1. Presented By:- Siva Prasad Reddy Nooli
EPC RFID Tag Security Weaknesses and Defenses -
Passport Cards, Enhanced Drivers Licenses, and Beyond -Karl Koscher, Ari Juels, Vjekoslav Brajkovic, Tadayoshi Kohno
Presented By:-
Siva Prasad Reddy Nooli

2. Motivation
EPC – RFID existence
Risks and Challenges
Counter Measures
Security Risks

3. Applications Wide Range of Applications Automation in supply chain
Security borders document verification
Driving licenses
EPC Gen-2 makes it possible with low cost

5. Today’s Agenda
Security of EPC RFID tags in United States PASS cards at national border crossings
Security of EPC RFID tags in Enhanced Driving Licenses
The Risks involved in applying EPC RFID tags in these applications and its reflections on others applications.
Counter Measures
The conclusions on derived results

6. Vulnerability Analysis
EPC RFID use on PASS cards and EDLs is of prominent security concern
The need for vulnerability analysis in these applications
The possibilities for security risks
Similar to other approaches
ISO security standards

7. 1. Cloning Security check with public identity documents
Can be cloned with single read
Casts doubt on unique – TIDs, Low power tool
Apply to tag’s publicly readable data
Either eavesdropping or physical invasive attacks

8. 2. Readability Major vulnerability other than cloning
Distance at which EPC tag is read
EDL inside wallet will be detected even at considerable distance
Human body as abstraction for tag reading
Privacy with unique serial number

9. 3. Other possible attacks
Denial of service and covert channel attacks
Cards without PIN
Passport cards exempt from similar weaknesses.
EDLs’ heightened susceptibility to in-sleeve scanning

10. The Proposed Contribution
Security depends on operational environment
The EDL or Passport is checked with photo of its bearer
The passenger screening process benefits from multiple layers of security
EPC-enabled identity documents should provide adequate security
Implementation of “kill” co-opting techniques
Helps for anti-counterfeiting and secure item pedigrees

11. Experimental Evaluation of Passport card and EDLS

12. 1.Weakness in the TID based anti-cloning mechanism
ACCESS PIN on both the cards and KILL pin of the passport card.
Unique identities cannot be cross copied, but manufacturer give enough additional information to determine the tag’s capabilities.
E0h vs E2h class of TID
Tag specific TID’s might just prevent copying (physical) of one EPC to other but cannot prevent emulation (logical) of EPC tag in another radio device.
Not an anti cloning tool but a countermeasure.

13. Continued. Physical copying vs Logical copying
ACCESS PIN on PASSPORT and EDL, and the KILL PIN of the Passport Card cannot be cloned
Does not prevent the emulation of an EPC tag in another radio device
Forego the security of TID in EDL and Passport Card increases the risks of cloning

14. 2.Other memory banks
Read-protected pieces of memory on the cards are the KILL PIN and ACCESS PIN on Passport Card and ACCESS PIN on EDLs
the entire EPC memory bank (which contains the card’s unique EPC value) is readable, as is the TID memory bank
Cards report “no such memory location” error when attempting to read words that we do not expect to be present

15. 3.KILL-PIN selection
The KILL PIN is unprogrammed and not locked on the Washington State EDLs
Unless the EDL Gen-2 tag is specially manufactured, the presence of a generic TID is subject to over-the-air killing by any reader
An attacker can exploit the KILL PIN as a covert channel.

16. 4.Read-Range Experiments
Given the cloning threat (single read), tag read ranges become a major consideration in the vulnerability of tags to clandestine scanning, so…
US Department of State issued radio-opaque shielding sleeves with each Passport
Washington State issued protective sleeves for EDLs as well
Consistent use of protective sleeves requires diligence on the part of EDL and Passport Card bearers (unlikely)
Read ranges could vary due to…
The material to which a tag is affixed
The configuration of the interrogating reader
The physical characteristics of the surrounding scanning environment
The tag's antenna

17. Continued. Tested read ranges in different physical environments:
Indoors, freestanding, but with other objects nearby
Indoors, in a corridor, with no other nearby objects
Outdoors in free space
With different carrying modes:
Held away from the body
Inside a purse, both inside a wallet and in a side pocket
In a backpack
In a wallet in a back trouser pocket
In a wallet in a front shorts pocket
Adjacent to a wallet in a front shorts pocket

18. Continued. With different protective sleeves (crumpled vs new):
In a new sleeve, held out by hand;
In a crumpled sleeve, held out by hand;
In a new sleeve, in a wallet in a back trouser pocket; and
In a crumpled sleeve, in a wallet in a back trouser pocket.
Why these tests? Read range results have a strong bearing on overall security of the border- crossing system

19. Continued. Observations:
Both cards were subject to reading at distances > 50 meters in optimal conditions
Passport Cards, while not readable in new protective sleeve, were readable under certain circumstances in a crumpled sleeve
EDLs were readable, inside protective sleeves, at a distance of some tens of centimeters

20. Antenna inside EDL and Passport Card

21. DEFENSIVE DIRECTIONS: BACKWARD-COMPATIBLE CLONING DEFENSES

22. 1. KILL Command:
An EPC feature designed to protect consumer privacy by providing an option to disable tags at point of sale in retail environments.
Tag receiving KILL command along with tag specific 32 bit KILL PIN Pkill would be permanently disabled but depending on the “Power” factor.
KILL based authentication.

23. Co-opting KILL for tag authentication
To Authenticate Tag, a Reader…
Must have knowledge of a tag’s valid KILL PIN (Pkill)
Constructs an invalid KILL PIN (P’kill)
Transmits the KILL PIN pair (P’kill; Pkill), in a random order, across two low-power KILL command sessions
Expected Result…
A valid tag will acknowledge the correct PIN (by responding with an “Insufficient Power” error code) and reject the incorrect PIN (with no response at all)
An invalid tag will respond correctly only once (i.e., with no response to P’kill) – but will not respond to either PIN.

