1. ASAS Thematic Network
ASAS Operational Improvements -Dream or Reality:-
The Impact on the Controller
Anthony Smoker - IFATCA
ASAS-TN First Workshop Rome April 2003
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

2. ATCEUC
The contents of this presentation also represent the views of the ATCEUC, whose representative is unable to attend this seminar.
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

3. Dream or Reality?
For many controllers, ASAS has the potential to be a “bad dream” – why?
What will be the effect of ASAS on controllers? – technical concerns and practical considerations
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

4. Controllers and ASAS
History: “ASAS” style concepts have been around for many years – IEE 1961 etc
Generally there is a poor record of implementation of advanced technical systems into ATC - leads to concern and a legacy
The needs of the controller are often secondary to implementation – compromise and understanding of the controller task – “Cinderella effect”
Human in the system used as fallback for poor system design or technical shortcomings
Differing interpretations of procedures
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

5. The IFATCA View
“It is arguable that the concepts have a potential to improve the safety and productivity of the ATM system”
IFATCA welcomes the change from “assurance” to “assistance”
Several areas of concern: many that involve the “impact” on the controller
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

6. IFATCA – Procedural and technical Concerns
Visual Separation: ICAO rule changes
Responsibility for separation – there remain uncertainties in certain situations
Workload impact of “new tasks” - negative or positive effects, task scheduling etc
Airspace organisation and: design – rigid discrimination to achieve full ASAS benefits?
ASSAP – identification of traffic
Intent information
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

7. IFATCA Concerns – Practical considerations - 1
How many aircraft can be transferred for ASAS ops at anyone time, and retain system resilience to perturbation?
Will flight-deck workload limit the extent of tactical instructions or the controllers tactical freedom?
Complexity of multiple clearances to achieve system goals
System failure
More 
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

8. IFATCA Concerns – Practical considerations - 2
Military traffic
Transfer of traffic from sector to sector operating on “ASAS” type clearances
Practical application – common pilot understanding
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

9. Wider Issues
Don’t forget that controllers have other tasks than separation to fulfil
There are lots of other ”tools” e.g. MTCD, AMAN, DMAN, all competing for controller workload resources!
What are the limitations of ASAS – in a control sense?
ASAS concepts must be embedded into a holistic concept of operations
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

10. Conclusions ASAS is here, but then it has been a long time in coming!
There is a long way to go.
There is much that we simply do not know about ASAS in operation
THE IFATCA vision, might perhaps be that ASAS should be just another tool in the controller “box of tools” – please ask us
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003

11. Conclusions – cont’d
Please try to appreciate that controllers are system users as well, not just system providers, and that we have our own set of user requirements to make ASAS work.
Moreover, many controllers simply do not understand why there is a need for ASAS, and there is a need to ensure that they are engaged fully in it’s development
ASAS-TN Rome 29th-IV-2003