needed stronger mandate to protect civilians, more realistic concept of operations, more manpower, better logistics, and funding
No clear goals set out for them, tried to tackle the issue from too many angles

15. Failures of the International Community
United Nations
Slow to take actions
Reluctance to exert pressure on Khartoum
Failed to impose serious sanctions, bans, and a no-fly zone
The freeze of assets and sanctions of individuals involved
UNSC failed to monitor the disarmament and enhanced security of displacement camps

16. Failures of the International Community
International Bystanders
Moral right to intervene without council authorisation
US and UK
Russia and China, arms and oil
Naval blockade requires backing from UNSC
Initiative of EU and European governments

17. Failures of the International Community
UN Peacekeeping Forces
Expectations of them were wildly inflated
Did not possess the power to disarm
Needed 40,000-50,000 peacekeepers
Resulted in reversal of priorities, from diplomacy to protection

18. Evaluation Based on R2P Just Cause ★★★★★ Right Intention Last Resort ★
Proportional Means ★★
Reasonable Prospect
Right Authority

19. Just Cause
★★★★★
R2P
“Large scale loss of life… which is the product… of deliberate state action”
Death toll 400,000 (according to UHRC, 2014)

20. Right Intention
★★★★★
Recognition of humanitarian abuse from an early stage
Weak presence of non-humanitarian interest for states to intervene in Darfur
Reluctance to repeat the mistake of Rwanda

21. Last Resort
★☆☆☆☆
Necessity of international pressure due to Khartoum’s reluctance
Alternatives: More
effective sanctions,
diplomacy, no-fly zone

22. Proportional Means ★★☆☆☆ AMIS: approx. 7,000 soldiers (2005)
UNMIS: +17,300 soldiers for Darfur (decided in 2006)
Rejected by Khartoum
UNAMID: approx. 20,000
peacekeepers (2007)
Slow deployment

23. Reasonable Prospect ★★☆☆☆ Ineffective and unclear strategy
Boots on the ground were not the best strategy
More international pressure and sanctions were needed instead
Proposed plans were vague

24. Right Authority ★★★★★ Constitutional rights of UN and AU
No actions outside of UN authorization
Refugees spilling into Chad makes the conflict a trans-boundary problem

25. Present Situation: Sudan
2010: Al-Bashir resigned from the top position of the military but is still in his presidency. Situation has not improved.
2011: Independence of South Sudan

26. Present Situation: Darfur
Talks have been arranged for the AU Peace and Security Council, the government, JEM and SLM/MM to meet and negotiate an agreement but there has been no improvement.
July, 2011: Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD)
Signed by the Sudanese government and LJM
JEM rejected the framework due to the issues of territorial claims and voting system
23rd Nov: AU-initiated talks with these parties
Failed

27. Current Situation: Civilians
March 2009, UN peacekeeping chief in Sudan: “The world should no longer consider the long-running conflict a war.”
However, humanitarian abuse still persists (Thomson Reuters Foundation)
Destruction of villages and violence towards civilians
Displacement of approx. 400,000 in the first half of 2014
Mass rape
Environment of displacement camps
Still feeling the effects of 2013’s famine
UNAMID continues to observe the situation

28. Main References
Bellamy, A. (n.d.). Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq.
De Waal, A. (n.d.). Darfur and the failure of the responsibility to protect.
International Crisis Group. (n.d.). Getting the UN into Darfur
Badescu, C., & Bergholm, L. (n.d.). The Responsibility To Protect and the Conflict in Darfur: The Big Let-Down.

29. URLs

30. The End