1. Michael Lacewing enquiries@alevelphilosophy.co.uk
Ethical naturalism
Michael Lacewing

2. Cognitivism vs. non-cognitivism
What are we doing when we make moral judgments?
Cognitivism: moral judgments, e.g. ‘Murder is wrong’
Aim to describe how the world is
Can be true or false
Express beliefs that the claim is true
Non-cognitivism: moral judgments
Do not aim to describe the world
Cannot be true or false
Express attitudes towards the world

3. Three quick arguments
If there were no facts about moral right and wrong, it wouldn’t be possible to make mistakes.
Morality feels like a demand from ‘outside’ us, independent of what we want or feel.
How is moral progress possible, unless some views about morality are better than others?

4. Types of realism
Moral realism: good and bad are properties of situations and people, right and wrong are properties of actions
Moral judgements are true or false depending on whether they ascribe the moral properties something actually has
What is the nature of these properties?

5. Ethical naturalism
Naturalism: moral properties are actually natural (psychological) properties
Reductionism: things in one domain are identical with things in another
Utilitarianism as naturalism
Goodness is happiness
Rightness is maximizing happiness
Cf. non-reductive reading: maximizing happiness and rightness are correlated

6. Objection How can we prove the identity claim?
Which natural property, if any, is identical with goodness isn’t obvious
We can’t use empirical reasoning
Science can show whether, e.g. someone is happy, but can’t show whether this is good
We can’t deduce it: conceptual analysis of ‘happiness’ doesn’t establish that it is good
Philosophical argument will be necessary

7. Was Mill a naturalist?
Moore argues that Mill defines good as ‘desired’
Mill argues that happiness is desired, and then infers that happiness is good
But this only works if what is desired is good
Likewise, Mill says that to think of something as desirable (good) and as pleasant is the same thing – so pleasant, desired, good are all the same

8. Was Mill a naturalist?
But Mill could be taking what is desired as evidence as what is good
Not the same property, but evidence that a different property is possessed

9. Was Aristotle a naturalist?
Aristotle argues that eudaimonia – the good for people – what we achieve if we perform our ‘function’ well
There are psychological facts about what traits enable us to do this
Reply: but what eudaimonia is can’t be identified with any set of natural facts
The person with practical wisdom understands the reasons for feeling and acting a certain way
Whether something is a reason isn’t a natural fact