1. Time, Self and Mind (ATS1835) Introduction to Philosophy B Semester 2, 2015
Dr Ron Gallagher
Office Hours:please for appointment)
Week 2: Time Travel; Freedom, Determinism, and Indeterminism
AT1 Due Monday August 10 at 10am words 10%)
Extension of 48 hours available if you Ron and request.

2. Time - Introduction and Time Travel
Week
Beginning
Topic
Assessment
Readings W1
27-Jul-14
Time - Introduction and Time Travel
Readings 1.1 & 1.2 W2
03-Aug-14
Time Travel; Freedom, Determinism, and Indeterminism
Readings 1.5 & 1.6 (sections 1-2 & 6-10) W3
10-Aug-14
Logic Primer
AT1 Mon August 10, 10am
Readings W4
17-Aug-14
Mind- Dualism versus Materialism about the Mind
Readings W5
24-Aug-14
Mind - Can Machines Think? Computationalism and the Turing Test
Readings 3.3 W6
31-Aug-14
Mind - Can Machines Think? Objections to Computationalism
AT2 Mon Aug 31st, 10am
Reading 3.4 W7
07-Sep-14
Self - Lockean Psychological Theory and Identity
Readings W8
14-Sep-14
Self - Identity, the Body & Person Stages
Readings W9
21-Sep-14
Knowledge What is Knowledge and Gettier's Account
AT3 Mon Sep 21st, 10am
Readings
28-Sep-14
Mid-semester Break
W10
05-Oct-14
Knowledge - Nozick's Account and Scepticism
Readings
W11
12-Oct-14
Knowledge - The Moorean Response
AT4 Essay Mon Oct 12th
Readings 5.5
W12
19-Oct-14
Revision (no lectures, no tutorials)

3. Assessment Hurdle Requirements to Pass this Unit
Due Date
Assessment Task
Value
Mondays 10am
Reading Quizzes (10)
5% (bonus)
Mon Aug 10th
AT1 words)
10%
Mon Aug 31st
AT2 words)
Mon Sep 21st
AT3 words)
Mon Oct 12th
AT4 Essay words)
30%
TBA
Exam
40%
Hurdle Requirements to Pass this Unit
Your overall grade for the unit must be at least 50%
You must achieve a grade of 40% or more on the final exam
You must not fail more than one assessment task (not including Reading Quizzes)
You cannot miss more than 3 tutorials

4. Clayton Lectures and Tutorials

5. Caulfield Lectures and Tutorials

10. Late Penalties No submission after 10 days.
5% of the maximum possible mark for the assessment item, per calendar day overdue: max 10 days.
For example: A student who receives a 75 D for an assessment item incurs the following penalty: one day late, 70D; two days late, 65 C; three days late, 60 C; etc.
No submission after 10 days.

14. AT1 Due Monday August 10 at 10am (@600 words 10%)
Q1:What is the grandfather paradox, and how does it pose a problem for the possibility of time travel?
Lewis believes his four-dimensionalist theory can address this problem. How does Lewis explain this, especially given his discussion of the senses in which Tim ‘can’ kill his grandfather?
Q2: How does the compatibilist that Taylor discusses seek to reconcile free will with the existence of a unique determinate future?
And what briefly is Taylor’s ‘manipulation objection’ to this form of compatiblism?
Thoroughly explain your answers in your own words, and be sure to define any key terms and positions. 300 words max each question..

15. Q1:What is the grandfather paradox, and how does it pose a problem for the possibility of time travel?
Lewis believes his four-dimensionalist theory can address this problem. How does Lewis explain this, especially given his discussion of the senses in which Tim ‘can’ kill his grandfather?
[Hint: Remember that in four-dimensional space-time there is only one dimension of time. Does Lewis think that backwards time-travel is always paradoxical?]

16. Q2: How does the compatibilist that Taylor discusses seek to reconcile free will with the existence of a unique determinate future?
[Hint: define determinism, free will and compatibilism]
And what briefly is Taylor’s ‘manipulation objection’ to this form of compatiblism?
[Hint: what are Taylor’s three conditions on freedom?]

