1. A Standard of Judgement
Michael Smith
Princeton University
Lecture 1: From the human condition to
a standard of judgement
Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism
Lecture 3: The best form of moral
rationalism
Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs
non-moral reasons
Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame
Lecture 6: Loose ends
Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure”
“Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the
conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a
condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a
standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

2. Moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all other reasons for action are non-moral reasons.
An agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or, more accurately, desirableher.
The outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires that that outcome obtains.
The desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world.

3. Moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all other reasons for action are non-moral reasons.
An agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or, more accurately, desirableher.
The outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires that that outcome obtains.
The desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world.

4. Moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all other reasons for action are non-moral reasons.
An agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or, more accurately, desirableher.
The outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires that that outcome obtains.
The desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world.

5. Moral reasons for action are those reasons for action where the reason-giving features are impartial and unconditional, and all other reasons for action are non-moral reasons.
An agent has a reason to act so as to bring about a certain outcome if and only if: (i) she has the abilities and conceptual sophistication required to conceive of herself as having the option to bring that outcome about, and (ii) that outcome is desirable—or, more accurately, desirableher.
The outcome of an agent's acting in a certain way is desirablethat agent if and only if that agent's ideal counterpart desires that that outcome obtains.
The desires an agent's ideal counterpart has are those that that agent would have in the nearest possible world in which she has and exercises maximal capacities to have knowledge of the world in which she lives and realize her desires in that world, where maximality is to be understood in modal terms.

6. Because of the potential for incoherence in the exercise of these two capacities, each agents' ideal counterpart must have: (i) a coherence-inducing dominant desire that they do not now interfere with any agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition that the realization of those desires would not lead them to interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a coherence-inducing dominant desire to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever other desires those agents happen to have.
It is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do.
All agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to do whatever they desire to do.

7. Because of the potential for incoherence in the exercise of these two capacities modally, each agents' ideal counterpart must have: (i) a coherence-inducing dominant desire that they do not interfere with any agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition that the realization of those desires would not lead them to interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a coherence-inducing dominant desire to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever other desires those agents happen to have.
It is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do.
All agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to do whatever they desire to do.

8. Because of the potential for incoherence in the exercise of these two capacities modally, each agents' ideal counterpart must have: (i) a coherence-inducing dominant desire that they do not interfere with any agent's exercise of their capacities to have knowledge of the world in which they live or realize their desires in that world (on condition that the realization of those desires would not lead them to interfere)— for short, a dominant desire not to interfere; (ii) a coherence-inducing dominant desire to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise—for short, a dominant desire to help; and (iii) whatever other desires those agents happen to have.
It is desirableeach agent that that agent helps and does not interfere, and, insofar as it is consistent with helping and not interfering, that she does whatever she desires to do.
All agents have dominant moral reasons to help and not interfere, and, conditional on their doing that, non-moral reasons to do whatever they desire to do.

9. Note that there is a potential for conflict not just between moral and non-moral reasons, but also between the two moral reasons themselves. Example of moral/non-moral conflict I desire to believe that p whether or not p is true, and so have a conditional reason to so act, but I also have an unconditional reason not to interfere with my exercise of my capacity for knowledge-acquisition Example of moral/moral conflict I have a brain disease that will kill me if left untreated, but the only treatment available is the removal of part of my brain that processes information from a certain region of my visual field, and so will leave me ignorant of what is going on in that region. The upshot is that the dominant desires to help and not interfere have associated strengths and so can be weighed against each other.

10. Note that there is a potential for conflict not just between moral and non-moral reasons, but also between the two moral reasons themselves. Example of moral/non-moral conflict I desire to believe that p whether or not p is true, and so have a conditional reason to so act, but I also have an unconditional reason not to interfere with my exercise of my capacity for knowledge-acquisition Example of moral/moral conflict I have a brain disease that will kill me if left untreated, but the only treatment available is the removal of part of my brain that processes information from a certain region of my visual field, and so will leave me ignorant of what is going on in that region. The upshot is that the dominant desires to help and not interfere have associated strengths and so can be weighed against each other.

