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Comparative political economics
Lecture 2 Paolo Graziano
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The Westminster model of democracy
Majority principle British parliamentary and governmental institutions Need for alternation that prevents ‘elective dictatorship’ Prerequisite: homogeneous societies UK, Canada… … Australia, New Zealand … … Barbados.
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The case of UK I concentration of executive power in one- party and bare-majority cabinets (large minority is excluded from power) – exception with minority cabinets in the ’70s cabinet dominance vis-à-vis Parliament (but possible – although rare - vote of no confidence) two-party system: Conservative and Labour party (but recently increase of the Liberal Democrats) majoritarian (single-member districts and ‘first past the post’) and disproportional (votes vs. seats) electoral system. interest group pluralism
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The case of the UK II unitary and centralized government
concentration of legislative power in asymmetrical bicameral legislature: House of the Commons and House of the Lords flexible (“unwritten”) Constitution absence of judicial review: Parliament is the sovereign authority (except for EU control…) central bank controlled by the executive (1997: power to set interest rates)
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The consensus model of democracy
more usable for ‘plural’ societies it contributes to conflict reduction… …guaranteeing strong minorities… …limiting the power of majorities. Switzerland, Belgium … … and the European Union.
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The cases of Switzerland/Belgium I
executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets executive-legislative balance of power (possible government instability) multiparty system (religious, socioeconomic and linguistic cleavages) proportional representation interest group corporatism (agreements reached among few strong political and social actors)
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The cases of Switzerland/Belgium II
federal and decentralized government strong bicameralism (with the partial exception of Belgium) constitutional rigidity: need of ‘supermajorities’ in order to change judicial review (but not in Switzerland) central bank independence
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A supranational case of CD: the EU I
executive power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets executive-legislative balance of power multiparty system proportional representation interest group corporatism
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A supranational case of CD: the EU II
federal and decentralized government strong bicameralism constitutional rigidity judicial review central bank independence
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