1. Trade Restrictions: Tariffs
PART TWO Chapter 8
Trade Restrictions: Tariffs
贸易壁垒：关税

2. International Trade Policy
Chapter Organization
International Trade Policy
Part Two deals with international trade or commercial policies. Chapter 8 examines tariffs, the most important of the trade restrictions historically.
Chapter 9 extends the discussion to other trade restrictions, evaluates the justification usually given for trade restrictions, and summarizes their history. Chapter 10 deals with economic integration,
Chapter 11 with the effect of international trade on economic development, and Chapter 12 with international resource movements and multinational corporations.
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3. Introduction
We have seen in Part One that free trade maximizes world output and benefits all nations. However, practically all nations impose some restrictions on the free flow of international trade. Since these restrictions and regulations deal with the nation’s trade or commerce, they are generally known as trade or commercial policies.
While trade restrictions are invariably rationalized in terms of national welfare, in reality they are usually advocated by those special groups in the nation that stand to benefit from such restrictions.
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4. Commercial Policy Instruments
Introduction
Classification of Commercial Policy Instruments
Commercial Policy Instruments
Trade Contraction
Trade Expansion
Price
Quantity
Price
Quantity
Tariff
Export tax
Import quota
Voluntary Export Restraint (VER)
Import subsidy
Export subsidy
Voluntary Import Expansion (VIE)
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5. Partial Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff 关税的局部均衡效应X
Px($) Sx 5 4 3 2 1 E J H G
Sf+T A Sf M N B C Dx O
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6. Partial Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff 关税的局部均衡效应
Dx and Sx represent Nation 2’s demand and supply curves of commodity X. At the free trade price of Px = $1,Nation 2 consumes 70X (AB), of which 10X (AC) is produced domestically and 6oX (CB) is imported. With a 100 percent import tariff on commodity X, Px rises to $2 for individuals in Nation 2.
At Px = $2, Nation 2 consumes 50X (GH), of which 20X (GJ) is produced domestically and 30X (JH) is imported. THUs, the consumption effect of the tariff is (-)20X (BX); the production effect is 10X (CM);the trade effect equals (-)30X (BN+CM); and the revenue effect is $30 (MJHN).
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7. Basic Tariff Analysis Tariffs can be classified as:
Specific tariffs 从量关税
Taxes that are levied as a fixed charge for each unit of goods imported
Example: A specific tariff of $10 on each imported bicycle with an international price of $100 means that customs officials collect the fixed sum of $10.
Ad valorem tariffs 从价关税
Taxes that are levied as a fraction of the value of the imported goods
Example: A 20% ad valorem tariff on bicycles generates a $20 payment on each $100 imported bicycle.
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8. Basic Tariff Analysis
A compound duty (tariff) is a combination of an ad valorem and a specific tariff. 复合税
Modern governments usually prefer to protect domestic industries through a variety of nontariff barriers, such as:
Import quotas
Limit the quantity of imports
Export restraints
Limit the quantity of exports
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9. Basic Tariff Analysis Supply, Demand, and Trade in a Single Industry
Suppose that there are two countries (Home and Foreign).
Both countries consume and produce wheat, which can be costless transported between the countries.
In each country, wheat is a competitive industry.
Suppose that in the absence of trade the price of wheat at Home exceeds the corresponding price at Foreign.
This implies that shippers begin to move wheat from Foreign to Home.
The export of wheat raises its price in Foreign and lowers its price in Home until the initial difference in prices has been eliminated.
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10. Effect of a Tariff on Consumer and Producer Surplus 消费者和生产者剩余的关税效应
The increase in the price of commodity X from Px=$1 to Px=$2 as a result of the 100 percent tariff that Nation 2 imposes on the importation of commodity X leads to a reduction in consumer surplus and increase in producer surplus.
These are examined in Figure 8.2 and used in Section 8.2c to measure the costs and benefits of the tariff.