11. Note that there is a potential for conflict not just between moral and non-moral reasons, but also between the two moral reasons themselves. Example of moral/non-moral conflict I desire to believe that p whether or not p is true, and so have a conditional reason to so act, but I also have an unconditional reason not to interfere with my exercise of my capacity for knowledge-acquisition Example of moral/moral conflict I have a brain disease that will kill me if left untreated, but the only treatment available is the removal of part of my brain that processes information from a certain region of my visual field, and so will leave me ignorant of what is going on in that region. The upshot is that the dominant desires to help and not interfere have associated strengths and so can be weighed against each other.

12. Note that there is a potential for conflict not just between moral and non-moral reasons, but also between the two moral reasons themselves. Example of moral/non-moral conflict I desire to believe that p whether or not p is true, and so have a conditional reason to so act, but I also have an unconditional reason not to interfere with my exercise of my capacity for knowledge-acquisition Example of moral/moral conflict I have a brain disease that will kill me if left untreated, but the only treatment available is the removal of part of my brain that processes information from a certain region of my visual field, and so will leave me ignorant of what is going on in that region. The upshot is that the dominant desires to help and not interfere have associated strengths and so can be weighed against each other.

13. MORAL REASONS
What is the intuitive substance of the two moral reasons?
The reason we have not to interfere with anyone’s exercise of their capacity for knowledge-acquisition or desire-realization is a reason for us not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable anyone. The reason we have to do what we can to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise is a reason for us to ensure that everyone is able to make free and informed choices about how to live their lives
there is a connection between the two moral reasons and autonomy rather than welfare;
the scope of the two moral reasons;
how this scope differs from the scope of the principles of other theorists who ground morality in autonomy;
the real moral significance of autonomy  

14. MORAL REASONS
What is the intuitive substance of the two moral reasons?
The reason we have not to interfere with anyone’s exercise of their capacity for knowledge-acquisition or desire-realization is a reason for us not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable anyone. The reason we have to do what we can to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise is a reason for us to ensure that everyone is able to make free and informed choices about how to live their lives
there is a connection between the two moral reasons and autonomy rather than welfare;
the scope of the two moral reasons;
how this scope differs from the scope of the principles of other theorists who ground morality in autonomy;
the real moral significance of autonomy  

15. MORAL REASONS
What is the intuitive substance of the two moral reasons?
The reason we have not to interfere with anyone’s exercise of their capacity for knowledge-acquisition or desire-realization is a reason for us not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable anyone. The reason we have to do what we can to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise is a reason for us to ensure that everyone is able to make free and informed choices about how to live their lives
there is a connection between the two moral reasons and autonomy rather than welfare;
the scope of the two moral reasons;
how this scope differs from the scope of the principles of other theorists who ground morality in autonomy;
the real moral significance of autonomy  

16. MORAL REASONS
What is the intuitive substance of the two moral reasons?
The reason we have not to interfere with anyone’s exercise of their capacity for knowledge-acquisition or desire-realization is a reason for us not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable anyone. The reason we have to do what we can to ensure that agents have knowledge-acquisition and desire-realization capacities to exercise is a reason for us to ensure that everyone is able to make free and informed choices about how to live their lives
there is a connection between the two moral reasons and autonomy rather than welfare;
the scope of the two moral reasons;
how this scope differs from the scope of the principles of other theorists who ground morality in autonomy rather than welfare;
the real moral significance of autonomy

17. MORAL REASONS Note that the argument given for the existence of moral reasons connects in a straightforward way with an intuitive argument for adopting a moral point of view, an argument that is usually put in the form of a rhetorical question: 'What’s so special about you?’ What the argument we have given suggests is that this is best understood not as a moral question, but as a question about our own persistence conditions to which the only answer that can be given is ‘Nothing’. This is why the desires that are constitutive of ideal agents cannot be restricted to ourselves over time, but must concern all agents at all times. One of the great divides in moral philosophy, the divide between impartialism and partialism is thus decided in favor of impartialism. Moreover, as we have already seen, another of the great divides in moral philosophy, the divide between those who value welfare and those who value autonomy, is decided in favor of autonomy.

