Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Presentation is loading. Please wait.

Political Science 200A Week 7 Levels of Analysis: Political Violence

Similar presentations


Presentation on theme: "Political Science 200A Week 7 Levels of Analysis: Political Violence"— Presentation transcript:

1 Political Science 200A Week 7 Levels of Analysis: Political Violence

2

3 Levels-of-Analysis Distinction
1. Levels-of-analysis distinction in international relations Kenneth Waltz. Man, the State, and War. 2. Level-of-analysis shapes The cases for analysis/comparison The dependent variables The independent variables In short, the question that you ask

4 Levels-of-Analysis Distinction
3. Levels of analysis is not an ontological issue Actor Level System Level Individuals Group Group State State Dyad International system 4. Levels of analysis is a general epistemological issue Fallacy of composition Fallacy of division At the operational level: Ecological inference fallacy

5 Ted Robert Gurr (1936- ) Ph. D. NYU (1965)
Appointments at Princeton ( ), Northwestern ( ), Colorado ( ), Maryland (1989-) Violence in America (1969) with Hugh David Graham Why Men Rebel (1970) Polity Project, Minorities at Risk Project, State Failure Task Force

6 Ted Robert Gurr 1. How would you categorize Gurr’s analysis?
2. What does Gurr’s middle-range theory purport to explain? What are the key explanatory variables? 3. What empirical, testable hypotheses follow? 4. What is the causal mechanism that underlies the middle-range theory of political violence?

7 Barry Posen (1952- ) Ph. D. Berkeley (1981)
Appointments at Princeton (1984-7), MIT (1987-) The Sources of Military Doctrine (1984) Inadvertent Escalation (1991) Restraint (2014)

8 Barry Posen 1. How would you categorize Posen’s analysis?
Research programme Level of analysis 2. What are the key testable hypotheses advanced by Posen? How does Posen elaborate these with the contingencies encountered during the transition from empire to independent nation-states? 3. What are the theoretical foundations?

9 Samuel P. Huntington (1927-2008)
Ph. D., Harvard University Career: Harvard, Columbia, Harvard Retired 2006 1957. The Soldier and the State 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies 1991. The Third Wave 1996. The Clash of Civilizations

10 Huntington. Clash of Civilizations
1. What are the key testable hypotheses? [DV]Patterns of cooperation and conflict [IV] Civilizations Cooperation within civilizations Conflict across civilization divides Cleft states Torn countries

11 Huntington. Clash of Civilizations
2. What is the middle-range theory that leads to these hypotheses? “In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural.”

12 Huntington. Clash of Civilizations
3. Axioms and key auxiliary hypotheses: a. Postulate about human motivation: Fundamental importance of “Who are we?” Why we enter politics b. Cultures and civilizations: “both involve the ‘values, norms, institutions, and modes of thinking to which successive generations in a given society have attached primary importance.’” Religion as most fundamental Civilization as broadest cultural entity/identity c. Civilization as foundation (base)

13 Huntington. Clash of Civilizations
“political systems are transient expedients on the surface of civilization, and the destiny of each linguistically and morally unified community depends ultimately upon the survival of certain primary structuring ideas around which successive generations have coalesced ”

14 Theda Skocpol (1947- ) Ph. D. Harvard (1975)
Professor, Harvard University States and Social Revolutions (1979) Protecting Soldiers and Mothers (1992)

15 Theda Skocpol 1. How would you categorize Skocpol’s analysis?
2. What is the key dependent variable? 3. What empirical, testable hypotheses does Skocpol advance? 4. The comparative historical method

16 James Fearon 1992 Ph.D., Berkeley Professor at Chicago, Stanford

17 III. Fearon on Rational War
Central puzzle--Ex post inefficiency of war 1. War is costly 2. There should always be a contract that leaves parties better off Assumptions necessary for this model to apply Public good Divisibility Fungibility

18 III. Fearon on Rational War
B. Postulated Model: War as an Anomaly/War is costly War is costly And there is always a contract that would leave parties better off after conflict without conflict 8 slices 16 slices Bargaining range Anything in this range is preferable to 0-8, but within this range there is pure conflict

19 III. Fearon on Rational War
C. War as Bargaining Failure 1. Asymmetrical information with incentives to misrepresent 2. Inability to credibly commit to fulfill bargaining 3. Indivisibility


Download ppt "Political Science 200A Week 7 Levels of Analysis: Political Violence"

Similar presentations


Ads by Google