2. Grievance, Ideology, and Information: The Sources of Iraqi Support for the Islamic State
Munqith Dagher, IIACSS
Karl Kaltenthaler, University of Akron/Case Western Reserve University
Daniel Silverman, Ohio State University

3. Source: F2F surveys in Mosul
Why I changed the subject from Dai’sh still winning to source of the support for Da’ish? Da’ish is losing now but is it the final scene?
Thinking about life in general, is it better or worse today than eighteen months ago?
Source: F2F surveys in Mosul

4. Why I changed the subject from Dai’sh still winning to source of the support for Da’ish? Da’ish is losing now but is it the final scene?
In your opinion ,to what extent does Da’esh represent the views and interests of people like you
Source: F2F surveys in Mosul

5. Research Question
Why do some Iraqis support the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)?
Crucial question because:
This support is a potential source of recruits, funds, and general acquiescence to ISIL presence
Popular support is key in models of asymmetric conflict; sources of this support much debated

6. Support for ISIL in Iraq

7. Potential Hypotheses
Conventional explanations of popular support for militant Islamist groups:
Relative deprivation
H1: An individual who believes that his or her group is worse off than it should be is more likely to support a militant Islamist group (Gurr 1968a; 1968b; Shafiq and Sinno 2010)
Sunni deprivation/discrimination is an important conventional explanation in case of ISIS

8. Sunni Views of Discrimination

9. Potential Hypotheses (cont’d)
Shared Ideology
An individual who holds the basic ideology of a militant Islamist group is more likely to support that group (Wickham 2002)
ISIL’s unique ideological appeal/propaganda is another common explanation for its support

10. Moderating Influence of Information
Yet the aforementioned models do not take into account the role of information
An individual's exposure to information can play a major role in shaping views of a militant Islamist group

11. Moderating Influence of Information (cont’d)
H3: An individual exposed to positive (negative) information about the actions of a militant Islamist group is more (less) likely to support it
H4: Exposure to positive (negative) information about a group is likely to reinforce (undermine) the impact of shared identity and ideology

12. The Data May-July 2015 survey of 1,500 Iraqis from across Iraq
Used stratified probability sampling
Fielded by Iraqi survey firm IIACSS
Excluded areas under control of ISIL

13. The Data (Cont’d)

14. Operationalizing the Model
Two scales: perceived sectarian deprivation and support for political Islam
Sectarian deprivation index:
(1) “to what extent do you think that ‘the principle of getting a fair trial’ is applied in Iraq?,”
(2) “to what extent is the government applying the law equally among people?,” and
(3) “do you believe that the principle of equal rights of citizens in Iraq is applied, regardless of their sect (Shia, Sunni)?”

15. Operationalizing the Model
Islamist ideology index:
(1) “religious sheikhs/men should not influence the way voters vote”
(2) “it is better for Iraq that religious men occupy public offices in the government”
(3) “religious sheikhs/men should not influence the government’s decisions”
(4) “it is better for Iraq to separate religion from policy.”

16. Operationalizing the Model
Exposure to ISIL-related news
“Do you follow the updates related to ISIL through the media?”
Most information about ISIL’s actions in the media (both national and international) is negative

17. The Model
Control variables: Shi’a Christian Kurdish Age Education Gender Income

18. Base Results
The Impact of Information, Ideology, and Grievance on Iraqi Support for ISIL

19. Base Results (cont’d) Significant predictors No significant impact
-Iraqis who do not follow news about ISIL
-Iraqis who harbor an Islamist ideology
-Demographics: greater support among Sunnis, Kurds, and the uneducated
No significant impact
-Perceived sectarian deprivation index

20. Interaction of Islamist Ideology with Information about ISIL

21. Conclusions
Ideological affinity is the most powerful predictor of support for ISIL
Perceived discrimination at the hands of Shi’a is not a significant predictor, surprisingly
Exposure to information about ISIL reduces support and the impact of shared ideology

22. Conclusions Key policy takeaways:
Information campaigns highlighting the atrocities of ISIL may help limit Sunni support for the group, even among those with Islamist worldviews
ISIL is occupying large swathes of Iraq against the wishes of the populations under its control
Occupation of brutality and not popularity