18. MORAL REASONS However, the indeterminacy of the reasons to help and not interfere, coupled with the need to coordinate with others in acting on these reasons, provides all of us with an incentive to give these reasons more determinate shared content and weight. We need to distinguish between the following cases in which we have this incentive: ideal state of nature cases vs ideal conventional cases real world cases

19. MORAL REASONS However, the indeterminacy of the reasons to help and not interfere, coupled with the need to coordinate with others in acting on these reasons, provides all of us with an incentive to give these reasons more determinate shared content and weight. We need to distinguish between the following cases in which we have this incentive: ideal state of nature cases vs ideal conventional cases real world cases

20. MORAL REASONS Ideal state of nature cases Scanlon tells us that it is impermissible to fail to meet the reasonable expectations that we knowingly create. He formulates this idea in the following principle which he calls 'Principle F': If (1) X voluntarily and intentionally leads Y to expect that X will do such-and-such (unless Y consents to X’s not doing so); (2) X knows that Y wants to be assured of this; (3) X acts with the aim of providing this assurance, and has good reason to believe that he or she has done so; (4) Y knows that X has the beliefs and intentions just described; (5) X intends for Y to know this, and knows that Y does know it; and (6) Y knows that X has this knowledge and intent; then, in the absence of special justification, X must do such-and-such unless Y consents to such-and-such’s not being done. (Scanlon WWOTEO p.304) The reasons we have not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable, and to make possible free and informed choice for all, explain why Principle F is true.

21. MORAL REASONS Ideal conventional cases When a large number of people within a group come to have the same reasonable expectations about how they are to behave, more precise conventional meanings and weights will attach, via Principle F, to the reasons they all have not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable, and to make sure everyone has the wherewithal to make free and informed choices, and then everyone will have reasons to to do what’s required to maintain and, where possible, improve these conventional meanings. This will often include having reasons to act in accordance with the conventions. The reasons we have not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable, and to make possible free and informed choice for all, thus also provide a rationale for the development, maintenance, and improvement of these conventions, and for often acting in accordance with them.

22. MORAL REASONS Real world cases
determinate cases in which the reasons we have not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable, and to make possible free and informed choice for all, give unequivocal advice concerning pernicious conventions, ie those that support partialism over impartialism;
however these reasons give much more equivocal advice about how to maintain and improve non-pernicious conventions that give these ideas more determinate shared content. Existing conventions will reflect the views of others who, despite being impartialists, have very different moral beliefs and desires from those that we have, and these people may well wield more power in the maintenance of the conventions than we do. Even so, as dictated by the determinate cases of what it is not to deceive, mislead, manipulate, coerce, diminish, or disable, and to make possible free and informed choice for all, we all have reasons to join with like-minded others to do what we can to change existing conventions in ways that we prefer.

23. Facts about what is intrinsically desirable as fixed by the intrinsic desires of ideal agents
Facts about what there is reason to do
Evaluative and deontic facts in possible worlds inhabited by our crappy selves obtain in virtue of facts about the desires the ideal counterparts of our crappy selves have about those possible worlds
Facts about what is morally forbidden, permissible, and obligatory

24. DEFINITIONS OF DEONTIC STATUSES OF ACTIONS
According to the best form of moral rationalism:
an act's being morally forbidden entails that there are moral reasons, that some of these are reasons not to perform the action, and that these moral reasons are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform the action;
an act's being morally permissible entails that there are moral reasons, and that it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it;
and an act's being morally obligatory is a matter of its being uniquely morally permissible.
So understood, the connection between these deontic statuses of actions—being morally forbidden, morally permissible, and morally obligatory—and the existence of moral reasons to perform or not perform those actions is somewhat indirect. Question: What would it be for an act to be supererogatory? .

25. DEFINITIONS OF DEONTIC STATUSES OF ACTIONS
According to the best form of moral rationalism:
an act's being morally forbidden entails that there are moral reasons, that some of these are reasons not to perform the action, and that these moral reasons are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform the action;
an act's being morally permissible entails that there are moral reasons, and that it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it;
and an act's being morally obligatory is a matter of its being uniquely morally permissible.
So understood, the connection between these deontic statuses of actions—being morally forbidden, morally permissible, and morally obligatory—and the existence of moral reasons to perform or not perform those actions is somewhat indirect. Consider some examples.

