1. The Troubled Relationship Between Law and Industrial Relations as Regulatory Systems in Italy. Integrations and Interferences after the Labour Law Reform (so-called “Jobs Act”)
Iacopo Senatori
Marco Biagi Foundation, University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
Alberto Mattei
Law Department, University of Verona
11° ILERA European Regional Congress, Milan, 8-10 September 2016

2. An alternative title: «The Never Ending Story»
4 major labour law reforms, with a direct regulatory impact on IR, in less than 15 years (2003, 2011, 2012, 2015).
4 national framework agreements on collective bargaining (actors, levels, competences, effectiveness) in less than 10 years (2009, 2011, 2013, 2014).
Uncoordinated initiatives by autonomous players (FIAT case, 2010 onwards): establishment of single-level company bargaining systems.

3. Theoretical framework: remember Kahn-Freund?
«The law is not the principal source of social power» (Labour and the Law, 1972).
The main functions of law in respect of collective bargaining:
Auxiliary legislation, promoting the making of collective bargaining (promotion of negotiation, promotion of agreement) and favouring the enforcement of collective agreements (e.g. rules on effectiveness, selection of players).
Regulatory legislation, establishing the boundaries between law and collective bargaining.

4. Factual framework: the main features of the Italian system
Autonomy of IR in the shadow of supportive legislation (Constitutional right to trade union freedom, «Workers’ Statute»).
Legal effectiveness dependent on factual premises (principle of effectiveness).
Co-ordinated decentralisation of collective bargaining (since 1993,with a slowly increasing trend).
IR as a regulatory resource for the State (delegation of powers, participation of IR players in the law-making process).
Enduring problems: enforcement, low coverage of second level agreements, diverging policy targets (uniformity to correct inequalities; diversification to boost a «race to the top»).

5. The impact of the Jobs Act: 1. Actors
Art. 51, legislative decree n. 81/15
Levels: national, local and company are put on an equal standing No prior regulation, implicit acknowledgement of the parties’ own settlements.
Actors:
Representative unions at the national level (for national and local agreements)
Their representative bodies at the plant level, i.e. «rappresentanze sindacali aziendali, rappresentanza sindacale unitaria» (for company agreements).
A marked shift towards a single-channel model: bargaining, participation and trade union rights at the company level enjoyed by the same players.
Representativeness as an entitlement to negotiate: assessed on a comparative basis at the national level, no majority rule.

6. The impact of the Jobs Act: 2. Functions of collective agreements
The impact of the Jobs Act: 2. Functions of collective agreements. Lights and Shadows
Cases in which the law grants collective agreements exclusive or priority credits as a regulatory source. E.g.: fiscal incentives to productivity-enhancing arrangements, see also Budget Law 2016; transfer of rest and holiday entitlements between employees on solidarity grounds.
Cases in which the law sets up a «regulatory shadow» for the exercise of individual rights, also in case of inactivity of collective agreements (possibile effect: boost collective regulation and protect individual employees’ freedom of choice). E.g. fruition of parental leaves on a hourly basis.

7. The impact of the Jobs Act: 2. Functions of collective agreements
The impact of the Jobs Act: 2. Functions of collective agreements. Lights and Shadows
In general, for diverse, heterogeneous and non-linear referrals to social partners in the Jobs Act;
In general, for the contradictory coexistence of the proximity collective bargaining (Article 8 l. 148/11) and referrals to collective bargaining in the Jobs Act;
In particular, for the collective autonomy that is instrumental-functional at the Jobs Act political towards the goal of easing the protections (eg.: downgrading and recent reformulation of Article 2103 c.c. on job classifications).

8. Hard disintermediation Soft disintermediation
A key concept: disintermediation
Hard disintermediation
Soft disintermediation

9. Definition, sources and articulations
Approximative definition: the ability to remove filters and put directly in touch with the workers without recourse to intermediate bodies (i.e. social partners).

10. Definition, sources and articulation
Tax Law: ”Irpef Decree" (l. d. 24 April 2014, n. 66, into l. 23 June 2014, n. 89).
Social Security Law and Labour Law: exemption from the obligation to pay social security contributions for hiring employees (Budget Law 2015, l. 23 December 2014, n. 190, and Stability Law 2016, l. 28 December 2015, n. 208).
Tax Law, Social Security Law and Labour Law: possibility conciliation taking place after dismissal and is not subject to tax and social security contributions (Jobs Act, l. d. 4 March 2015, n. 23).

11. Definition, sources and articulation
Reduction labour cost
Hard
disintermediation

12. Definition, sources and articulation
Labour Law and Industrial Relations: equalization of collective bargaining levels (Jobs Act, l. d. 25 June 2015, n. 81).
Labour Law, Tax Law and Social Security Law: employment benefits (Budget Law 2016, l. 28 December 2015, n. 208)

13. Reduction of the role of collective bargaining at national level
Definition, sources and articulation
Reduction of the role of collective bargaining at national level
Soft
disintermediation

14. Conclusion
The law promotes decentralisation with a neutral approach as regards the degree of coordination of collective bargaining.
The law considers IR as a regulatory resource, mainly just as long as it is aligned with its policy goals.
Uncertain whether the law will contribute to solve the enduring problems in the IR field.
Coming soon: legislation on minimum wages and on the structure of collective bargaining?