1. PLACEHOLDER SLIDE ON SIPR!
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Future “Disruptive” Threat to Mission Command
Find & interdict Command Posts
Multi echelon use of UAVs; multi level, saturated airspace… decreased sensor-to-shooter time
Space-based, Multispectral sensors…EO, radar
Ground based multi intel sensors …targeting electronic signatures
Long range fires with area and precision munitions
Disrupt Mission Command
GPS jamming & spoofing, disruption of PNT, denial of electromagnetic spectrum
Space-based jamming and ASAT
Communications jamming, electronic deception… DRFM jamming
Smart and EW munitions
PLACEHOLDER
SLIDE ON SIPR!
Disrupt the Network
Massive data injection
Insider threat…exploitation, corruption of data…false data insertion
Combining Cyber and EW capabilities
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

2. Red Perspective of NIE Network
NIE events since 14.2 and CTC rotations have shown some of the same vulnerabilities.
Basic-level OPFOR offensive cyber operations (OCO) revealed significant U.S. network vulnerabilities allowing exploitation.
Threat representative Electronic Warfare (EW) systems (CICADA Jammer) were effective in disrupting and desynchronizing US Army formations conducting operations.
GPS Jamming introduced delays in processing data as well as locational errors, potentially degrading C2.
Synchronization of OPFOR activities with EW and OCO in combination with UAS reconnaissance provided a significant advantage for the OPFOR by disrupting US Army situational awareness (SA) while increasing OPFOR SA.
Unit OPLANS, OPORDS, operational graphics, spot reports, intel summaries, and commander battle update briefings (BUB) were acquired and passed to the Red Command group.
Consequently, after confirming the accuracy of the captured products using various air and ground reconnaissance assets, the OPFOR battalion commander had a near-perfect picture of 1-6 Infantry's defense well before he attacked: