1. Continuity and Change in the Middle East
Prof. M. Cammett
POLS1270 May 1, 2012

2. What is theory? Why is it useful?
What is the purpose of theory?
 An example: Governance and GDP/cap.

3. “‘Bellin (2004, p. 148) proposed that “the solution to the puzzle of Middle Eastern and North African exceptionalism lies less in absent prerequisites of democratization and more in present conditions that foster robust authoritarianism, specifically a robust coercive apparatus in these states.’ This was little more than the inverse of the democracy question, however, and many of the same factors that had been deployed to explain democracy’s fragility were adduced to account for the robustness of the coercive machinery and the stability of the regimes. That there was a tautological character to this argument is not surprising; after all, “authoritarianism” is little more than a residual category in most political science, encompassing all the otherwise very varied nondemocratic regimes that have existed throughout history.”
- Lisa Anderson (2006, 201)

4. “Scholars identified two pseudodemocratic political institutions in particular as containing the keys to regime longevity: the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and the periodic elections to Mubarak’s rubber-stamp parliament, the People’s Assembly But these underpinnings of durable authoritarianism were far flimsier than previously thought. Once the demonstrations began, the ruling party collapsed almost immediately Mubarak seemed to forget about his party entirely, preferring to rely on the security apparatus [T]he military’s refusal to back Mubarak was in part a function of its jealousy over the rise of the NDP and the latter’s eclipse of the military as the fount of political authority.”
- Tarek Masoud, “The Road To (and From) Liberation Square” (Journal of Democracy, 2011, pp )

5. “Egyptian opposition parties were often said to be wasting their time and resources by playing the mug’s game of election, but many of Egypt’s young activists got their start in these parties and their political campaigns These reflections suggest that autocracies are inherently unstable They also suggest that academics, like autocrats, court peril when they focus on elites and ignore the people.”
- Masoud (2011, 25)

6. Lessons?
In sum, what did the “persistent authoritarianism” literature get right and overlook?
Implications for studying authoritarianism?

7. Trajectories of the Arab Revolutions (thus far)
1) Political transition: Egypt, Tunisia
2) Regime pushback: Syria, Bahrain (Libya, Yemen?)
3) Fragmentation inhibiting uprising: Algeria, Lebanon, Iraq
4) Preemption via state “concessions”: Jordan, Morocco 
5) Preemption via oil wealth: Gulf oil monarchies

8. 1) Political Transition RECAP - Egypt: Opposition & Civil Society
Three major types of opposition:
Legal opposition parties (i.e., New Wafd)
Open, but not legally recognized opposition movements (i.e., Muslim Brotherhood, Kifaya)
Disorganized, underground opposition (i.e. Radical Islamists, internet-based groups)
 Implications of type of opposition group for the uprisings
Civil society:
- The proliferation and evolution of CSOs
- Regime methods of control:
Constitutional tools
Carrots
Sticks

9. 2) Regime pushback RECAP - Syria: Opposition & Civil Society
Main opposition groups:
Radical Baathist opposition
Islamist groups
Other groups (1990s)
Muslim Brotherhood
Origins & Evolution
Factions (& geographic bases)
Showdown with the state  Hama Massacre (1982)
Reconciliation with the state
Beyond Islamists
Rising civic activism in the 1990s+
Women’s groups, intellectuals, workers

10. 3) Fragmentation: RECAP - The Lebanese Political System
Structure of representation
The Ottoman era origins of sectarian power-sharing in Lebanon
1943 National Pact
Electoral system:
Open-list PR
Multi-member districts
“Joint electorates with reserve seats”
Challenges of the system
What’s at stake?

11. 4) Preemption via state “concessions” RECAP – Jordan: A “liberal” MENA monarchy?
Major opposition groups
Leftists
Islamists  Islamic Action Front (IAF)
Electoral dynamics in a “hybrid” regime
Regime concessions:
Feb. & Oct. 2011: PM dismissed/replaced
King’s call for swift democratic reform
Subsidies, wage increases
Electoral reform (SNTV  PR)
[Also, Morocco’s preemptive
constitutional reforms & their limitations]

12. 5) Preemption via oil wealth: RECAP: Why and how the longevity of Saudi rule?
Major mechanisms:
Patronage/distribution
(Yet poverty and inequality in the world’s largest oil exporter!)
Penetration of society
Coercion
Legitimating ideology