1. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography
The Meese Commission focused on whether pornography has harmful effects.
Four kinds of pornography:
1. Violent
2. Nonviolent but degrading
3. Nonviolent and nondegrading
4. Child pornography
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2. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography
Conclusions
Both (1) violent and (2) nonviolent but degrading pornography are linked to violence against women, as well as other harms (e.g., shifts in one's attitudes towards women and sexual offenders).
Members of the committee could not agree on whether nonviolent and nondegrading pornography are harmful.
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3. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
Nadine Strossen, “Why Censoring Pornography Would Not Reduce Discrimination or Violence Against Women”
First part of Strossen's paper: objections to four kinds of arguments allegedly showing that pornography does cause violence/discrimination
1. Arguments relying on laboratory research
2. Arguments relying on correlational data
3. Arguments relying on anecdotal data
4. Arguments relying on studies of sex offenders
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4. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
Nadine Strossen, “Why Censoring Pornography Would Not Reduce Discrimination or Violence Against Women”
Second part of paper: positive argument for the claim that censoring pornography would do women more harm than good even if there was some causal connection between pornography and harm to women
Other popular forms of mass media would also have to be censored—leading to “a death-blow to First Amendment freedoms”
The “forbidden fruits” effect
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5. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
Ronald Dworkin, “Liberty and Pornography”
Discussion of Isaiah Berlin's “Two Concepts of Liberty”
1. Two kinds of liberty:
Negative liberty: liberty to not be obstructed by others in doing what one wishes to do
Positive liberty: power to control or participate in public decisions
2. The complexity of political value
The “Platonic ideal”: all the political virtues can be realized in a single political structure
Platonic ideal “a seductive myth”; some freedoms conflict with others
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6. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
Ronald Dworkin, “Liberty and Pornography”
One argument against pornography: it conflicts with equality and women's positive liberty.
Dworkin's objection: This is a causal argument, and as such is “strikingly implausible.” Moreover, the negative causal influence of television and other aspects of popular culture is probably much greater than that of pornography.
Second argument (from Frank Michelman) against pornography: it “silences” women.
Dworkin's objection: Pornography does not deprive others of their negative liberty to speak.
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7. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
Judith M. Hill, “Pornography and Degradation”
Hill focuses on “victim pornography”: “the graphic depiction of situations in which women are degraded by sexual activity”
“A person is degraded when she is publicly, or at least overtly, treated as a means only, as something less than a person. Degradation involves de-grading at least in the sense that it entails a (false) imputation of a lower moral status than persons.”
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8. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
Judith M. Hill, “Pornography and Degradation”
A moral implication: Given that it is wrong to treat persons merely as means, and given that victim pornography depicts women as mere means (as “less than persons”), it follows that victim pornography is morally objectionable.
A legal implication: Because victim pornography depicts women as less than persons, the pornography industry is guilty of libel.
Note that Hill is not focusing on any harms caused by victim pornography.
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9. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
Charles R. Lawrence III, “Racist Speech as the Functional Equivalent of Fighting Words”
Lawrence argues that hate speech is not protected by the First Amendment.
One reason: Hate speech falls under the “fighting words” exception.
Fighting words: words that “by their very utterance inflict injury...”
Lawrence claims that racial insults harm the insulted person directly.
Another reason: Hate speech is not intended to discover truth or initiate discussion.
“The purpose of the First Amendment is to foster the greatest amount of speech.”
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10. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
John Arthur, “Sticks and Stones”
Arthur argues that hate speech—even the sort Lawrence discusses—is protected by the First Amendment.
Note: Arthur is not saying anything about the morality of using hate speech.
Being harmed vs. being wronged
Being harmed requires that our interests be frustrated.
Interests are “ongoing concerns” rather than mere temporary wants.
Cumulative vs. individual harm
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11. Chapter 4: Pornography, Hate Speech, and Censorship
John Arthur, “Sticks and Stones”
Being harmed vs. being wronged
Being wronged does not require being harmed.
Example: Somebody could break into your house without damaging or stealing anything.
This would be an example of being wronged without being harmed.
Arthur denies that there is any evidence that hate speech causes harm, so harm-based arguments against its legality fail.
Arthur accepts that hate speech wrongs its victims, but he argues that it should still be legally protected, given the serious costs of censorship.
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