1. Jeffrey S. Passel Pew Hispanic Center — Washington, DC
Demographic & Labor
Trends in the U.S.:
Immigration Today:
Emerging Patterns of Continuity and Change by
Jeffrey S. Passel
Pew Hispanic Center
Pew Research Center
Washington, DC
Regional Seminars for Journalists
The Century Foundation
Drake Hotel
Chicago, Illinois
April 7-8, 2005
Demographic Trends, Immigration Policy and Remittances
Migration Policy Institute & Inter-American Development Bank
Washington, DC — 16 May 2007

2. Migration Flows to U.S.
Large Increases, Now Stable -- Shift to Latin America & Asia
New Migrants are Unauthorized -- More Heavily Latin American
Responsive to Origin & Destination -- Job Availability in U.S Conditions in Mexico & Elsewhere
New Destinations Emerge -- Driven by Unauthorized (Mexican)
The major demographic highlights of recent immigration to the U.S. are:
Large and increasing flows to the U.S. have stabilized. The number of immigrants settling in the United States has increased steadily over the last five decades but the overall level of the in-flows has stabilized in the last 10years (with sizeable fluctuations around a constant mean).
Since 1965, the origins of immigrants have shifted away from the historic flows from Asia to the point where roughly 80% of all immigrants are from Latin America and Asia.
2. A very high percentage of new migrants are unauthorized. The percentage of unauthorized immigrants who are from Latin America is even higher than among the legal in-flows. Overall about half of all Mexicans in the U.S. are unauthorized.
3. The size of flows and their destinations responds respond to economic conditions at both their origins and destinations. Over the long run, economic conditions at the origins are more important than in the U.S. with worsening conditions in Mexico leading to increased migration to the United States. However, short-run fluctuations in the availability of jobs in the U.S. have more immediate impacts in year-to-year changes.
4. New destinations for Mexican immigrants emerged in the late 1990s. Traditional settlement areas (e.g., CA, TX, IL, AZ) continued to attract migrants but a much larger share went to new destinations. The spread of immigration flows to new areas (largely drive by new settlement patterns of unauthorized Mexican immigrants) has transformed the political issue of immigration from a largely localized concern (in 6 states) in the early 1980s to a national issue now.

3. 20st Century: New Peaks Reached in ’80s
14-16+
(est.)
Europe/Canada (Legal)
All Other (Legal)
Additional* 10
* Additional immigrants are mostly illegals and
legalized aliens
9.0 7
6.0
5.2
In this presentation, we highlight three major aspects of recent trends in immigration:
(1) high sustained flows;
(2) an increase in unauthorized immigration; and
(3) growing geographic dispersal.
We start with the large scale of recent flows to the U.S.
During the 1990s, more than 14–16 million new immigrants entered the United States according to our estimates (based in part on Census 2000); this figure exceeds flows in any decade in the nation’s history;
Given the overall levels of legal immigration (about 800,000–1,000,000 per year), it is likely that the net in-flow of unauthorized immigrants averaged about 500,000 per year over the decade; the annual number of unauthorized entries was much higher;
Barring a major change in the nation’s legal immigration policy or a sustained deterioration in the economy we project the entry of at least 15 million immigrants between 2000 and 2010.
Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the INS and Office of Immigration Statistics (DHS) and Pew Hispanic estimates and projections.
4.1
3.7
3.8
2.8
2.6
2.3
2.5
1.7
1.0
0.6
0.5
0.1

4. 21st Century: Current In-Flows Are Very High
14-16+
(est.)
15+?
Europe/Canada (Legal)
All Other (Legal)
Additional* 10
* Additional immigrants are mostly illegals and
legalized aliens
9.0 7
6.0
5.2
In this presentation, we highlight three major aspects of recent trends in immigration:
(1) high sustained flows;
(2) an increase in unauthorized immigration; and
(3) growing geographic dispersal.
We start with the large scale of recent flows to the U.S.
During the 1990s, more than 14–16 million new immigrants entered the United States according to our estimates (based in part on Census 2000); this figure exceeds flows in any decade in the nation’s history;
Given the overall levels of legal immigration (about 800,000–1,000,000 per year), it is likely that the net in-flow of unauthorized immigrants averaged about 500,000 per year over the decade; the annual number of unauthorized entries was much higher;
Barring a major change in the nation’s legal immigration policy or a sustained deterioration in the economy we project the entry of at least 15 million immigrants between 2000 and 2010.
Sources: Statistical Yearbooks of the INS and Office of Immigration Statistics (DHS) and Pew Hispanic estimates and projections.
4.1
3.7
3.8
2.8
2.6
2.3
2.5
1.7
1.0
0.6
0.5
0.1

5. Latin Americans & Asians Dominate Foreign-Born
Mexico -- 32%
11.6 million
Other Latin America -- 23%
8.4 million
Africa & Other -- 5%
1.7 million
A previous chart tracked the in-flows of legal immigrants by decade. This chart displays the “stock” of immigrants or the foreign-born population as measured by the March 2006 Current Population Survey (with a correction for those missed by the survey).
These data show an estimated foreign-born population of 36.4 million. Mexico alone accounts for 11.6 million persons or 32 percent of the immigrants living in the U.S. This degree of concentration is not unprecedented as over 30 percent of the foreign-born population in the mid- and late-19th century came from Ireland or Germany. (Some decades had more than 30 percent of each or more than 40 percent of the larger.)
The other two principal sources are: Asia—9.4 million or 26 percent of the total; and the rest of Latin America (everything south of the U.S. other than Mexico)—8.4 million or 23 percent. The traditional source regions of Europe and Canada have dropped to 5.4 million or only 15 percent of the total, a share that seems to be steadily decreasing.
Source: Based on Pew Hispanic Center tabulations of the March 2005 CPS. In these data, most persons reporting with country of birth “unknown” have been assigned to regions of birth based on responses to other CPS questions or relationships within households and families. Data adjusted for omissions of immigrants from the CPS. (Based on Passel 2005.)
Asia -- 26%
9.4 million
Europe & Canada -- 15%
5.4 million
36.4 Million Foreign-Born in 2005

6. Immigrant Numbers at Record --
36 Million
(2005 CPS)
9.6 Million
(1970 Census)
This chart depicts the “stock” of immigrants in the U.S. or the foreign-born population from 1850 through 2004 with a projection to
The foreign-born population at 31.1 million was at an all-time high in Census 2000 and has increased further to more than 34 million in (The chart suggests a very rapid increase in the late 1990s, but the true growth trajectory is probably smoother with the rapid change at the end of the decade representing significant improvements in in measurement between the Current Population Survey and Census 2000.)
The sustained rapid growth and high levels of immigration, shown in the previous chart, have led to the foreign-born population more than tripling in only 30 years, shown in this chart.
The percentage of the total population that is foreign-born is about 12 percent in more than double the 4.7 percent in That said, the 1970 levels are probably the lowest in the history of the country (certainly the lowest since we have data).
Looking ahead a decade, we project that the the foreign -born population will rise to more than 40 million, representing more than 13 percent of the total population -- a level that remains below the historical peak of almost 15 percent at the time of the last great wave of immigration.
Source: Decennial censuses for ; Current Population Surveys (CPS) for and ; Urban Institute and Pew Hispanic Center projections (2004) for 2010.