26. DEFINITIONS OF DEONTIC STATUSES OF ACTIONS
According to the best form of moral rationalism:
an act's being morally forbidden entails that there are moral reasons, that some of these are reasons not to perform the action, and that these moral reasons are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform the action;
an act's being morally permissible entails that there are moral reasons, and that it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it;
and an act's being morally obligatory is a matter of its being uniquely morally permissible.
So understood, the connection between these deontic statuses of actions—being morally forbidden, morally permissible, and morally obligatory—and the existence of moral reasons to perform or not perform those actions is somewhat indirect. Question: What would it be for an act to be supererogatory?

27. DEFINITIONS OF DEONTIC STATUSES OF ACTIONS
According to the best form of moral rationalism:
an act's being morally forbidden entails that there are moral reasons, that some of these are reasons not to perform the action, and that these moral reasons are weightier than the moral or non-moral reasons to perform the action;
an act's being morally permissible entails that there are moral reasons, and that it isn't the case some of these are reasons not to perform the action that are weightier than the reasons, whether moral or non-moral, to perform it;
and an act's being morally obligatory is a matter of its being uniquely morally permissible.
So understood, the connection between these deontic statuses of actions—being morally forbidden, morally permissible, and morally obligatory—and the existence of moral reasons to perform or not perform those actions is somewhat indirect. Question: What would it be for an act to be supererogatory?

28. NON-MORAL REASONS
In general humans have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component.
In general humans have desires concerning their own happiness, where this in turn provides them with desires concerning their own wealth, power, and reputation. 
In general humans have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning themselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and in the best case, so on and so forth; in this way the well-being of each comes to be tied up with the well-being of the other. 
But remember that these are claims about the desires that humans in general have, and that there may well therefore be less typical humans who lack these attitudes.

29. NON-MORAL REASONS
In general humans have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component.
In general humans have desires concerning their own happiness, where this in turn provides them with desires concerning their own wealth, power, and reputation. 
In general humans have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning themselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and in the best case, so on and so forth; in this way the well-being of each comes to be tied up with the well-being of the other. 
But remember that these are claims about the desires that humans in general have, and that there may well therefore be less typical humans who lack these attitudes.

30. NON-MORAL REASONS
In general humans have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component.
In general humans have desires concerning their own happiness, where this in turn provides them with desires concerning their own wealth, power, and reputation. 
In general humans have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning themselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and in the best case, so on and so forth; in this way the well-being of each comes to be tied up with the well-being of the other. 
But remember that these are claims about the desires that humans in general have, and that there may well therefore be less typical humans who lack these attitudes.

31. NON-MORAL REASONS
In general humans have desires with both an affect component and a related disposition-to-act component.
In general humans have desires concerning their own happiness, where this in turn provides them with desires concerning their own wealth, power, and reputation. 
In general humans have dispositions to cause desires in particular others concerning themselves, and to be caused to have desires in turn by those others when they act on their desires, and in the best case, so on and so forth; in this way the well-being of each comes to be tied up with the well-being of the other. 
But remember that these are claims about the desires that humans in general have, and that there may well therefore be less typical humans who lack these attitudes.

32. NON-MORAL REASONS The paradigm case of desires of the third kind are the desires constitutive of friendship. Other cases include: romantic love, attitudes towards art objects, attitudes towards natural objects Note that some of the dispositions to desire constitutive of friendship and romantic love will give rise to moral reasons via Scanlon’s Principle F. These relationships are thus morally-laden. Note as well that many of these dispositions to desire can lead us to act contrary to our moral reasons. The limit case of this is total indifference to moral reasons: that is, a version of partialism. One striking feature of partialist views of friendship and romantic love is that they do not have the resources to explain why these relationships, as they conceive of them, have the features that we have seen that they have in virtue of being morally-laden.