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11. Effect of a Tariff on Consumer and Producer Surplus 消费者和生产者剩余的关税效应X
Px($) X
Px($) 5 4 3 2 1 5 4 3 2 1 R Sx E G H G J Q B A A K N C Dx U L Z W V O O
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12. Effect of a Tariff on Consumer and Producer Surplus
The left panel shows that tariff that increase the price of commodity X from Px=$1 to Px=$2 results in a reduction in consumer surplus from ARB = $ to GRH = $62.50, or by shaded area AGHB = $60.
The right panel shows that the tariff increases producer surplus by shaded area AGJC = $15.
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13. Costs and benefits of a Tariff 关税的成本和利益
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14. Costs and benefits of a Tariff 关税的成本和利益
The concept and measure of consumer and producer surplus can now be used to measure the costs and benefits of the tariff.
These are shown in Figure on page 241, which summarizes and extends the information provided by the 2 previous Figures.
保护成本或称重负损失中的生产部分(CJM=b=5美元）会上升是因为征收关税后，一些国内资源从更有效的出国商品Y的生产部门转向较低效率的进口商品X的生产部门。
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15. The Theory of Tariff Structure 关税的结构理论
So far, we have discussed the nominal tariff on imports of a final commodity. We now extend the partial equilibrium analysis of the previous section to define, measure, and examine the importance of the rate of effective protection.
This is a relatively new concept developed only since the 1960s but widely used today.
g = (t-aiti)/1-ai
g = 对最终产品生产者的有效保护率
t =种种商品消费者的名义关税税率
ai =无关税时进口要素成本与最终商品价格比例
ti =进口要素的名义利率
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16. Case Study 8.5: Rising Tariff Rates with Degree of Domestic Processing
Figure shows that industrial countries imposed an average import tariff of about 2.1 percent on raw materials, 5.3 percent on semi manufactures, and 9.1 percent on finished products before the completion of the Uruguay Round in1993.Although average tariff rates on imports at all stages of processing have fallen during the past decade as a result of the implementation of the Uruguay Round, the figure shows that the cascading tariff structure or the tariff escalation with the stage of processing remains.
Thus, the effective rate of protection exceeds the nominal tariff rate by large percentages, the greater the degree of domestic processing.
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17. Case Study 8.5: Rising Tariff Rates with Degree of Domestic Processing 随着国内产品加工程度加深的关税税率不断上升
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18. Case Study: Structure of Tariffs on Industrial Products in the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Canada 美欧日加的工业产品的关税结构
Table gives the post-Uruguay Round tariff levels on imports of raw materials, semi manufactures, and finished products in the United States, the European Union, Japan, and Canada. Transport equipment, nonelectrical machinery, electrical machinery, and other manufactured goods have the single tariff level indicated in Table 8.1 (independently of the stage of processing), and so they are not included in this Table.
The table shows the cascading tariff structure on many industrial products imported in the leading developed countries. The increase in the tariff with the stage of processing is greatest on imports of textiles and closing, leather, rubber, and travel goods. It is also prevalent in metals, fish, and fish products (except foe Japan), and in mineral products (except for Canada). For chemicals, wood, pulp, paper, and furniture, the situation is mixed. The tariff structure in other developed countries is similar.
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19. Cascading Tariff Structure on Imports of Industrial Products in the United States, European Union, Japan, and Canada in 2000 (percentages)
The United States
European Union
Product
Raw Materials
Semi-Manufactures
Finished Products
木材、纸张、纸浆、家具
0.0
0.7
1.0
0.5
纺织品、布料
2.8
9.1
2.6
6.6
9.7
皮革、橡胶、旅游用品
2.3
11.7
0.1
2.4
7.0 金属
0.8
1.1
2.9
1.2
化学品、摄影器材
4.1
5.2
3.4
矿产品
0.6
1.3
5.3
3.7
渔产品
1.7
4.0
11.2
13.3
14.1
Japan
Canada
1.9
0.2
0.9
5.9
8.3
2.5
11.1
14.5
10.4
20.7
0.3
5.7
10.3
4.7
3.9
1.8
2.7
4.4
7.9
4.6
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20. General Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff in a Small Country 小国关税的一般均衡分析
When a very small nation imposes a tariff, it will not affect prices on the world market. However, the domestic price of the importable commodity will rise by the full amount of the tariff for individual producers and consumers in the small nation.