24. 2 .The access command
Accompanied by 32 bit PIN Paccess command could perform a read access control.
ACCESS based authentication.
EDL could have its KILL PIN set and locked over-the-air at the border

25. Co-opting ACCESS for tag authentication
ACCESS-Based Authentication (ABA)
A form of one-time “challenge-response”
To Authenticate Tag, a Reader…
Must have knowledge of a tag’s ACCESS PIN (Paccess) as well as its Private Data (D)
Transmits the Paccess and confirms correct Private Data (D)

26. Advantages and disadvantages of KBA and ABA
KBA is preferred because of optional ACCESS command and its possible to deploy independently.
One can use Pkill to authenticate tags using KILL.
Pkill might be revealed to state law enforcement officials, allowing them to authenticate tags (and kill them), but not to clone them
Neither technique is resistant to eavesdropping.
They are ad-hoc tools.
KBA and ABA are backward compatible.
KBA, if not carefully implemented, may kill the cards.

27. Experiments with and extensions to KILL- based authentication

28. Implementing KILL-based Authentication (KBA)
The Implementation Challenge
Reader Power Calibration: I.e., Having the reader transmit enough power to interrogate a tag, but not enough to actually KILL the tag
Two KBA Algorithms are proposed & evaluated:
Simple KBA Algorithm
Scaled KBA Algorithm
Each Algorithm consists of two phases:
Reader Power Calibration Phase – correct power level is determined
Authentication Phase – the KILL command is issued

29. I. Simple KBA Algorithm Reader Power Calibration Phase
Reader ramps up power, from min to max, in its smallest possible increments
Reader transmits the KILL command at each level
When reader receives its first reply from the tag, reader’s power level is fixed (at that level)
Authentication Phase
Reader sends N KILL commands (N-1 bogus PINs, 1 real PIN), at the selected power level, to authenticate the tag

30. Simple KBA Algorithm (Cont.)
Tested using varying distances b/w Tag and Reader’s Antenna
Test Criteria:
N = 10 (# KILL commands sent)
Algorithm repeated 10 times/distance
Expectation: 10 successful tag authentications at each distance
Observations:
Weakness… if tag too close, reader power level not low enough to avoid unintentional KILL
Successfully authenticates tag most of the time
In practice, authentication could be repeated if unsuccessful

31. II. Scaled KBA Algorithm
More sophisticated. Attempts to avoid unintentional KILLs
Calibrates reader power levels b/w the min power required to read tag and the min power required to write tag
Why? More power required to write than to read.
Tag disablement (a true KILL) would require, minimally, the power to write

32. Scaled KBA Algorithm (Cont.)
Reader Power Calibration Phase (5 steps)
Via power ramping, determine the minimum reader power level PW RR required to read the target tag
Via power ramping, determine the minimum reader power level PW RW required to write to the tag
Verify the availability of minimum margin PW RW − PW RR ≥ µ, where µ is a minimum power- margin parameter. If not, abort.
Scale the reader’s power level within the range PW RR+ δ(PW RW − PW RR), for δ ∈ [0, 1].
Ensure that the power level selected doesn’t allow a tag to write to itself.
Authentication Phase
Reader sends N KILL commands (N-1 bogus PINs, 1 real PIN), at the selected power level, to authenticate the tag

33. Scaled KBA Algorithm (Cont.)
Tested using varying distances b/w Tag and Reader’s Antenna
Test Criteria:
N = 10 (# KILL commands sent)
Algorithm repeated 100 times/ea
Expectation: 100 successful tag authentications at each distance
Observations:
Achieves objective – alleviates unintentional KILLs at short ranges
Weakness… calibration phase requires writing to tag, and not all tags support being written to (e.g., PASS cards are perma-locked read-only)

34. Other Security Proposals.
Present mechanisms for protecting the tag:
A 16-bit Pseudo-Random Number Generator and
A 16-bit Cyclic Redundancy Code
Proposed methodologies:
TRAP-1: a EPCGen2 RFID protocol
TRAP-2: a anonymous EPCGen2 RFID protocol
Security:
Privacy
Authentication
Attack Ranges
Attack Against RFID systems

35. Some more details RFID and EPC on Internet of Things
RFID transponders (tags) consist of:
Micro Chip
Antenna
Case
Battery
Energy Sources
Passive
Semi – Passive
Active

36. Key vendors of EPC RFID devices:
Frequency Bands:
Low Frequency - (LF, kHz)
High Frequency - (HF, MHz)
Ultra High Frequency - (UHF, MHz, GHz, 5.8GHz)
Key vendors of EPC RFID devices:
Datalogic
Honeywell International
Zebra Tecgnologies

37. Conclusion
Explored the issue of cloning in most widely deployed radio device, the Class-1 Gen-2 EPC tag
Focused on deployment of RFID tags in Passport Cards and Enhanced Drivers Licenses
Can be extended well beyond EDLs and Passport Cards to EPC deployment wherever cloning or counterfeiting poses a risk
KILL-Based Authentication (KBA) offers a viable strategy in defense of the Gen-2 EPC Tag’s weakness to cloning
Simple KBA is the most promising approach when Scaled KBA cannot be used
e.g., when tag writing is not supported (as is the case with the PASS Card)

38. References http://www.ijcst.com/vol61/1/26-Mohsen-Hallaj-Asghar.pdf
technologydevelopmenttrends-and-opportunities-market-research-report-to- 2021

39. Q&A

40. Thank You