7. Immigrant Numbers at Record -- Percentage Still Below Peak
36 Million
(2005 CPS)
14.8 Percent
This chart depicts the “stock” of immigrants in the U.S. or the foreign-born population from 1850 through 2004 with a projection to
The foreign-born population at 31.1 million was at an all-time high in Census 2000 and has increased further to more than 34 million in (The chart suggests a very rapid increase in the late 1990s, but the true growth trajectory is probably smoother with the rapid change at the end of the decade representing significant improvements in in measurement between the Current Population Survey and Census 2000.)
The sustained rapid growth and high levels of immigration, shown in the previous chart, have led to the foreign-born population more than tripling in only 30 years, shown in this chart.
The percentage of the total population that is foreign-born is about 12 percent in more than double the 4.7 percent in That said, the 1970 levels are probably the lowest in the history of the country (certainly the lowest since we have data).
Looking ahead a decade, we project that the the foreign -born population will rise to more than 40 million, representing more than 13 percent of the total population -- a level that remains below the historical peak of almost 15 percent at the time of the last great wave of immigration.
Source: Decennial censuses for ; Current Population Surveys (CPS) for and ; Urban Institute and Pew Hispanic Center projections (2004) for 2010.
12.1 Percent
(2005)
4.7 Percent

8. Projection Methods
Cohort Component Race-Hispanic (W-Bl-H-API-AIAN) “Generations”
Assumptions -- Fertility Trends Up/Down to Immigration — +1% per Year
Education-Labor Force -- Upgrade Education by Cohort -- LFPR constant by A-S-R-G-Ed 2 2

9. Projected Role of Immigrants in Work Force
Immigration Drives Growth -- Increased “Minority” Populations
Education Upgrading of LF -- Better Education -- “Aging Out” of Low Education
Aging Population,
Immigrants Help Social Security -- Relatively Small Impact -- Offsets from More Children

10. Immigration Drives Growth;
Population in millions
These projections illustrate the full impact of immigration on the U.S. labor force. Without post-2000 immigration, the U.S. labor force would actually decline slightly after about 2015 and would stabilize at just below 150 million from 2020 through With immigration at more than 1.1 million per year, the labor force would grow steadily. Post-2000 immigration adds over 40 million to the labor force by 2050. 31 31

11. Immigration Drives Growth;
Population in millions
These projections illustrate the full impact of immigration on the U.S. labor force. Without post-2000 immigration, the U.S. labor force would actually decline slightly after about 2015 and would stabilize at just below 150 million from 2020 through With immigration at more than 1.1 million per year, the labor force would grow steadily. Post-2000 immigration adds over 40 million to the labor force by 2050. 31 31

12. Immigration Drives Growth; 65% for 2005-2025 from Immigration
Population in millions
These projections illustrate the full impact of immigration on the U.S. labor force. Without post-2000 immigration, the U.S. labor force would actually decline slightly after about 2015 and would stabilize at just below 150 million from 2020 through With immigration at more than 1.1 million per year, the labor force would grow steadily. Post-2000 immigration adds over 40 million to the labor force by 2050. 31 31

13. Immigration Drives Growth; 85% for 2005-2045 from Immigration
Population in millions
These projections illustrate the full impact of immigration on the U.S. labor force. Without post-2000 immigration, the U.S. labor force would actually decline slightly after about 2015 and would stabilize at just below 150 million from 2020 through With immigration at more than 1.1 million per year, the labor force would grow steadily. Post-2000 immigration adds over 40 million to the labor force by 2050. 31 31

14. Percent Hispanic Increases Under All Immigration Scenarios
Percent of total population
These projections illustrate the full impact of immigration on the U.S. labor force. Without post-2000 immigration, the U.S. labor force would actually decline slightly after about 2015 and would stabilize at just below 150 million from 2020 through With immigration at more than 1.1 million per year, the labor force would grow steadily. Post-2000 immigration adds over 40 million to the labor force by 2050. 31 31

