1. Initial Capabilities Document Review
Slide 1 – Introduction -- Self Introduction and to get familiar with the class and its make-up.

2. Lesson Goals Objective:
This class is about comparing and contrasting 2 ICDs,
One basically good (JCIDS compliant) and
One basically bad (JCIDS non-compliant)
Build a bridge between old documents and new guidance
Address changes from new JCIDS Guidance
Blue text indicate the changes to the JCIDS Manual
Goal:
Provide some tools/techniques to help you review ICDs
Slide 2 - Introduction
I put in blue things that changed from old lesson to build the bridge
Objective
This class is about comparing and contrasting 2 ICDs, one basically JCIDS compliant and one basically JCIDS non-compliant

3. Is JCIDS Broken? ICD Review - RQM 310 SLIDE 3 – ICD Review – RQM 310
Attention-getting step—this is an experienced class and use this time to dialogue with students about whether JCIDS is really broke as critics allege or is it people not using the system as designed.
Also discuss if JCIDS is not doing its job, what is inhibiting successful execution
Is JCIDS Broken
Open the floor for discussion

4. Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper (Ret) Inside the Pentagon, June 17, 2010
Retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper long a critic of JCIDS, urged scrapping it with a more streamlined system.
“Fundamentally, JCIDS is the process the joint community uses for force development, that is, the creation of forces for the future,” he said.
The two main problems with JCIDS:
An overly bureaucratic approach
Focus on materiel solutions to the detriment of the DOTMLPF solutions
Slide 5 – Lt Gen Paul Van Riper USMC (Ret) - Quote
Retired Marine Corps Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper, long a critic of JCIDS, argues it cannot be fixed and should be replaced with a more streamlined system.
JCIDS is too bureaucratic and too focused on materiel solutions, he told Inside the Pentagon.
“Fundamentally, JCIDS is the process the joint community uses for force development, that is, the creation of forces for the future,” he said.
“The two main problems with JCIDS are an overly bureaucratic approach and a focus on materiel solutions to the detriment of doctrine, organization, training, leader education, personnel and facilities.
Seldom is enough consideration given to trade-off among materiel solutions and the other elements of the process --doctrine, organization, training, etc,”
He said. “Personally, I don’t think JCIDS is fixable; the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff need to start over with a streamlined system ‘driven’ by the Capstone Concept for Joint Operations. At the same time they need to walk away from most of the existing concepts, which are poorly written and designed to protect various equities rather than advance joint warfighting capabilities.”
Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper (Ret)
U.S. Marine Corp
“Inside the Pentagon, June 17, 2010, p1

5. Is JCIDS Broken?
JCIDS is not too focused on materiel solutions, the PEOPLE doing the analysis may be, but the system fully accounts for non-materiel solutions and the analysis is suppose to exhaust those possibilities before identifying materiel approaches
Slide 6 – Is JCIDS Broken? (BUILD SLIDE)
Is JCIDS Broken (Build Slide)
JCIDS is not too focused on materiel solutions, the PEOPLE doing the analysis may be, but the system fully accounts for non-materiel solutions and the analysis is suppose to exhaust those possibilities before identifying materiel approaches (and it is materiEl not materiAl)
Everything in the Pentagon is overly bureaucratic—not just JCIDS.  It is built that way and intended to be that way. 
As Tax payer I kind of want it that way -- It is a risk averse building that makes sure everything is vetted at every level to ensure a consensus is achieved whether or not it is the right answer—just one that nobody disagrees with.
Everything in the Pentagon is overly bureaucratic—not just JCIDS.  It is built that way and intended to be that way
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As Tax Payer I kind of want it that way -- It is a risk averse building that makes sure everything is vetted at every level to ensure a consensus is achieved
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6. ICD Compliance / Review
ICD Review - RQM 310
ICD Compliance / Review
Slide 7 – ICD Compliance / Review
Transition Slide

7. Compliance Two parts to compliance Capstone guidance for CBAs / ICDs
Content – does underlying analysis meet the intent of guidance
Format – does the document comply with JCIDS Manual / CDTM
Capstone guidance for CBAs / ICDs
CBA is an analytic basis to identify capability gaps / requirements:
Validation of an ICD validates;
The capability requirements and proposed IOC/FOC meet National Military Strategy (NMS) and Combatant Commander (CCMD) need
The capability requirements are prioritized and do not provide unnecessary redundancy across the Joint Force
Slide 8 – Compliance
Describe compliance in terms of content and format
Two parts to compliance
Content – does underlying analysis meet the intent of guidance
Format – does the document comply with JCIDS Manual / CDTM
Capstone guidance for CBAs / ICDs
CBA is an analytic basis to identify capability gaps / requirements:
Validation of an ICD validates;
The capability requirements and proposed IOC/FOC meet National Military Strategy (NMS) and Combatant Commander (CCMD) need
The capability requirements are prioritized and do not provide unnecessary redundancy across the Joint Force