Although the price of the importable commodity rises by the full amount of the tariff for individual producers and consumers in the small nation, its price remains constant for the small nation as a whole since the nation itself collects the tariff.
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21. Illustration of the Effects of a Tariff in a Small Country
We will illustrate the general equilibrium effects of a tariff by continuing to utilize our familiar Nation 1 and Nation 2 from previous chapters. We start by using Nation 2’s production frontier because it is somewhat more convenient for the type of analysis that we need to perform now.
The same analysis for Nation 1 is left as an end-of-chapter problem. The only conclusion that we need to remember from previous chapters is that Nation 2 is the capital-abundant nation specializing in the production of commodity Y (the capital-intensive commodity), which it exports in exchange for imports of commodity X.
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22. Illustration of the Effects of a Tariff in a Small Country
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23. General Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff in a Large Nation
To analyze the General Equilibrium Effects of a tariff in a large nation, it is more convenient to utilize offer curves.
When a nation imposes a tariff, its offer curve shifts or rotates towards the axis measuring its importable commodity by the amount of the import tariff.
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24. General Equilibrium Effects of a Tariff in a Large Nation
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25. The Meaning of the Concept of Optimum Tariff and Retaliation 最优关税和报复关税的含义
As we saw in the previous section, when a large nation imposes a tariff, the volume of trade declines but the nation’s terms of trade improve.
The decline in the volume of trade, by itself, tends to reduce the nation’s welfare.
On the other hand, the improvement in its terms of trade, by itself, tends to increase the nation’s welfare.
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26. Illustration of the Optimum Tariff and Retaliation1
Pw=1 Y 60 50 40 30 20 10 2 1*
Pw*=0.625 2* E E*
O X
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27. Optimum Tariff and Retaliation
Figure repeats free trade offer curves I and 2 from Figure 8.6, defining equilibrium point E at Pw = 1. Suppose that with the optimum tariff, Nation 2’s offer curve rotates to 2*.(Why the tariff associated with offer curve 2* is an optimum tariff will be explained in Section A8.6 in the appendix.)
If Nation 1 does not retaliate the intersection of offer curve 2* and offer curve 1 defines the new equilibrium point E*,at which Nation 2 exchanges 25Y for 40X so that Px/Py=P*w=0.625 on the world market and for Nation 2 as a whole.
As a result, Nation 1’s (the rest of the world’s) terms of trade deteriorate from Px/Py=Pw=1 to Px/Py=P*w=0.625,and Nation 2’s terms of trade improve to Px/Py=1/P*w=1/0.625=1.6.
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28. The Optimum Tariff and Retaliation.
The Optimum Tariff and Retaliation. Offer curves 1 to 2 define free trade equilibrium point E and Px/Py =1/P*w=1, as in Figure 8.6. If the optimum tariff for Nation 2 rotates its offer curve to 2*, Nation 2’s terms of trade improve to Px/Py=1/P*w=1/0.625=1.6. At equilibrium point E*, Nation 2 is at its highest possible welfare and is better off than at the free trade equilibrium point E.
However, since Nation 1’s welfare is reduced, it is likely to retaliate with an optimum tariff of its own, shown by offer curve 1* and equilibrium at point E**. Nation 2 may then itself retaliate so that in the end both nations are likely to lose all or most of the benefits from trade.
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29. Thank you for listening That’s all for this Chapter 谢谢！本章结束
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