15. Immigrants Projected to Grow --
Percentage Passes Historical Peak
Immigrants Projected to Grow --
55 Million
(2025, Pew ‘07)
14.8 Percent
36.4 Million
(2005 CPS)
15.3 Percent
(2025)
This chart depicts the “stock” of immigrants in the U.S. or the foreign-born population from 1850 through 2004 with a projection to
The foreign-born population at 31.1 million was at an all-time high in Census 2000 and has increased further to more than 34 million in (The chart suggests a very rapid increase in the late 1990s, but the true growth trajectory is probably smoother with the rapid change at the end of the decade representing significant improvements in in measurement between the Current Population Survey and Census 2000.)
The sustained rapid growth and high levels of immigration, shown in the previous chart, have led to the foreign-born population more than tripling in only 30 years, shown in this chart.
The percentage of the total population that is foreign-born is about 12 percent in more than double the 4.7 percent in That said, the 1970 levels are probably the lowest in the history of the country (certainly the lowest since we have data).
Looking ahead a decade, we project that the the foreign -born population will rise to more than 40 million, representing more than 13 percent of the total population -- a level that remains below the historical peak of almost 15 percent at the time of the last great wave of immigration.
Source: Decennial censuses for ; Current Population Surveys (CPS) for and ; Urban Institute and Pew Hispanic Center projections (2004) for 2010.
12.1 Percent
(2005)
4.7 Percent

16. Immigrants Projected to Grow --
Percentage Passes Historical Peak
Immigrants Projected to Grow --
81 Million
(2050, Pew ‘07)
14.8 Percent
36.4 Million
(2005 CPS)
18.6 Percent
(2050)
This chart depicts the “stock” of immigrants in the U.S. or the foreign-born population from 1850 through 2004 with a projection to
The foreign-born population at 31.1 million was at an all-time high in Census 2000 and has increased further to more than 34 million in (The chart suggests a very rapid increase in the late 1990s, but the true growth trajectory is probably smoother with the rapid change at the end of the decade representing significant improvements in in measurement between the Current Population Survey and Census 2000.)
The sustained rapid growth and high levels of immigration, shown in the previous chart, have led to the foreign-born population more than tripling in only 30 years, shown in this chart.
The percentage of the total population that is foreign-born is about 12 percent in more than double the 4.7 percent in That said, the 1970 levels are probably the lowest in the history of the country (certainly the lowest since we have data).
Looking ahead a decade, we project that the the foreign -born population will rise to more than 40 million, representing more than 13 percent of the total population -- a level that remains below the historical peak of almost 15 percent at the time of the last great wave of immigration.
Source: Decennial censuses for ; Current Population Surveys (CPS) for and ; Urban Institute and Pew Hispanic Center projections (2004) for 2010.
12.1 Percent
(2005)
4.7 Percent

17. Labor Force Growth in Future Driven by Immigration (esp. after 2015)
Labor force in millions
These projections illustrate the full impact of immigration on the U.S. labor force. Without post-2000 immigration, the U.S. labor force would actually decline slightly after about 2015 and would stabilize at just below 150 million from 2020 through With immigration at more than 1.1 million per year, the labor force would grow steadily. Post-2000 immigration adds over 40 million to the labor force by 2050. 31 31

18. Labor Force Growth in Future Driven by Immigration (esp. after 2015)
Labor force in millions
These projections illustrate the full impact of immigration on the U.S. labor force. Without post-2000 immigration, the U.S. labor force would actually decline slightly after about 2015 and would stabilize at just below 150 million from 2020 through With immigration at more than 1.1 million per year, the labor force would grow steadily. Post-2000 immigration adds over 40 million to the labor force by 2050. 31 31

19. Minorities Increase in Labor Force Whites Still a Majority (until 2045+)21 21

20. Net Change 2005-10 is Mostly Minority;
Pew ’07 Projection
(In millions) 21 21

21. Net Change 2005-10 is Mostly Minority; But, Whites Still Most of Entrants
Pew ’07 Projection
(In millions) 21 21

22. Net Change 2005-10 is Mostly Minority; Whites Even Higher Share of Exits
Pew ’07 Projection
(In millions) 21 21

23. Net Change 2020-25 is More Minority; Even So, Whites Most of Entrants
UI-Pew ’03 Projection
(In millions) 21 21

24. Age 12-17: Percent Hispanic Grows Rapidly
Percent Hispanic above bar
Population (millions)
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White, not Hispanic 28 28 28 9 17 9