8. Quick ICD Review
ICD must capture the results of a well-framed CBA or other studies
ICD summarizes the results of DOTmLPF-P analysis
ICD describes;
Military problem being addressed
Tasks, Conditions and Standards
Capability Requirements and Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies
Risks associated with each capability gap
Threat / operational environments
DOTmLPF-P analysis
Recommended Materiel Approaches
ICD is a required input to Materiel Development Decision (MDD) and guides Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase
ICDs will typically support an AoA / materiel approach
Slide 9 – Quick ICD Review
Voice-over – The ICD Describes what’s in an ICD and you will se on the next slide how these areas align with the 7 sections of an ICD.
ICD must capture the results of a well-framed CBA or other studies
ICD summarizes the results of DOTmLPF-P analysis
ICD describes;
Military problem being addressed
Tasks, Conditions and Standards
Capability Requirements and Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies
Risks associated with each capability gap
Threat / operational environments
DOTmLPF-P analysis
Recommended Materiel Approaches
ICD is a required input to Materiel Development Decision (MDD) and guides Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) phase
ICDs will typically support an AoA / materiel approach

9. Quick ICD Review
ICD Section Descriptions -- The ICD shall have the following seven sections, followed by four appendices
The body of an ICD – consisting of the seven primary sections and Appendix A -- The ICD shall be no more than 10 pages long
Executive Summary (Not to exceed 1 page)
Section1 - CONOPS Summary
Section 2 - Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Section 3 – Capability Requirements
Section 4 - Capability Gaps and Overlaps / Redundancies
Section 5 - Threat and Operational Environment:
Section 6 – Assessment of Non-Materiel Approaches (DOTmLPF-P Analysis)
Section 7 - Final Recommendation: Non-materiel / Materiel approaches
Mandatory Appendix
Appendix A: Architecture Data
Appendix B: References
Appendix C: Acronym List
Appendix D: Glossary
Slide 10 – Quick ICD Review (cont)
ICD Section Descriptions -- The ICD shall have the following seven sections, followed by four appendices
The body of an ICD – consisting of the seven primary sections and Appendix A -- The ICD shall be no more than 10 pages long
Executive Summary (Not to exceed 1 page)
Section1 - CONOPS Summary
Section 2 - Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Section 3 – Capability Requirements
Section 4 - Capability Gaps and Overlaps / Redundancies
Section 5 - Threat and Operational Environment:
Section 6 – Assessment of Non-Materiel Approaches (DOTmLPF-P Analysis)
Section 7 - Final Recommendation: Non-materiel / Materiel approaches
Mandatory Appendix
Appendix A: Architecture Data
Appendix B: References
Appendix C: Acronym List
Appendix D: Glossary

10. ICD Comparison / Review
There are LOTS of BAD ICDs that get approved
Why do less than fully compliant ICDs get approved?
Time
Apathy / lack of equity
Expertise
“Back scratching mentality”
Nobody reads them / who cares
Great brief bad ICD
Is it the process — Or is it the people inside the JCIDS process
Slide 11 – ICD Comparison / Review (Build Slide)
There are LOTS of BAD ICDs that get approved
Why do less than fully compliant ICDs get approved?
Time
Apathy / lack of equity
Expertise
“Back scratching mentality”
Nobody reads them / who cares
Great brief bad ICD
Is it the process — Or is it the people inside the JCIDS process
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11. Look at 2 Initial Capability Documents,
What’s In A Title?
Look at 2 Initial Capability Documents,
Both ICDs were approved by the JROC
Armed Aerial Scout (Sponsor: Army)
Airborne Strategic Deterrence (Sponsor: Air Force)
Slide 12 – What’s in a Title (Build Slide)
What’s in a Title — What stands out ?
Armed Aerial Scout ICD vs Airborne Strategic Deterrence ICD
Solution vs Capability
As a side note the Armed Aerial Scout ICD was repackaged from Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter and was written during the JCIDS transition period between CJCSI 3170 F and G.
The Airborne Strategic Deterrence ICD was worked entirely under CJCSI 3170G
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12. Executive Summary Executive Summary
Not to exceed 1 page, shall follow the cover page and precede the body of the ICD
Slide An executive summary, not to exceed 1 page, shall follow the cover page and precede the body of the ICD.

13. 1. Concept of Operations Summary
­Describe the relevant parts of the Joint Concepts, CONOPS, and/or Unified Command Plan (UCP) - assigned mission to which the capability requirements identified in the ICD contribute
­What operational outcomes they provide
­How they complement the integrated joint / multinational warfighting force
­What enabling capabilities are required to achieve the desired operational outcomes.
Slide 14 – Use this slide to provide an overview of what the JCIDS Manual says should be addressed in Section 1, CONOPs of the ICD.
­Describe the relevant parts of the Joint Concepts, CONOPS, and/or Unified Command Plan (UCP)-assigned mission to which the capability requirements identified in the ICD contribute;
­What operational outcomes they provide;
­What effects they must produce to achieve those outcomes; and
­How they complement the integrated joint/multinational warfighting force;
­What enabling capabilities are required to achieve the desired operational outcomes.

14. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) 1. Concept of Operations Summary
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Identify the UCP-assigned mission
The fundamental purpose of an Armed Aerial Scout is to conduct armed reconnaissance, security operations, and attack missions in support of full spectrum operations. In doing so, it improves the commander's ability to maneuver and concentrate superior combat power against the enemy at the decisive time and place. The following are descriptions of the mission areas this capability contributes to, what operational outcomes it provides and what effects it must produce to achieve those outcomes.
Operational outcomes
The precise application of combat power and effective synchronization of maneuver and supporting fires require a current and accurate picture of the enemy's current dispositions and activity within a given area of operations. An Armed Aerial Scout plays a critical role in providing this information and provides advantages over other intelligence sources by countering enemy deception efforts, providing improved real-time situational awareness and assessing terrain.
Integrate into the joint / multinational warfighting force
???
Identify enabling capabilities
to conduct armed
reconnaissance, security operations, and attack missions in support of full spectrum
operations.
Slide 15 — Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) CONOPS (Build Slide)
Identify a Unified Command Plan (UCP) - assigned mission?
This slide shows that Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) ICD does not meet the letter or intent of addressing how the capability meets a UCP-assigned mission.
The paragraph makes no mention of any UCP-assigned mission.
… to conduct armed reconnaissance, security operations, and attack missions in support of full spectrum operations.
Operational outcomes?
The slide shows that the sponsor failed to provide any operational outcomes associated with the desired capability.
The mention of what an AAS will do shows that the sponsor had a solution in mind while writing the ICD.
The paragraph does not mention what outcomes must be attained and indicates a lack of analysis.
Does the ICD mention Integrated into a Joint / Multinational fight?
The ICD makes no mention of how AAS will integrate into the Joint Force or any enabling capabilities required to employ the AAS.
Does the ICD Identify enabling capabilities?
The ICD makes no mention any enabling capabilities required to employ the AAS.
AAS is a solution, not a capability.
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15. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 1. Concept of Operations Summary
Identify the UCP-assigned assigned mission
CDRUSSTRATCOM is the lead combatant commander for strategic deterrence planning and is responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations.” Unified Command Plan, 17 Dec 2008, pg 27
The capabilities identified in this Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) directly contribute to the deterrence mission as identified in USSTRATCOM’s Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC) , tasks established in the Unified Command Plan and requirements …….
Operational outcomes
(a) assure friends and allies, (b) dissuade potential adversaries from developing or expanding inventories of (c) deter potential adversaries
Integrate into the joint / multinational warfighting force
deterrence capabilities complement the joint warfighter’s integrated campaign plan -- preventing the need to escalate to armed conflict.
Slide 16 — Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) CONOPS
Identify a Unified Command Plan (UCP) - assigned mission?
Sponsor makes clear linkage to both the UCP and the STRATCOM Joint Operating Concept.
Airborne Strategic Deterrent (ABSD) is a capability not a solution.
What operational outcomes are provided?
Sponsor provides clear operational outcomes, assure, deter and dissuade.
They have a more strategic focus than operational but that is inherent in nuclear deterrence.
JCIDS has to be flexible to accommodate.
Does the ICD mention Integrated into a Joint / Multinational fight?
Sponsor discusses integrating into a joint campaign plan.
It is more difficult to show because if deterrence is effective, then no campaign plan is executed.

16. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 1. Concept of Operations Summary
Identify enabling capabilities to achieve operational outcome
Enabling capabilities required to achieve Assurance, Dissuasion And Deterrence (ADD) include:
an understanding of allied and adversary goals, priorities and values
an effective Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) providing early warning, assessing programs and threats, adversary behaviors and intentions, targeting, and post attack analysis
a secure, survivable Command, Control and Communications
the building and cultivation of strategic partners
the maintenance of a robust and responsive conventional and nuclear industrial base to sustain capabilities over time and
an effective hedge against technical and/or geopolitical uncertainties.
Slide 17 – ABSD CONOPS Summary
Does the ICD Identify enabling capabilities?
Sponsor provides a reasonable list of enabling capabilities.
The point is not to debate if the list is complete but to ensure consideration is given.
We are not grading their homework or analysis, but ensuring that analysis was done.

17. 2. Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Cite the applicable Tier 1 and Tier 2 JCAs
Range of military operations
Timeframe for IOC based upon input from CCMD / AQ
Relevant Integrated Security Constructs (ISC), if applicable
Slide 18 – Joint Capability Area
(Talking Points) Particular attention should be focused on timeframe and DPSs.
Timeframe is important to ensure capability can be delivered when required and will be reviewed during the AoA review and CDD review.
DPSs (ICSs) are important to ensure analysis is conducted against joint-approved scenarios and cover the ROMO to identify tasks, conditions and standards.
­Cite the applicable Tier I and II JCAs from reference hh , and
­The range of military operations being addressed.
­Identify the timeframe under consideration for initial operational capability based on input from supported/supporting CCMDs and the acquisition community.
­Also identify the Relevant Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) (ICS), if any, applicable to this ICD.
Integrated Security Constructs (ISCs)
ISCs contain scenarios for major combat operations.
Military objectives of the ISCs provide a source for developing the list of required capabilities.
Developed as part of the DoD Analytic Baseline in accordance with DoDD and DoDI
Integrated Security Constructs (ISCs) - Developed as part of the DoD Analytic Baseline. ISCs contain scenarios for major combat operations. Military objectives of the ISCs provide a source for developing the list of required capabilities.

18. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) 2. Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Cite the applicable JCAs
Battlespace Awareness
Force Application
Command and Control
Net-Centric
Range of military operations
Conventional Warfare
Forcible Entry
Unconventional Warfare
Show of Force
Peace Enforcement
Peacekeeping Operations
Normal and Routine Military Operations
Timeframe
timeframe from 2015 through approximately 2024
Relevant Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) (ICS) - ?????
Slide 19 – AAS JCAs
Cite the applicable Tier 1 and Tier 2 JCAs
AAS does list applicable JCAs and they seem appropriate.
Again, ensuring they are addressed is more important than grading whether they are perfect
Range of military operations seems appropriate however, the disconnect is in the last main bullet.
Another indicator that no analysis was conducted.
No DPSs are cited so what was the basis for the list of missions in the ROMO?
Timeframe for IOC based upon input from CCMD / AQ -- The timeframe seems tight—this was a 2009 document and they are looking at 2015.
Nothing gets fielded from an ICD in 6 years unless buying COTS.
Relevant Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) (ICS), if applicable
The timeframe should align with the DPSs but there are no DPSs and no indication of what really drove this timeframe

19. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 2. Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Cite the applicable JCAs
ABSD capabilities reside in FA, supporting the Maneuver and Engagement Tier 1 & 2 JCAs
Supporting capability areas include: Battlespace Awareness (BA), Command and Control (C2), Corporate Management (CM), Force Support (FS), Net Centric (NC) and Protection (FP)
Range of military operations
Deterrence capabilities are applicable across the entire Range of Military Operations (ROMO)
Timeframe
a 2020 threat environment.
Relevant Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) (ICS)
The ABSD CBA was informed by Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) 2-4 (Bipolar, Multi-polar and Global Insurgency worlds) . Table 2.1 lists the Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) vignettes
Slide Airborne Strategic Deterrence JCAs
Cite the applicable JCAs
ABSD does list applicable JCAs that seem appropriate.
Range of military operations
The sponsor states that deterrence occurs across the ROMO and essentially expands the role of traditional nuclear deterrence to a broader mission area
Timeframe
The timeframe is 2020 based on the expected service life of the Air Launch Cruise Missile.
Relevant Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) (ICS)
Sponsor clearly states which DPSs were selected as the basis of the analysis.

20. 3. Capability Requirements
Describe capabilities required in CBA or other study
Why are they essential to Sponsor to achieve goals / objectives
Relate to Concept, CONOPs, UPC-assigned mission
Address compliance with OSD, Joint, National, International, policies and regulations
Define capability requirements in JCA lexicon
UJTLs / METLs
Relevant Range of Military Operations
Timeframe Under Consideration
Operational attributes, qualitative parameters, metrics
Minimum value below which capability will no longer be effective
Slide Covers what is required to be in this section of an ICD.
Capability requirements and capability gaps must be described in terms of the ISCs assessed on achieving the relevant military objectives
Capability requirement table added

21. 3. Capability Requirements
Provide a summary of the relationship between JCAs, capability requirements and relevant attributes, and their associated metrics and minimum values in a table
Tier1 & Tier 2 JCAs
Capability Requirements
Metrics
Minimum Value
 JCA X.X
Capability 1
Attribute 1.1
Description
Value (No TBDs)
Attribute 1.n
Capability 2
Attribute 2.1
Attribute 2.n
Slide 22 – Capability Requirements
Provide a summary of the relationship between JCAs, capability requirements and relevant attributes, and their associated metrics and minimum values in a table as shown in JCIDS Manual Table B-1.
Table 3.x - Capability Requirements Table

22. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) 3. Capability Requirements
Describe capabilities required in CBA
the need for an Armed Aerial Scout to enable dominant maneuver for the joint air-ground maneuver force by providing aggressive combined arms reconnaissance.
Why are they essential for JFC to achieve objectives
The Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires a relatively low cost, armed aerial scout platform that requires minimal training support, is supportable within the planned logistics environment, affordable with the planned level of logistics resources throughout the lifecycle, and is interoperable with organic and joint fires systems and manned/unmanned aviation platforms.
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requires a relatively low cost
Slide 23 – AAS Required Capability (BUILD SLIDE)
Paragraph basically articulates Army doctrine for armed reconnaissance.
Describe capabilities required in CBA (How do you do an AoA on this?)
The paragraph makes no mention of how these capabilities were derived through analysis.
This section needs to discuss how capabilities were derived from the CBA and the inability of the programmed force to conduct assigned tasks for the scenario.
Why are they essential for JFC to achieve objectives
The paragraph about the JFC objectives makes no mention of contributing to a JFC objective.
These objectives should be derived from the ISCs. JFCs do not care about cost, training, life cycle costs, etc. That is Service responsibility, not a JFC concern.
Another indication that the Sponsor already had acquisition considerations in mind and no analysis was conducted.
affordable with the planned level of logistics
resources throughout the lifecycle
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23. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) 3. Capability Requirements
Capability is required to comply with OSD, Joint, National policies
????????
Identify JCAs to which capability contributes
Force Application
Command and Control
Net-Centric
Protect
Use JCAs to describe capabilities
The Armed Aerial Scout capability gap has been repeatedly identified in previous studies and analysis including: …….
current rotary wing aircraft employed by Army aviation in the armed reconnaissance role have shortcomings in performance, lethality, interoperability and survivability.
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Slide AAS Required capability (cont) (BUILD SLIDE)
Capability is required to comply with OSD, Joint, National policies
The ICD makes no mention of linkage or tie into OSD, Joint or national policies
Identify JCAs to which capability contributes
ICD does bin JCAs
Use JCAs to describe capabilities
The “Use JCAs to Describe Capabilities” section is a red flag with the comment about being shortfalls being repeatedly identified in previous studies and discussing current shortfalls in capability.
Both are indications that no analysis of operating in a future environment was conducted.
Previous studies, etc are not inherently bad, but the capability must be delivered for anticipated future scenarios not current or past operations.
One of the challenges with this ICD is that it’s looking backward vs forward
AAS “gap” is identified in previous studies dating from
1987, Applying the NTC Experience: Tactical Reconnaissance (RAND)
1991, Value of Army Aviation Reconnaissance Literature Review
1992, Armed Reconnaissance/Scout/Light Attack Helicopter Force Multiplier (Burdeshaw)
1993, Bottom-Up Review
1993, Measuring the Value of Scout/Reconnaissance (RAND)
, Manned and Un-Manned (MUM) I-IV Studies
2002, Defense Planning Guidance 04 Helicopter Study
2003/2008 USCENTAF Lessons Learned from OIF/OEF (Unclassified)
capability gap has been repeatedly identified in previous
studies and analysis
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8 Studies

24. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 3. Capability Requirements
Describe capabilities required in CBA
These required capabilities (listed alphabetically) from the CBA formulated the ICD recommendations.
(U) Adaptable
(U) Clear/Visible.
(U) Credible
(U) Effective.
(U) Endurable.
(U) Global in Coverage.
(U) Persistently Present.
(U) Responsive.
(U) Survivable.
(U) Tailorable.
Slide 25 – Required Capability ABSD
Describe capabilities required in CBA
ABSD does a good job of clearly listing the capabilities required by the airborne leg of the Triad to assure, deter and dissuade, ie achieve the operational outcomes.

25. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 3. Capability Requirements
Capability is required to comply w/ OSD, Jt, National policies
above capabilities are essential because they provide credible deterrent tools to the National Command Authority and the Joint Force Commander to achieve military objectives which support Assurance, Dissuasion and Deterrence (ADD).
Identify JCAs to which capability contributes
directly support both Maneuver and Engagement in the Force Application (FA) Tier 1 JCAs.
Use JCAs to describe capabilities
The ABSD capabilities do not apply to any Tier 1 & Tier 2 JCAs that have been prioritized by the SWarF process. The STRATCOM SWarF process identified nuclear strike attributes but did not prioritize JCAs
Prioritize capabilities through SWarFs
These capabilities are rooted in previous USSTRATCOM deterrence analysis and refined in the USSTRATCOM Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF). A crosswalk of SWarf attributes with ABSD capabilities is found in Appendix I
Slide 26 – Required Capability ABSD (cont)
Capability is required to comply with OSD, Joint, National policies
ABSD sponsor links strategic deterrence to the tools required by both the NCA and the JFC to comply with National, OSD and Joint policies to assure, deter and dissuade
Identify JCAs to which capability contributes
The sponsor ties the required capabilities to Engage and Maneuver JCAs.
This is tough because there are no JCAs for deterrence and these JCAs are really when deterrence fails.
They did the best they could given the uniqueness of this mission set.
Use JCAs to describe capabilities
Deterrence is not well articulated in the JCA construct so it is difficult to align to the JCAs for required capabilities to ASSURE, DETER and DISSUADE.

26. 4. Capability Gaps/Overlaps/Redundancies
Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited
Describe capability gaps or overlaps in terms of the difference between capability requirements in Sec 3 and performance of current / projected force
Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced
Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies
Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc
Prioritize capability gaps based upon operational risk
Rules for capabilities
Contain operational attributes
General enough to not prejudice outcome in favor of a particular means
Slide 27 – 4. Capability Gaps/Overlaps/Redundancies
(Talking Points) Covers what is required to be in this section of an ICD.
Points worthy of discussion are the difference between sufficiency and proficiency and the
importance of linking CONOPs to UCP missions to CBA results deriving capability gaps and shortfalls into required capabilities.
This enables you to better prioritize risk because you can tie it to mission outcomes.
Describe the mission, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited
Include considerations of capabilities provided by other DoD components, Interagency, Allies / Partners
Capability gaps are assessed in terms of the risk to mission, risk to force, other important considerations
Assess if overlap is advisable for operational redundancy or should be evaluated for as potential tradeoff
Proficiency – cannot accomplish the mission to level expected -- Sufficiency – do not have enough to be effective
Lack of existing capability
Need for replacement due to aging, fatigue life, tech obsolescence, etc of existing capability
Policy limitations
The lack of existing capability, etc are still in the CBA guide section but not in the ICD template

27. Proposed Capability Requirements Current Capabilities (If Applicable)
4. Capability Gaps/Overlaps/Redundancies
Provide a summary of the Capability Gaps
Gaps are now articulated by defining the required metrics and min values and the current force metrics and values.
Prioritization done by the FCB
Proposed Capability Requirements
Current Capabilities (If Applicable)
Capability Requirements
Metrics
Minimum Value
Value
Capability 1
Attribute 1.1
Description
Value (No TBDs)
Attribute 1.n
Capability 2
Attribute 2.1
Attribute 2.n
Slide 28 – Capability Gap Table
Capability Gap table (Prioritization Removed from Table)
Gaps are now articulated by defining the required metrics and min values and the current force metrics and values.
Prioritization done by the FCB?
As a Foot Stomp – Later this week you will be presenting an ICD brief to a panel and you might think about having the Ch 4 table as part of the brief.
During the JCIDS process in the building, the tables are the meat of the brief and are discussed during the FCB phase of the briefing process.
Table 4.x - Capability Gap Table

28. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) 4. Capability Gaps/Overlaps/Redundancies
Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited
They are not sufficiently deployable to permit rapid concentration of aviation combat power to support a brigade combat team within 96 hours after liftoff, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. They do not have sufficient responsiveness in terms of speed and range to support operations across the entire area of operation forecast for the Division area in the future Modular Force…………
Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced - ???????
Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies
the capability described in this ICD should provide a solution to the armed aerial scout capability gaps resulting from the limitations of currently employed armed reconnaissance helicopters
Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc - ????
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concentration of aviation
combat power to support a brigade combat team within 96 hours after liftoff, a
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division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days.
Slide 29 – AAS Capability Gaps/Overlaps/Redundancies (BUILD Slide)
AAS does a very poor job of describing what cannot be accomplished.
The verbiage is not tied to any DPS requiring deploying a brigade combat team within 96 hours after liftoff, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days.
Even if this were a valid requirement, is the inability to do this (and they have not said they can’t, only that it is a requirement) is the problem with the Army or the TRANCSOM. This could be a shortfall in strategic lift.
The ICD does not say how much speed or how much responsiveness is required or what bad will happen if not met.
 The AAS ICD makes no reference to proficiency or sufficiency
 What is inherently wrong with 3rd bullet?? – ICDs Don't provide Solutions
The AAS does not address capability gaps, overlaps or redundancies.
Instead, it describes what the solution must be able to do in order to overcome limitations in current platforms.
ICDs do not describe solutions, just capability gaps and required capabilities. Those should be framed for a future operating environment vice correcting current shortfalls.
The AAS ICD had no linkages to CONOPs, UCPs, etc and made no effort to prioritize gaps in ICD based upon operational risk (ICD Table 4). Another indication that no CBA was performed.
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solution
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29. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 4
Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 4. Capability Gaps/Overlaps/Redundancies
Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited
Capability Gaps. [Remainder of paragraph REDACTED].
Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced
Determination of shortfalls as proficiency or sufficiency
The capability shortfalls discussed above exist now
Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies
There are no excess deterrence capability overlaps or redundancies in the 2020 timeframe
Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc
required capabilities support the Nuclear Response (NR) CONOPS requirement for Force Application…as follows:
Slide 30 – ABSD Capability Gaps/Overlaps/Redundancies
The ABSD ICD was classified SECRET so the capability gaps and shortfalls were redacted to security issues.
Discussion of proficiency, sufficiency, etc were also limited due to classification issues.
The analysis did indicate that there no overlaps or redundancies and this is logical for the airborne leg.
It would be reasonable to assume that if one reviewed the sea- based and ground-based legs (SLBM and ICBM) there would be overlaps and redundancies.
Links to CONOPs were established earlier and reinforced here with a link to the Nuclear Response CONOPs.
Table 4.1 is provided in the ICD and provides the priorities for required capabilities.

30. (5) Threat and Operational Environment.
Describe Joint operating environment
Summarize current and projected threat capabilities (lethal and non-lethal)
Reference DIA validated threat documents
Defense Warning Office threat validation
Approved Service intelligence products
Slide 32 – 5. Threat and Operational Environment
Description of environment already accomplished
Slide covers what is required to be in this section of an ICD
(5) Threat and Operational Environment.
Summarize the current and projected threat capabilities (lethal and non-lethal) to be countered.
- (a) Reference the current DIA-validated threat documents and DOD Component intelligence production center-approved products or data used to support the CBA.
- (b) During staffing, documents with JSDs of JROC Interest, Joint Capabilities Board (JCB) Interest, and Joint Integration will be subject to Defense Warning Office (DWO) threat validation in accordance with reference pp.1
[1] pp. CJCSI Series, “Joint Military Intelligence Requirements Certification”

31. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) 5. Threat and Operational Environment
Describe Joint operating environment
An armed aerial scout system will operate in both global and regional conflicts in support of operations ranging from peacetime engagements to conventional, high intensity, conventional or nuclear (general) warfare
Summarize current and projected threat capabilities
Projected threats include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), MANPADS and other surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), integrated air defense systems (IADS); fixed wing (including UAS) and rotary wing aircraft and associated air-to-air weapons, IADS; nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and information warfare.
Reference DIA validated threat documents
Reconnaissance Helicopter / Kiowa Warrior System Threat Assessment Report (STAR) – June 2007, Apache Block III STAR – March 2007, Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance Threat Environment Description (TED)
Approved Service intelligence products
Slide 33 – 5. AAS Threat and Operational Environment
The AAS ICD fails to describe a joint operating environment.
This description would be derived from the environments articulated in the DPSs.
The AAS ICD was not predicated upon the DPSs so they could not articulate an anticipated operating environment.
The description is non-specific and could be lifted from anything. Of particular note, does the sponsor really think an AAS will operate in a nuclear environment?
This point is worthy of discussion because people need to understand the cost of operating in that environment (over-pressurization, EMP hardening, etc).
Do not mention operating in a nuclear environment unless you really think it will happen.
This is why accurate DPS (ICSs) selection is so important.
Current and projected threats should be derived from the selected DPSs.
The AAS sponsor selected all possible threats with no analysis to support.
This has implications in engineering the solution.
If you develop a helicopter that can withstand all these threats, it will be too heavy to get off the ground

32. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 5
Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 5. Threat and Operational Environment
Describe Joint operating environment (REDACTED)
Summarize current and projected threat capabilities (REDACTED)
Operational Environment. (REDACTED)
Organizational resources.. (REDACTED)
Projected threat capabilities. (REDACTED)
Reference DIA validated threat documents
Approved Service intelligence products
All threat-based scenarios and excursions were derived from OSD’s analytic agenda and the Steady State Security Postures highlighted in Table 2.1. Greater detail on strategic environments and scenarios used can be found in Appendix J.
Slide 34 – 5. ABSD Threat and Operational Environment
ABSD is challenging here due to classification and the point of deterrence is to not operate.
If deterrence is successful, then you don’t have to operate.
The threat capabilities were redacted because the DPSs and posited threats were all classified but it does show that the threats were based upon analysis of the projected threats.

33. 6. DOTMLPF-P Analysis Assessment of Non-Materiel Approaches
Summarize the results of the analysis
Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency
If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation
Assessment of Non-Materiel Approaches
Summarize changes to DOTMLPF-P that were considered
Include consideration of Allies, partners, interagency, other DOD components
DOTmLPF-P Change Request (DCR) D
Doctrine O
Organization T
Training m
materiel* L
Leadership and Education P
Personnel F
Facilities
Policy
Joint DCRs do not advocate new materiel development, but rather advocate increased quantities of existing materiel capability solutions or use in alternate applications
JCIDS Manual, 4,b,(2),(d), pg A-5
Slide 35 – 6. DOTMLPF-P Analysis
A worthy discussion point is that DOTMLPF analysis is frequently misunderstood.
There are many ICDs where the DOTMLPF analysis section really addresses how the proposed solution would impact DOTMLPF.
The real purpose of DOTMLPF analysis is to do the necessary analysis to determine if non-materiel approaches could mitigate or solve any of the capability gaps and shortfalls.
The analysis should also be cognizant of materiel approaches that are dependent upon implementation of non-materiel solutions.
DOTMLPF Change Request (DCR)
D – Doctrine
O – Organization
T – Training
m – materiel – The specific needs of a force to complete a specific mission. The term is also often used in a general sense ("men and materiel") to describe the needs of a functioning army
L – Leadership and Education
P – Personnel
F – Facilities
P - Policy
(6) Assessment of Non-Materiel Approaches
Summarize the changes to DOTmLPF-P considered during the CBA or other analysis that would satisfy the capability gaps in part or in whole. Include consideration of capabilities in Allied/partner nations, the interagency, and other DOD Components.

34. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) 6. DOTMLPF-P Analysis
Summarize the results of the analysis
Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency
Doctrine. Changing current Army aviation doctrine will not eliminate or reduce the Armed Aerial Scout capability gap.  
Organization. The described Armed Aerial Scout capability gap cannot be eliminated or minimized by instituting organizational changes.  
Training. Training and education alternatives cannot address the aircraft performance limitations that comprise a significant portion of the capability gaps.
Leadership & Education. Leadership and education changes …..cannot eliminate the capability gap 
Personnel. Changes to personnel will not eliminate the …capability gap.
Facilities. Facilities changes do not address the capability gap.
If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation
Slide 36 – 6. AAS DOTMLPF-P Analysis
(Voice Over) For the AAS ICD by the time I’ve gotten this far in my reading and have seen limited Analysis -- I pretty much know that the Non-materiel and materiel analysis is going to be pretty limited.
The verbiage indicates that no analysis was done.
The Sponsor made the pre-determination that no non-materiel approaches were viable.
Further, “Armed Aerial Scout” is a solution, not a capability gap or a required capability.

35. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 6. DOTMLPF-P Analysis
Summarize the results of the analysis
Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency
If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation
Non-materiel solutions did not produce an effective U.S. force component for assurance dissuasion and deterrence thus necessitating the need to seek materiel approaches.
See Appendix H for a detailed description of the Non-Materiel Solutions considered.
Slide 37 – 6. ABSD DOTMLPF-P Analysis
The verbiage on the slide indicates that analysis was performed and the approaches are in Appendix H of the ICD.
It is logical that changes in the DOTMLPF spectrum will not fill capability gaps in the airborne leg of the Triad.

36. 7. Final Recommendations
Describe non-materiel approaches
Identify DOTmLPF-P recommendations considered as part of materiel solution
Identify DOTmLPF-P recommendations considered independent of materiel solution
Recommend type of materiel approach
Enhance an existing system / Information systems
Replace or recapitalize existing system
Develop new capability solution
Evolutionary development of an existing capability
Transformational Approach
Slide 38 – 7. Final Recommendations
Evolutionary and Transformational still address in CBA Guide but not called out specifically in ICD template
7. Final Recommendations
(a) Identify DOTmLPF-P recommendations to be considered as part of a materiel solution.
(b) Identify DOTmLPF-P recommendations to be considered independent of a materiel solution.
(c) For all capability requirements that cannot be met using non-materiel approaches, make specific recommendations on the type of materiel approach preferred to close each capability gap, which may be used by the MDA to adjust the scope of the AoA:
1. Enhancement of an Existing System. Enhancing an existing system includes development and fielding of IS, development of similar technologies to address high obsolescence rates, or evolution of the system through significant capability improvements.
2. Replacement or Recapitalization of an Existing System. ICDs will describe a plan to retire (sunset) an existing system as the new capability or version of legacy system is brought into service, and whether quantities should be reduced based on the increase in capability for the new system.

