1. Beyond the crime-terror nexus:
Socio-economic status, violent crimes and terrorism

2. Criminal offences with terrorist intent
Terrorism utilizes (a threat of) violence to achieve political objectives (Schmid, 2016).
According to the Article 83a, terrorist intent is an attempt “to seriously intimidate the population (or part of it), and/or […] to force the government or any organization to act or refrain from acting, and/or to disrupt the political, economic or social structure of a country.”
Realistic threat of terrorist attacks in the Netherlands (AIVD)
Foreign fighters
Cross-border criminal jihadi networks
The common denominator in the crime-terror nexus is the use of violence.

3. Crime-terror nexus
Crime-terror nexus = terrorism + crime (organized or sporadic)
Traditionally, drugs trade have mantled with ideological struggles (FARC; Islamic militants in the Middle East)
Terrorists often have a criminal record and/or
use the services of criminal networks, e.g. forged documents, weapons or explosives
Makarenko's security continuum
terrorist and organized crime interact and overlap
strategic cooperation, rarely complete convergence
blurred line between criminal and terrorist motivations
In the West, the confluence between terrorist and criminal groups intensified after 9/11 (Gallagher, 2016).
‘traditional’ funding sources have evaporated (Wang, 2010)
replaced with drug trafficking, robberies, kidnapping, arms trading, and smuggling (Hutchinson & O’malley, 2007)
An important commonality between organized crime and terrorism refers to extensive organizational capability, albeit divergent objectives
(Sanderson, 2004; Shelley & Picarelli, 2002). Terrorists utilize criminal activities to support their political or ideological ends, whereas organized criminals engage in terrorist activities in order to maximize illegal profit.

4. Sageman’s four waves of international Jihadi terrorism
1st ‘inspirational’ wave (the conflict between Afghanistan and Soviet Union); international Mujahedeen fighters
2nd ‘elite’ wave (Bin Laden, highly educated Middle Eastern immigrants (e.g. 9/11 attackers).
3rd ‘home grown’ wave (inspired by the Iraq war)
4th ‘gangsta’ wave (Syrian war, ISIS)
Immigrants gangs (Europol)
80% history of violent or petty crimes (Basra and Neumann, 2016)
loosely affiliated, ‘sporadic’ criminals, fragmentized cells.
prison radicalization & recruitment
Little is known about socio-economic drivers of the contemporary crime-terror nexus
linear historical overview of the crime-terror nexus, viewed as a dynamic phenomenon, influenced by Zeitgeist
4th wave: detention centers often ‘dating-service’ for criminals and extremists

5. The “fourth wave” of the crime-terror nexus
Criminological strain perspectives: blocked opportunities, adversity and stress may lead to alternative solutions to adversity, including crime (Agnew, 2010).
Psychological perspectives: the loss of education and employment may lead to ‘significance loss’, promoting a perception of life as meaningless (Kruglanski and colleagues, 2006, 2009).
Sociological perspectives: status disadvantages among the European “underclass” facilitate collaboration of the ‘common’ and ‘terror’ criminals to advance their respective economic and political goals (Makarenko, 2004; Ballina, 2011).
According to Alain Grignard, home-grown terrorism can be seen as an extension of inner-city crime.

6. Who are those “Jihadi gangsters”
According to Sageman (2005), individual transition from an ‘ordinary’ offender to a terrorist is largely a function of someone’s social network
‘bunch of violent guys”
cross-national (jihadi) identity (Cotte, 2011).
Crenshaw (1987) emphasizes redemption, that is, a road to salvation from past sins (e.g. promiscuity, drugs, alcohol, or a criminal past).
Adverse socioeconomic status
contributes to one’s vulnerability to violent offending in the first place
increases resilience towards de-radicalization and re-socialization

8. The findings on jihadist networks (N=209) reported in De Bie (2016).
What are the educational and employment characteristics of violent and terrorist offenders?
We used three sources of data on educational and employment characteristics of violent and terror offenders:
Dutch statistical data (CBS) including the Police Recognition System (HKS) on violent criminals (N=3499).
The findings on jihadist networks (N=209) reported in De Bie (2016).
The open-access on European terrorists (N=26).
criminological implications of strain in general & instrumental use of violence in particular

9. Comparison of socio-economic characteristics of violent offenders and foreign fighting suspects in the Netherlands
Gender distribution: 82% of violent offenders and 84% of jihadists are men
Almost 40% of violent offenders and 90% of jihadists are non-Western immigrants.
Interestingly, 68% of violent offenders and 63% of Jihadi sympathizers have only completed primary school. None of them had followed higher education.
A great majority of violent offenders (93.4%) and 64% jihadi sample was unemployed in the year of offending.
age group that is most comparable to those of terrorist offenses. From empirical literature in the Netherlands. the large majority of terrorist suspects and offenders are emerging adults, year olds

10. Findings from open sources on perpetrators of recent terrorist attacks in Europe
Search criteria: active involvement in violence; available data on educational and employment status at the time of attack.
The sample consists of 27 European terrorists, all men
65% was born in France or Belgium.
70% belongs to second-generation immigrants.
50% completed only secondary education or less. Only two persons attended vocational university of college, and three have attended university.
70% unemployed at the time of attack.
50% previously involved in violent crimes (and/or had joined foreign fighters’ jihadi groups abroad).
One third of the sample radicalized in prison

11. Conclusion
Criminals are an attractive target audience for terrorist recruiters
Perhaps, due to easy “access to weapons and forged documents, as well as the psychological ‘skill’ of familiarity with violence” (Basra & Neumann, 2016).
Furthermore, low socio-economic status is prevalent among both violent and terror offenders.
Likewise, European data on terrorism shows that at least two thirds of radicals are poorly educated and/or unemployed (Marret, 2010; Lichfield, 2015; Higgins & De La Baume, 2015).
- However, the findings merely inform us about the background conditions under which violent and terrorist crime can originate!
- Challenge for future research: causal antecedents of the 4th wave jihadi terrorism
Comparing the sample of the European group with Dutch samples reveals some interesting dissimilarities. All jihadi terrorists in the European sample are men. In contrast, at least a fourth of (both violent and terror offenders) in the Dutch sample are women. The two groups also differ with regard to age. These dissimilarities may, at least partly, be explained by measurement differences: Age of the Dutch sample was recorded at the time of violent crime and/or the time when persons attempted to or joined terrorist groups abroad. In contrast, European terrorists’ age was recorded at the time of attack. Many of them, including perpetrators of Brussels and Paris attacks have committed violent crimes or (attempted) to join ISIS at the age which is comparable with the Dutch sample

12. Policy implications
Alternative, pro-social means for significance gain
Education and employment may decrease the potential for crime and terror among disadvantaged groups
Subtle criminal monitoring & prevention strategies in deprived districts
Multicultural associations and community networks in support of mutual (interethnic and interreligious) understanding
Needless to say, not all those who are poor and face adversity become terrorists or criminals. Neither is poverty a necessary characteristics of ideologically motivated violence. the socio-economic profile of crime and terror offenders have been evolving and changing over time
disadvantageous youth are particularly at risk to be exposed to (and involved into) to all forms of violence in their immediate surroundings, such as family, neighbourhood and school.