1. MVZ489 Causes of Political Violence Lucie Sitarová April 2016
Democratization, Political institutions, and Ethnic Conflict Presentation
MVZ489 Causes of Political Violence 
Lucie Sitarová
April 2016

2. Saideman, S. , Lanoue, D. , Campenni, M. , Stanton, S
Saideman, S., Lanoue, D., Campenni, M., Stanton, S. (2002): “Democratization, Political institutions, and Ethnic Conflict. A pooled-Time Series Analysis, ”, Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 35, No 1., pp:

3. Structure Democracy and conflict Core assumptions
Ethnic security dilemma
Political institutions and conflict
Research design
Hypothesis and results

4. Democracy and conflict
3rd wave of democratizatoin - increase in the number of ethnic groups in conflict
Questions:
If political competition exacerbates communal tensions, do increases in ethnic tensions coincide with democratization?
Are the differences in ethnic unrest among democracies due to variations in political institutions?
Are presidential systems more prone to ethnic conflict than parliamentary democracies?
Does the electoral system matter?
Does federalism cause more problems than it solves? 

5. Should we prescribe democracy?

6. Core assumptions and question
Groups can be perceived as unitary actors
Institutions matter because they can favor or deter organized groups and their dissent
Q: what conditions are associated with greater or less ethnic dissent, both peaceful and violent?
Ethnic protest X ethnic rebellion
Protest – „making an appeal to government leaders for redress of grievances“
Rebellion – „conscious attempt to destabilize (and in some cases overthrow) the government itself“
Important distinction, because some institutions favor protest to prevent violent rebelllion

7. Ethnic security dilemma
Application of the international concept to domestic politics
Posen – collapse of an empire creates anarchy  security dilemma
Saideman – revises the concept to make it broadly applicable:
government of any state is the greatest potential threat to any groups inside (it usually takes a state’s resources to commit genocide)
 groups try to control the state (or secede if the state's neutrality cannot be assured)
 security dilemma
Q: what institutions might matter and what are their likely effects?
Institutions that promote power sharing or provide some level of representation or self-government for minority groups are therefore assumed to be more likely to reduce conflict
eth groups will be secure if they have access to decision makers, can block harmful politices, veto... 
Uncertainity - Because the tendency toward protest and violence is inversely related to group security, we assume that groups are more likely to act up when they are uncertain about their position and prospects for the future.
-- more problems when there are first elections...
bcs autocracies offer stability, ethnic unrest can be greater in democracies

8. Political institutions and conflict
nature of the executive
type of electoral system
distribution of power between central government and subunits
How much power is held by the winners and what can do the losers
presidentialism vs parliamentarism - what is better? 
presidential systems are better because of greater accountability, greater identifiability, and the existence of mutual checks
BUT The ethnic security dilemma theory suggests that presidential systems are superior in reducing conflict
Parliamentarism,can be quite threatening to minority groups if they cannot get significant representation and especially threatening if one party tends to gain control with no need for coalitions - Ethnic groups may be safer in presidential systems because there are more points within the system to block unfavorable actions

9. Research Minorities at risk dataset Group/years
Both democratic and authoritarian regimes

10. democracy
Hypothesis 1: Ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in democracies than in authoritarian regimes.
Competition for the control of government
Costs of protesting are less and the perceived benefits are greater 
Ethnic outbidding

11. democracy
Hypothesis 1: Ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in democracies than in authoritarian regimes.
Competition for the control of government
Costs of protesting are less and the perceived benefits are greater 
Ethnic outbidding

12. Regime age
Hypothesis 2: Ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in states with younger political institutions.
State is more vulnerable to capture by one group at the expense of others during transitions
Older regimes are more likely to have „worked things out“

13. Regime age
Hypothesis 2: Ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely in states with younger political institutions.
State is more vulnerable to capture by one group at the expense of others during transitions
Older regimes are more likely to have „worked things out“
older - more violence, not significantly more protest
the fact of establishing a new dem is often a part od grievance-management

14. Young democracies
Hypothesis 3:Young democracies are less likely to experience severe ethnic strife.
The mere fact of the transitions to a democracy is an act of adressing grievances
Groups might try to use the system first

15. Young democracies
Hypothesis 3:Young democracies are less likely to experience severe ethnic strife.
The mere fact of the transitions to a democracy is an act of adressing grievances
Groups might try to use the system first

16. First election
Hypothesis 4: When a country undergoes its first election under the current political system, ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely
More dissent during a first election, because this is often the first opportunity to make clear what a group desires
Increases incertainity about who will rule 
They don‘t necessarily lead to democracy

17. First election
Hypothesis 4: When a country undergoes its first election under the current political system, ethnic protests and rebellion are more likely
More dissent during a first election, because this is often the first opportunity to make clear what a group desires
Increases incertainity about who will rule 
They don‘t necessarily lead to democracy
No significant influence

18. Electoral system
Hypothesis 6: Ethnic conflict is more likely in systems characterized by plurality than those with proportional representation
Plurality systems - exaggerate the power of the strongest parties
Proportional representation —a distribution of seats proportional to the votes received

19. Electoral system
Hypothesis 6: Ethnic conflict is more likely in systems characterized by plurality than those with proportional representation
Plurality systems - exaggerate the power of the strongest parties
Proportional representation —a distribution of seats proportional to the votes received
neither large-scale demonstrations nor violence is required for groups to have some say over their destinies

20. Federalism
Hypothesis 7a: Ethnic protest is more likely in systems characterized by federalism. Hypothesis 7b: Ethnic rebellion is less likely in systems characterized by federalism.
Facilitates collective action
Many groups have more control over the government of their territory
Put smaller minorities at risk

21. Federalism
Hypothesis 7a: Ethnic protest is more likely in systems characterized by federalism. Hypothesis 7b: Ethnic rebellion is less likely in systems characterized by federalism.
Facilitates collective action
Many groups have more control over the government of their territory
Put smaller minorities at risk

22. Other Actors Wealth Cultural differences Concentration
level of development matters more than how well it has been doing lately - groups in richer countries engage in less violence
Cultural differences
culturally distinct or politically disadvantaged groups engage in more dissent (peaceful and violent)
Concentration
positive relationship with both protest and rebellion 

23. Conclusion
no need to fear democratization

24. Thank you