19. Different Kinds of (Im)Possibility
(Current) Psychological impossibility ≈ what’s impossible given one’s current psychological abilities
Speaking fluent Turkish
Designing a microwave
Believing that there’s a giant pink elephant in the room
Technological impossibility ≈ what’s impossible given our current level of technology
Curing cancer
Humans travelling faster then the speed of sound with a non-jet or rocket propelled engine

20. Different Kinds of Possibility
Physical impossibility ≈ what’s impossible given the laws of nature
Turning lead into gold; freezing water at room temperature
The destruction of energy (would violate the law of the conservation of energy)
Travelling faster than the speed of light (maybe)
Logical impossibility ≈ what’s impossible given the laws of logic
Non-contradiction: there are no true contradictions.
Excluded Middle: every statement is either true or false.
Leibniz's Law: two objects are identical if and only if everything true of one is true of the other.

22. Possible Worlds - Modal Logic
Is it logically possible for a balloon of solid lead to float in the air?
Possible Worlds - Modal Logic

24. Which is logically possible
Which is logically possible? Faster than light travel Time Travel ESP That we are all on a beach now! = 5 This sentence is false if true

29. Lewis page 30 - TSM Reader
We have this seeming contradiction: “Tim doesn’t, but
can, because he has what it takes” versus “Tim doesn’t, and can’t, because it’s logically impossible to change the past.” I reply that there is no contradiction. Both conclusions are true, and for the reasons given. They are compatible because “can” is equivocal.

30. 1. Compatibilism and the Problem of Manipulation
1.1 The Standard Argument
The standard version of the manipulation argument relies on the following two principles:
Manipulation Principle (MP): If S is manipulated to A, then S does not freely A, and S is not morally responsible for A.
No Difference Principle (NDP): There are not any relevant differences between manipulation and determinism (with respect to FW and MR).
Given these principles, the standard presentation of the manipulation argument (call it the ‘standard argument’) is best understood as an objection to compatibilism that proceeds as follows:
the truth of the conjunction of MP and NDP strongly suggests that if S is causally determined to A, then S does not freely A, and S is not morally responsible for A. Therefore, compatibilism is false.

31. Compatibilism holds that there is no deep conflict between freedom of the will and causal determination. ..the compatibilist holds that not every causal influence on our behaviour leaves us unfree. For example, one simple compatibilist theory is: if the way my actions are caused leaves me able to act as I want, then I act freely. To say that I have acted freely is to say something like this: If I had wanted to do something other than what I did do, then I would have done something else. (This is the classical ‘conditional analysis’ of free will.) Where this is not the case an agent is not free. Where it is
the case, an agent is free. This is a version of the view Taylor calls soft determinism, which states that determinism is true but it is compatible with free will.
Tip: If you think that two things can exist at once you are a compatibilist about those two things.

32. Incompatibilism comes in two flavours
The first form of incompatibalism holds that freedom of the will requires that an agent who acts freely must be able to act differently—in a very strong sense, one that requires multiple futures. If I do something freely (e.g., scratch my head)..... it means that I could have chosen differently—there was genuinely more than one option available.
If we adopt this incompatibilist view, then there are two ways we might complete our position. We might defend the view that humans do sometimes act freely in this very strong sense; we might argue that free will does exist. This is the libertarian view; it is the conjunction of incompatibilism and the view that free actions do sometimes occur (and thus it rejects determinism).
The second form of incompatibalism holds that if we are convinced of the truth of determinism, then we will conclude that humans never act freely. Freedom of the will is an illusion. This is often called hard determinism.

33. Fatalism is the view that ‘whatever happens is unavoidable’.
A compatibilist would emphasize that determinism doesn’t necessarily yield what fatalism must—namely, that events will happen no matter what you want, believe, choose, decide, etc. A determinist who is not a fatalist would emphasize that our futures are not inevitable - they depend on what we do as agents.

34. Compatibilism
Determinism and free will are true. (Soft Determinism)
Incompatibilism
Position 1. Free will is true determinism is false. (Libertarianism)
Position 2. Determinism is true free will is false. (Hard Determinism)
See TSM Reader P. 18

35. Compatibilism:
Compatibilism: Free will and determinism are consistent.
Adherents:
Stoics, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, J.M. Fisher, Dennett….
Recall The Conditions of Freedom:
One is able to perform act A freely ONLY IF
1) there is no obstacle that prevents one from doing A, and
2) there is nothing that constrains or forces one to do A, and
3) one could have done otherwise, i.e., action A is avoidable.
Worry: can Determinists consistently ever claim that “I could have done otherwise”?

39. For Dennett, free will consists in the ability of a person to control her conduct on the basis of rational considerations through means that arise from, or are subject to, critical self-evaluation, self-adjusting and self-monitoring. That is, free will involves responsiveness to reasons.