1. FCC Safety Strategy for the Conceptual Design Report
Thomas Otto
Departmental Safety Officer, Technology Department, CERN

2. Contents Scope of Safety in the Conceptual Design Report
Hazard Register
Implementation of a Hazard Register for the FCC
“Standard Best Practice”
Safety Design
Performance-Based Safety Design
Conclusions

3. FCC Conceptual Design Report
The CDR has the purpose of demonstrating the viability of the planned facility in terms of
Accelerator technology
Detector technology
Infrastructure (tunnel, transport, services…)
and Safety (incl. environmental protection)

4. Safety accompanies development
CDR
Conceptual Safety Study
Hazard Register
Standard best practice – directives, standards, guidelines
Identify cases for risk assessment
Proposal of conceptual approaches for risk-control
TDR
Technical Safety Study
Specific Risk Assessments
Prescriptive solutions: strictly rule-based
Performance-based: tailor-made solutions to meet safety objectives
Proposal of detailed technical solutions for risk-control

5. Hazard Register
Hazard is the potential of a substance, activity or process to cause harm (accident or illness)
Risk is a combined measure of the likelihood (probability) of harm and the severity of its consequences
FCC Hazard Register: Systematic collection of Hazards in the FCC facilities during different phases of its lifetime No assessment of probability or severity

6. Hazard Register Systematic collection of Hazards, ordered by:
Technology
S.c. magnets
N.c. magnets
Cryogenics
Vacuum
Powering
Transport
… others
Project Phase
Construction
Service Installation
Accelerator installation
Commissioning
Operation
Technical Stop
Long Shut-down
Dismantling
Location in the facility
Surface
Shaft
Long Straight Section
Arc Tunnel
Caverns
… others

7. Hazard Register based on …
Breakdown of the planned facility
Technology
Item
Process
Activity / Equipment / Substance
Hazard
Location
Phase
Powering
Transformer
Maintenance
Work at height
Fall from height

8. Hazard Register based on …
Activation of ground
Additional Traffic
Noise (Environment)
Release of pollutants: air
Release of pollutants: solid
Release of pollutants: water
Release of radioactive liquid
Release of radioactive solid
Release of radioactivity by air
Structured list of potential hazards
at workplaces
during autonomous operation
≈100 characterised hazards A1
External Hazard to Facility A2
Hazard to the Environment B1
Physical Hazards B2
Radiation, ionising B3
Radiation, non-ionising B4
Noxious Substances B5
Fire Hazards B6
Mechanical Hazards B7
Electrical Hazards C1
Working Environment C2
Physiological Constraints C3
Unexpected events C4
Organisation C5
Psychological Constraints
Dangerous surface
Fall of object from height
Fluid under presure
Uncontrolled object in motion
Unprotected element in movement

9. Filling the database Technology Item Process Activity/ Equipment
Cryogenics
Compressor
Supply Line
Cryostat
Operation
Heat xchange
Pressure vessel
Helium
Cold burns
ODH
Maintenance
Welding
Welding torch
Hot surface
Ignition source
UV radiation
Flammable gas
Combustible Material
Return Line
Technology
Item
Process
Activity/
Equipment
Substance
Hazard
Location
Phase

10. Implementation
Numerous technologies, locations, phases, items and processes in particle accelerator project as FCC
Spreadsheets quickly overcharged
Use of a relational database
Scales with complexity of the project
Incremental iteration during project lifecycle
Overall coherence of data assured
Use of queries to highlight risks

11. Representation in relational database
Technology Item Process Act./Equip./Subst Hazard

12. Flexibility of Database Approach
Capability for specific reports in database approach e.g. extraction of hazard register for selected criteria:
What hazards during commissioning in arc tunnel ?
Under which circumstances does a fire hazard appear (simultaneous use of flammable substance and ignition source, at the same location)
Many processes are universal and hazards need to be identified only once
Transport of heavy objects
Powering an electrical device
Supplying cooling water
The same equipment and substances are used over and over again
Power tools, brazing and welding kits…
Alcohol, acetone…

13. Exploiting the relations between data
Technology
Item
Process
Activity/
Equipment
Substance
Hazard
Compressor
Heat xchange
Supply Line
Operation
Pressure vessel
Cold burns
Helium
ODH
Cryogenics
Cryostat
Welding
Hot surface
Return Line
Maintenance
Welding torch
Ignition source
UV radiation
Flammable gas
Combustible Material
Tunnel
Shut-Down