25. Age 12-17: Pop. Change -- + for some groups; - for others
Hispanic, red (above);
White-Black, below
Population Change (millions)
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White, not Hispanic 28 28 28 9 17 9

26. Age 12-17: Pop. Change -- Hispanics Grow Every Period
Hispanic, red (above);
White-Black, below
Population Change (millions)
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White, not Hispanic 28 28 28 9 17 9

27. Age 12-17: Pop. Change -- Whites Decrease, then Increase
Hispanic, red (above);
White-Black, below
Population Change (millions)
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White, not Hispanic 28 28 28 9 17 9

28. Age 12-17: Growth from Latinos as Whites (& Blacks) Shrink
Percent Hispanic above bar
Population (millions)
Hispanic, red (above);
White-Black, below
Population Change (millions)
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White, not Hispanic 28 28 28 17 9 9

29. Age 18-24: Modest Growth, but Rapid Latino Shift after 2010
Percent Hispanic above bar
Population (millions)
Hispanic, red (above);
White-Black, below
Population Change (millions)
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White, not Hispanic 28 28 28 17 9 9

30. Age 25-44: No-Growth “Busters”; Rapid, Steady Growth in Latinos
Pct. Hispanic above bar
Population (millions)
Hispanic, red (above);
White-black below
Population Change (millions)
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White, not Hispanic 28 28 28 17 9 9

31. Age 45-64: “Boomers” Grow; Latinos & Asians Growth Steady
Percent Hispanic above bar
Population (millions)
Hispanic, red (below);
White-Black, above
Population Change (millions)
Asian
Hispanic
Black
White, not Hispanic 28 28 28 17 9 9

32. Education “Hourglass” & “Diamond” College Degree or Beyond
Share of Each Group’s Population, 2005
Less than High School
Graduate
College Degree or Beyond
Natives
This chart offers a bit more detail on legal status and duration of residence than the previous chart while depicting the low end of the educational spectrum (i.e. less than a high school education) and the high end (B.A. or greater) for all immigrants by legal status.
Some have characterized the educational distribution of immigrants as an “hourglass” because immigrants tend to be over-represented at both extremes relative to natives; with natives, the concentration is in the middle, hence the characterization of native education distribution as a “diamond.” However, as this chart highlights, the high proportion with low levels of education found among immigrants is due principally to unauthorized migrants and older cohorts of legal immigrants. The larger proportion with college degrees can be traced to naturalized citizens and recent legal immigrants. In fact, by 2004, all groups of legal immigrants in the country for less than 10 years are more likely to have a college degree than natives, notwithstanding the continued over-representation of legal immigrants at low levels of education.
This chart illustrates, too, the upgrading of education among recent legal immigrants in contrast to longer-term residents. It also illustrates some of the selectivity in the naturalization process. Among legal immigrants in the country 10 years or more, a much higher proportion of those who have naturalized have college degrees than among those who have not.
Source: Based on Urban Institute data from March 2004 CPS with legal status assigned. The CPS does not include direct information on unauthorized status or any legal status, other than naturalization. Status assignments use methods of Passel and Clark 1998 and Passel, Van Hook, and Bean 2004, See also notes on pages 17, 18, and 21.

