1. What I Think When I Think About Happiness
Dan Weijers
CSUS Faculty Panel on Happiness
April 20, 2015

2. Is Matthieu Ricard the Happiest Person in the World?
And how could we know?

3. Brain Scan Test of Happiness

4. Is Happiness Objective?
“Sceptics may still question whether
happiness is really an objective feeling that can be properly compared between people.”
“To reassure doubters, we can turn to modern brain physiology with its sensational new insights…”
–Richard Layard in Happiness (2005, p. 17)

5. What is Happiness? Flourishing Satisfaction Hedonism
Being all you can be (given what you are)
Satisfaction
Getting what you want in life
Hedonism
Feeling happy (pleasure and not pain)

6. What are We Measuring? Significant but low correlations
Flourishing: Ryff’s Scales of Psychological Well-Being (0.33**)
Life satisfaction: Diener’s Satisfaction With Life Scale (0.30**)
Hedonism: Watson et al.’s Positive and Negative Affect Scale (0.21*)
We are measuring something related to all three conceptions of happiness, but equal to none of them
In the only comprehensive study of correlations between neuroimaging and measurement of subjective well-being, several prominent subjective well-being measures were compared with electroencephalogram data from 84 right-handed adults aged 57–60. Correlating highest with the neuroimaging results were the results for a measure of psychological flourishing—Carol Ryff’s (1989) Scales of Psychological Well-Being. The correlation was highly significant (p < 0.01) and moderate in size (0.33) (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). Following close behind was Ed Diener and colleagues’ (1985) Satisfaction With Life Scale, which correlated with the neuroimaging results by 0.30 and was also highly significant (p < 0.01) (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). A smaller (0.21) and slightly less significant (p < 0.05) correlation was also found with the positive affect component of Watson, Clark, and Tellegen’s (1988) Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). It should be noted that, unlike the questions that directly ask about happiness, none of the measures of subjective well-being used in Urry and colleagues’ (2004) study are equivalent to the folk notion of happiness (although the measure of positive affect would come the closest).
- First, the neuroimaging results and these measures of subjective well-being are very likely to be tracking phenomena that are related in some positive way. This is shown by the fact that the correlation is positive and highly statistically significant.
- Second, the phenomena being tracked are clearly distinct. The high statistical significance of the results should make us confident that the various measures are not measuring exactly the same thing. If the size of the correlations were much higher, at least above 0.60, and the statistical significance remained very high, then we would expect to observe the phenomena measured by the different tests to covariate more closely and, thereby, give the impression of being the same thing. Positive correlations of 0.33 (roughly) mean that we should expect an increase in the results of the neuroimaging measure to be usually accompanied by a relatively smaller increase of the subjective well-being measure. This is the kind of relationship we expect from distinct but positively related variables, not from two different measures of the same phenomenon.
0.60 is the level above which behavioural scientists usually deem results to be ‘highly related’ (Cohen 1988).

7. Overarching Research Questions
What
is good
for societies?
What is good
for individuals?
The nature of happiness is certainly a contested and very interesting topic… but is happiness the most important thing? What is the connection between happiness and a good life?
This explains how my main line of research has developed over the years. These are also questions that I will continue to work on for many years to come.
What is happiness?

8. Interdisciplinary Interests
Neuro-science
Psychology
Philosophy
Economics
I’m a philosopher with interdisciplinary interests
Public Policy

9. Promoting Interdisciplinary Research on Happiness
Hedonism
Meaning of life
Values
International Journal of Wellbeing
Writing
Editing
Advising
Organizing
United Nations
Treasury (NZ)
Statistics (NZ)
Creating (writing and editing)
Connecting (advising and networking)
Innovation – for a philosopher I use forward-thinking and innovative methods
IJW is online only, interdisciplinary, and open access
My policy advice is usually pushing the boundaries (e.g. subjective wellbeing for public policy)
International Wellbeing and Policy Conferences

10. Some Happiness Research
Cross-cultural psychology
Faith makes injustice less dissatisfying
People are somewhat averse to happiness
Pondering the meaning of life might bring satisfaction
Experimental philosophy
The experience machine doesn’t make hedonism false
Philosophers are less happy than others
Philosophy
The meaning of life could depend on science
Happiness has meant different things in history
Public policy
Subjective wellbeing should be a gauge of public policy

11. Happiness (pleasure and not pain)
Defending Hedonism
Happiness (pleasure and not pain)
What
is good
for societies?
What is good
for individuals?
Define hedonism
I don’t mean pleasure now regardless of consequences
No theories of wellbeing are perfect. I defend hedonism because it is seen as much worse than the other main types of theory but I think it’s as good or better.
What is happiness?

12. The Experience Machine
“Suppose that there were an experience machine that would give you any experience you desired… Should you plug into this machine for life…?”
Nozick, Robert (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 42–45
Smart, Jack & Williams, Bernard (1973). Utilitarianism for and Against , pp. 18– 21.
Bradbury, Ray (1957). The Happiness Machine, Dandelion Wine, Doubleday.
Disclaimers:
Ignore responsibilities to family etc.
Don’t realise it’s not real
Still exercise autonomy
Machine works perfectly

13. The Argument Should you get in? Great experiences
Low connection with reality
High connection with reality
Great experiences
Two strengths of the argument:
Philosophers think that just about everyone agrees that reality is preferable
Comparison between great and average experiences (instead of equal experiences)
“Now if pleasure were our greatest good, then we would all volunteer to be hooked for life to this machine… But surely very few people would volunteer.”
Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, p 13.
If pleasure = g. good, then we’d plug in
We would not plug in
Therefore, pleasure ≠ g. good
Moderate experiences

14. The Argument Reversed Should you get out? Moderate experiences
High connection with reality
Low connection with reality
Moderate experiences
Bad experiences
Two strengths of the argument:
Philosophers think that just about everyone agrees that reality is preferable
Comparison between great and average experiences (instead of equal experiences)
“Now if pleasure were our greatest good, then we would all volunteer to be hooked for life to this machine… But surely very few people would volunteer.”
Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, p 13.
If pleasure = g. good, then we’d plug in
We would not plug in
Therefore, pleasure ≠ g. good

15. The Experience Machine
We like where we are
High connection with reality
Low connection with reality
Moderate experiences
Bad experiences
Two strengths of the argument:
Philosophers think that just about everyone agrees that reality is preferable
Comparison between great and average experiences (instead of equal experiences)
“Now if pleasure were our greatest good, then we would all volunteer to be hooked for life to this machine… But surely very few people would volunteer.”
Kymlicka, W. (1990). Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, p 13.
If pleasure = g. good, then we’d plug in
We would not plug in
Therefore, pleasure ≠ g. good

16. What Does it all Mean?
There is much about happiness we still don’t know