14. Status 1 Hazard list completed
Identification of Technologies, Location and Phases completed
Interviews with Stakeholders of the Technologies to identify the facility breakdown structure in progress
Assignment of Process and Hazards in Progress
Reviews with stakeholders planned
Production of Particular Hazard Reports for Location / Phase planned

15. What next ?
“Standard Best Practice” are preventive measures rendering a hazard inoffensive
Decide if S.B.P. is applicable to the specific circumstances of the hazard (location !)
Assess risk in the other cases

16. Standard Best Practice
Technology
Item
Process
Activity/
Equipment
Substance
Hazard
S.B.P.
Compressor
Heat xchange
Supply Line
Operation
Pressure vessel
Cold burns
Helium
Cryostat
ODH
Self-rescue mask
Cryogenics
Welding
Hot surface
Gloves
Return Line
Maintenance
Welding torch
Ignition source
Extinguisher
UV radiation
Protection mask
Flammable gas
Combustible Material
Tunnel
Shut-Down

17. Sources of Standard Best Practice
For the conformity of items:
EU directives, Int’l standards, Industry guidelines
For the use of substances
Material Safety Data Sheets
For the conduct of activities:
Practical guides from prevention organisms
Return of experience
CERN needs to define accepted sources of Standard Best Practice

18. Status 2 Hazard list completed
Identification of Technologies, Location and Phases completed
Interviews with Stakeholders of the Technologies to identify the facility breakdown structure in progress
Assignment of Process and Hazards in progress
Reviews with stakeholders planned
Production of Particular Hazard Reports for Location / Phase planned
Identification of Standard Best Practice in progress

19. Risk Assessment In the case where Standard Best Practice is
Thomas Otto, TE DSO
Risk Assessment
In the case where Standard Best Practice is
not available (e.g. innovative, non-standard technologies)
not applicable (e.g. in underground environments)
too simplistic (e.g. combined hazards of different nature)
the risk of a process must be assessed
Estimation of the probability / frequency
Estimation of the consequences

20. Safety design Safety design
The process is designed with the aim of lowering the risk rating
Risk Assessment
Process
Risk
Safety design

21. Prescriptive Safety Design
Example from Fire Safety: “
The length of the escape path in a room with two exits must not be longer than 35 metres.
The exits must be situated at the extremities of the room
Application in a 8 km long accelerator tunnel ?

22. Performance-based Safety Design
Objective
In case of fire, no loss of human life
Performance Criterion
Nobody exposed to dangerous CO conc.
location of ignition source, combustible material, power of heat release
Test Fire
building structure, occupation frequency, safety devices (alarms)
Trial Design
Evaluate
Does trial design meet performance criteria ?
Yes: adopt trial design
No: improve trial design

23. Example of Performance based design: Arc Tunnel Layout
Tunnel Diameter Distance of Fire Compartment Walls
determine, in case of fire or cryogenic spill:
spread of smoke, noxious or cryogenic gases
evacuation path
Safety of occupants in case of fire
Choices for these 2 parameters can be compared in a Performance Based Safety Design Approach

24. Application Areas of Performance Based Design
Fire
Cryogenic release
Radiation Protection
Objective
No loss of human life
No dose exceeding limit
Performance criteria
Low temperature
Low CO conc.
Sufficiently high temperature
Sufficient oxygen conc.
Low radiation dose rate
Test Scenario
Fire with specified heat and smoke output
Helium release with specified mass flow
Beam loss with specified intensity
Trial design
Building structure with escape paths
Shielding walls
Evaluation methods
Qualitative
Experience-based estimation by professional
Analytical
Zone model
Equilibrium model
Moyer formula
Numerical
Computational fluid dynamics
Monte-Carlo radiation transport

25. Status 3 Hazard list completed
Identification of Technologies, Location and Phases completed
Interviews with Stakeholders of the Technologies to identify the facility breakdown structure in progress
Assignment of Process and Hazards in progress
Reviews with stakeholders planned
Production of Particular Hazard Reports for Location / Phase planned
Identification of Standard Best Practice in progress
Identification of cases for Performance-based Safety Design in progress
Qualitative Evaluation of Trial Designs planned

26. Conclusion The scope of Safety in the Conceptual Design Report:
Hazard Register: overview of hazards in the facility
Identification of Standard Best Practice where available
Qualitative Performance-Based Design Studies where necessary to define the envelope of the facility, for example tunnel layout
Technical risk assessments and performance-based designs are reserved for the Technical Design Report
Thanks for assistance and time for discussions go to
Johannes Gutleber (ATS); Delphine Letant-Delrieux, Francesca Viggiano (TE); Saverio La Mendola, André Henriques, Markus Widorski (HSE)