33. Education “Hourglass” & “Diamond” College Degree or Beyond
Share of Each Group’s Population, 2005
Less than High School
Graduate
College Degree or Beyond
Natives
This chart offers a bit more detail on legal status and duration of residence than the previous chart while depicting the low end of the educational spectrum (i.e. less than a high school education) and the high end (B.A. or greater) for all immigrants by legal status.
Some have characterized the educational distribution of immigrants as an “hourglass” because immigrants tend to be over-represented at both extremes relative to natives; with natives, the concentration is in the middle, hence the characterization of native education distribution as a “diamond.” However, as this chart highlights, the high proportion with low levels of education found among immigrants is due principally to unauthorized migrants and older cohorts of legal immigrants. The larger proportion with college degrees can be traced to naturalized citizens and recent legal immigrants. In fact, by 2004, all groups of legal immigrants in the country for less than 10 years are more likely to have a college degree than natives, notwithstanding the continued over-representation of legal immigrants at low levels of education.
This chart illustrates, too, the upgrading of education among recent legal immigrants in contrast to longer-term residents. It also illustrates some of the selectivity in the naturalization process. Among legal immigrants in the country 10 years or more, a much higher proportion of those who have naturalized have college degrees than among those who have not.
Source: Based on Urban Institute data from March 2004 CPS with legal status assigned. The CPS does not include direct information on unauthorized status or any legal status, other than naturalization. Status assignments use methods of Passel and Clark 1998 and Passel, Van Hook, and Bean 2004, See also notes on pages 17, 18, and 21.

34. Education “Hourglass” & “Diamond” College Degree or Beyond
Share of Each Group’s Population, 2005
Less than High School
Graduate
College Degree or Beyond
Natives
This chart offers a bit more detail on legal status and duration of residence than the previous chart while depicting the low end of the educational spectrum (i.e. less than a high school education) and the high end (B.A. or greater) for all immigrants by legal status.
Some have characterized the educational distribution of immigrants as an “hourglass” because immigrants tend to be over-represented at both extremes relative to natives; with natives, the concentration is in the middle, hence the characterization of native education distribution as a “diamond.” However, as this chart highlights, the high proportion with low levels of education found among immigrants is due principally to unauthorized migrants and older cohorts of legal immigrants. The larger proportion with college degrees can be traced to naturalized citizens and recent legal immigrants. In fact, by 2004, all groups of legal immigrants in the country for less than 10 years are more likely to have a college degree than natives, notwithstanding the continued over-representation of legal immigrants at low levels of education.
This chart illustrates, too, the upgrading of education among recent legal immigrants in contrast to longer-term residents. It also illustrates some of the selectivity in the naturalization process. Among legal immigrants in the country 10 years or more, a much higher proportion of those who have naturalized have college degrees than among those who have not.
Source: Based on Urban Institute data from March 2004 CPS with legal status assigned. The CPS does not include direct information on unauthorized status or any legal status, other than naturalization. Status assignments use methods of Passel and Clark 1998 and Passel, Van Hook, and Bean 2004, See also notes on pages 17, 18, and 21.

35. Education Levels Improve
Less than H.S. Diploma
Some College
High School Diploma
Bachelor’s or more 28 28 28 9 17 9

36. Low Education LF Steady --
Labor Force by Education (in millions)
Percent Foreign-Born of Labor Force
Less than High School
Graduate

37. Low Education LF Steady -- College Degree LF Explodes
Labor Force by Education (in millions)
Percent Foreign-Born of Labor Force
Less than High School
Graduate
College Degree or Beyond

38. Persons Aged 65+ per 100 Persons Aged 20-64
Population Ages After 2010
Persons Aged 65+ per 100 Persons Aged 20-64
The “elderly dependency ratio,” defined here as the ratio of persons aged 65 and over to the population aged quite starkly reflects the demographic history of the U.S. population.
After gradually increasing from 16 elderly per 100 persons of working age during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s to roughly 20 per 100 by 1990, the elderly dependency ratio remains roughly constant through 2010.
Then, the ratio increases extremely rapidly between 2010 and 2030, again as a result of the aging of the baby boom, before beginning to level off after 2030.
This chart illustrates clearly the “window” available to address issues regarding Social Security financing before demographic pressures set in.
Source: Pew Hispanic Center projections (Passel, forthcoming 2007) and historical census data.