37. Armed Aerial Scout (AAS) 7. Final Recommendations
Describe non-materiel approaches
Recommend type of materiel approach
The DOTMLPF Analysis indicates that a materiel solution is required to eliminate the documented Armed Aerial Scout capability gap.
The alternative materiel approaches considered during the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) include the following six alternatives:
New-start Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft.
Upgrade an existing Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft 
Increased Attack A/C & Organizations.
Increased Off-board RSTA Assets.  
Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft.  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems
Slide 39 – 7. AAS - Final Recommendations
Verbiage supports the lack of analysis.
Armed Aerial Scout, by definition, is a materiel solution.
Oddly enough, no non-materiel approaches would fill the capability gap, but there are recommendations for “increasing organizations” which is a non-materiel approach.

38. Airborne Strategic Deterrence (ABSD) 7. Final Recommendations
Describe non-materiel approaches
Recommend type of materiel approach
Evolutionary development of an existing capability
Evolutionary solutions proved most capable in mitigating ABSD shortfalls
The analysis of the potential materiel solutions yielded two promising options:
A long range penetrating platform was assessed as most promising to mitigate ADD shortfalls
A long range penetrating weapon employed by both legacy and future airborne platforms was also assessed to significantly mitigate ADD shortfalls.
Slide 40 – 7. ABSD - Final Recommendations
The verbiage is exactly what guidance is seeking for materiel approaches.
The sponsor recommend and “evolutionary approach” and tied in the concept that both platforms and weapons needed to be considered.

39. Appendices Appendices Appendix A – Architectures (Mandatory)
Appendix B – References (Mandatory)
Appendix C – Acronyms (Mandatory)
Appendix D – Glossary (Mandatory)
Appendix E, F, …. (Supporting Documentation)
Slide 41 – Appendices

40. Appendices A: Architecture Data
Architectures
Appendices A: Architecture Data
Appendix A: Architecture Data.
Include the link(s) to the required architecture data identified in Table B-F-3 in accordance with references j and qq.
Other than the OV-1, do not include the diagrams themselves unless specifically referenced for illustration purposes elsewhere in the body of the ICD.
NOTE: - See architectures below
AV-1 -- Overview and Summary Information (Required)
OV-1 -- High-Level Operational Concept Graphic (Required)
AV-2 -- Integrated Dictionary (Required)
OV-2 -- Operational Resource Flow Description (Required)
CV-1 – Vision (Recommended)
OV-4 -- Organizational Relationships Chart (Required)
CV-2 -- Capability Taxonomy (Required)
OV-5a -- Operational Activity Decomposition Tree (Required)
CV-3 -- Capability Phasing (Recommended)
OV-5b -- Operational Activity Model (Optional)
CV-4 -- Capability Dependencies (Recommend)
SV-7 – Systems Measures Matrix or
SvcV-7 -- Services Matrix (Both SVs Recommended)
CV-6 -- Capability to operational Activities Mapping (Required)
Note: AV-1 – Must be registered, must be “Public” and “released” at the lowest classification level possible in DARS for compliance.
Note: SV-7 or SvcV-7 – The NR-KPP Measures data captured in the SV-7 or the SvcV-7.
Slide 42 – Architectures
Source: JCIDS Manual, Table B-F-3, (19Jan12), pg. B-F-6

41. Review You know you MAY have a bad ICD…..
If your ICD has the solution in the title …..
If you ICD clearly states “No CBA / analysis was conducted…..
If your ICD refers only to Lessons Learned and Past Studies…..
If your ICD makes no mention of Joint Operations…..
If your ICD has a timeframe of last year, this year or next year…..
If your ICD makes no reference to any DPS or joint warfighting scenario…..
If your ICD makes no reference to why capabilities are required for mission accomplishment…..
If your ICD lists the solutions required instead of approaches to solutions…..
If your ICD does not address any analysis on what non-materiel approaches were considered…..
And Finally---if the OV-1 in your ICD does not show all 5 Services…..
Slide 43 – Review (Build Slide)
You know you MAY have a bad ICD…..
If your ICD has the solution in the title …..
If you ICD clearly states “No CBA / analysis was conducted…..
If your ICD refers only to Lessons Learned and Past Studies…..
If your ICD makes no mention of Joint Operations…..
If your ICD has a timeframe of last year, this year or next year…..
If your ICD makes no reference to any DPS or joint warfighting scenario…..
If your ICD makes no reference to why capabilities are required for mission accomplishment…..
If your ICD lists the solutions required instead of approaches to solutions…..
If your ICD does not address any analysis on what non-materiel approaches were considered…..
And Finally---if the OV-1 in your ICD does not show all 5 Services…..