33. NON-MORAL REASONS The paradigm case of desires of the third kind are the desires constitutive of friendship. Other cases include: romantic love, attitudes towards art objects, attitudes towards natural objects Note that some of the dispositions to desire constitutive of friendship and romantic love will give rise to moral reasons via Scanlon’s Principle F. These relationships are thus morally-laden. Note as well that many of these dispositions to desire can lead us to act contrary to our moral reasons. The limit case of this is total indifference to moral reasons: that is, a version of partialism. One striking feature of partialist views of friendship and romantic love is that they do not have the resources to explain why these relationships, as they conceive of them, have the features that we have seen that they have in virtue of being morally-laden.

34. NON-MORAL REASONS The paradigm case of desires of the third kind are the desires constitutive of friendship. Other cases include: romantic love, attitudes towards art objects, attitudes towards natural objects Note that some of the dispositions to desire constitutive of friendship and romantic love will give rise to moral reasons via Scanlon’s Principle F. These relationships are thus morally-laden. Note as well that many of these dispositions to desire can lead us to act contrary to our moral reasons. The limit case of this is total indifference to moral reasons: that is, a version of partialism. One striking feature of partialist views of friendship and romantic love is that they do not have the resources to explain why these relationships, as they conceive of them, have the features that we have seen that they have in virtue of being morally-laden.

35. NON-MORAL REASONS The paradigm case of desires of the third kind are the desires constitutive of friendship. Other cases include: romantic love, attitudes towards art objects, attitudes towards natural objects Note that some of the dispositions to desire constitutive of friendship and romantic love will give rise to moral reasons via Scanlon’s Principle F. These relationships are thus morally-laden. Note as well that many of these dispositions to desire can lead us to act contrary to our moral reasons. The limit case of this is total indifference to moral reasons: that is, a version of partialism. One striking feature of partialist views of friendship and romantic love is that they do not have the resources to explain why these relationships, as they conceive of them, have the features that we have seen that they have in virtue of being morally-laden.

36. NON-MORAL REASONS The paradigm case of desires of the third kind are the desires constitutive of friendship. Other cases include: romantic love, attitudes towards art objects, attitudes towards natural objects Note that some of the dispositions to desire constitutive of friendship and romantic love will give rise to moral reasons via Scanlon’s Principle F. These relationships are thus morally-laden. Note as well that many of these dispositions to desire can lead us to act contrary to our moral reasons. The limit case of this is total indifference to moral reasons: that is, a version of partialism. One striking feature of partialist views of friendship and romantic love is that they do not have the resources to explain why these relationships, as they conceive of them, have the features that we have seen that they have in virtue of being morally-laden.

37. This discussion of our moral and non-moral reasons suggests that an uneasy relationship exists between our human nature and our nature as agents.
Many of the things we have reason to do—all of those we have non-moral reason to do—are things that we have reason to do because of our human nature. But our human nature can also lead us to fail to do what we have reason to do, as we often lack self-control, and we all too often attend to our non-moral reasons and thereby discount or ignore our moral reasons.
The next question to ask is what we have reason to do when this happens.

38. A Standard of Judgement
Michael Smith
Princeton University
Lecture 1: From the human condition to
a standard of judgement
Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism
Lecture 3: The best form of moral
rationalism
Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral
reasons
Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame
Lecture 6: Loose ends
Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure”
“Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the
conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a
condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a
standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

39. A Standard of Judgement
Michael Smith
Princeton University
Lecture 1: From the human condition to
a standard of judgement
Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism
Lecture 3: The best form of moral
rationalism
Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral
reasons
Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame
Lecture 6: Loose ends
Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure”
“Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the
conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a
condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a
standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11

40. A Standard of Judgement
Michael Smith
Princeton University
Lecture 1: From the human condition to
a standard of judgement
Lecture 2: From a standard of judgement to moral rationalism
Lecture 3: The best form of moral
rationalism
Lecture 4: Moral reasons vs non-moral
reasons
Lecture 5: A normative theory of blame
Lecture 6: Loose ends
Bonus discussion section: Defeat by nature in “Force Majeure”
“Here is the beginning of philosophy: a recognition of the
conflicts between men, a search for their cause, a
condemnation of mere opinion...and the discovery of a
standard of judgement” Epictetus, Discourses III:11