39. Immigration Helps, But Does NOT "Save" Social Security
Workers per Person in Age Group (65+ or 0-19)
The ratio of workers per dependent (elderly or child) is inversely related to the previous chart. This measure reflects how many workers are available to pay taxes to support children or the elderly.
The ratio of workers per elderly dependent actually increases slightly from its value in 2000 because of the relatively small depression era birth cohorts (who turn 65 before 2005).
The precipitous drop from about 4.2 workers per person age 65 or over in 2005 to less than 2.6 in 2030 is the coming “crisis” in Social Security which remains to be addressed.
The dotted line shows the worker-elderly ratio for the case with no post-2005 immigration. This scenario illustrates that more than 1.5 million immigrants per year have a substantial impact as the “no immigration” scenario shows a much larger drop to 2.2 workers per elderly in 2030 and 1.9 in 2050.
However, the “crisis” is not averted as the ratio will still be much, much below current levels. This chart also illustrates the futility of treating immigration as a “solution” to the crisis since more than 6 million immigrants per year would be necessary to bring the worker-elderly ration to its 2010 value.
For comparison, the youth-worker dependency ratio is shown.
Source: Pew Hispanic Center projections (Passel, forthcoming 2007).

40. Immigration Helps, But Does NOT "Save" Social Security
Workers per Person in Age Group (65+ or 0-19)
The ratio of workers per dependent (elderly or child) is inversely related to the previous chart. This measure reflects how many workers are available to pay taxes to support children or the elderly.
The ratio of workers per elderly dependent actually increases slightly from its value in 2000 because of the relatively small depression era birth cohorts (who turn 65 before 2005).
The precipitous drop from about 4.2 workers per person age 65 or over in 2005 to less than 2.6 in 2030 is the coming “crisis” in Social Security which remains to be addressed.
The dotted line shows the worker-elderly ratio for the case with no post-2005 immigration. This scenario illustrates that more than 1.5 million immigrants per year have a substantial impact as the “no immigration” scenario shows a much larger drop to 2.2 workers per elderly in 2030 and 1.9 in 2050.
However, the “crisis” is not averted as the ratio will still be much, much below current levels. This chart also illustrates the futility of treating immigration as a “solution” to the crisis since more than 6 million immigrants per year would be necessary to bring the worker-elderly ration to its 2010 value.
For comparison, the youth-worker dependency ratio is shown.
Source: Pew Hispanic Center projections (Passel, forthcoming 2007).

41. Immigration Helps, But Does NOT "Save" Social Security
Workers per Person in Age Group (65+ or 0-19)
The ratio of workers per dependent (elderly or child) is inversely related to the previous chart. This measure reflects how many workers are available to pay taxes to support children or the elderly.
The ratio of workers per elderly dependent actually increases slightly from its value in 2000 because of the relatively small depression era birth cohorts (who turn 65 before 2005).
The precipitous drop from about 4.2 workers per person age 65 or over in 2005 to less than 2.6 in 2030 is the coming “crisis” in Social Security which remains to be addressed.
The dotted line shows the worker-elderly ratio for the case with no post-2005 immigration. This scenario illustrates that more than 1.5 million immigrants per year have a substantial impact as the “no immigration” scenario shows a much larger drop to 2.2 workers per elderly in 2030 and 1.9 in 2050.
However, the “crisis” is not averted as the ratio will still be much, much below current levels. This chart also illustrates the futility of treating immigration as a “solution” to the crisis since more than 6 million immigrants per year would be necessary to bring the worker-elderly ration to its 2010 value.
For comparison, the youth-worker dependency ratio is shown.
Source: Pew Hispanic Center projections (Passel, forthcoming 2007).

42. Future U.S. Work Force Growth Due Mostly to Immigration
Increasing Share Foreign-Born
Increasing Share Minority
Low-End Workforce Shrinks -- Better Education -- “Aging Out” of Low Education
Immigrants Offset Some Aging -- Relatively Small Impact -- Immigrants Age, too

43. For more information, contact:
Jeffrey S. Passel, Ph.D.
Pew Hispanic Center
Pew Research Center
1615 L St., N.W. Washington, D.C
(202) 37 37