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Disruption Baseline, Monitor, Detect, Analyze, Respond, & Recover

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Presentation on theme: "Disruption Baseline, Monitor, Detect, Analyze, Respond, & Recover"— Presentation transcript:

1 Disruption Baseline, Monitor, Detect, Analyze, Respond, & Recover
Hervey Allen Chris Evans Phil Regnauld September 3 – 4, 2009 Santiago, Chile

2 Overview Disruption Hands-on Cyber Attack
Concepts, Examples, Motivations Hands-on Cyber Attack Concept Establishing a Baseline Demonstration of the Attack Monitoring & Detection Analyzing the Attack Response & Recovery Enacting Mitigation Actions Router Re-config DoS via DNS Queries

3 Disruption Disruption is the act of denying, degrading, or otherwise limiting the availability of services provided by a system or application

4 Disruption Some Examples:
Network Denial of Service – using the network protocols against themselves to saturate or overwhelm services or the links required to access them (e.g. SYN flood, DNS query flood) Hardware Denial of Service – making a change to the hardware which prevents the device from operating correctly (e.g. BIOS flashing) Service Reconfiguration – changing configurations or operating requirements such that the service, application or system no longer functions as intended (e.g. changing sshd_config to an unexpected port, disabling Windows services, overwriting system boot files)

5 Disruption Disruption can be done without any access to the systems affected DoS, DDoS, Traffic Floods, Amplification Attacks, … Disruption is also possible (and easier) with access to the system Rebooting hosts, router configuration changes, …

6 Disruption Network disruption attacks are a battle between attacker’s and defender’s provisioning capabilities. The one with more bandwidth, servers, capability, etc wins. They are typically done with BotNets since they offer an easy method of provisioning more than the defender can muster They take many, many forms – bandwidth saturation, malformed packets, server overload, etc

7 A Brief Aside – BotNets BotNet – “A collection of software robots, or bots, which run autonomously and automatically” Compromised Hosts (Zombies) are Centrally Controlled by a Single Entity (a Bot Herder) Typically Used for Malicious Purposes DDoS, spam, Non-attribution Attacks Simply said, a BotNet is a bunch of hosts which are controlled by a malicious entity. These hosts can be used for a variety of activities, but most commonly, are used for distributed denial of service attacks. Its important to note that BotNets present a method for an attacker to mask his identity (non-attribution) as the attack appear to be coming from hosts not related to the attacker.

8 A Brief Aside – BotNets Bot Herder Establishes a Presence
Step 1 – The Bot Herder (BotNet controller) decides he is going to setup a BotNet. Bot Herder Establishes a Presence

9 A Brief Aside – BotNets Bot Herder Creates a Delivery System
Step 2 – the Bot Herder establishes a server somewhere on the internet that is capable of delivering the BotNet software. This server can be used to deliver exploits, updates, host malicious webpages, etc. Bot Herder Creates a Delivery System - Delivers “BotNet” Payload to Hosts

10 A Brief Aside – BotNets Bot Herder Creates DNS Control Server
Step 3 – the Bot Herder establishes a command and control server for controlling the operation of the hosts in the BotNet. This server can use any protocol, and most often, they use IRC. For this example, we say the server uses DNS, but the protocol is entirely arbitrary. The selection of a protocol for BotNet control depends on the needs of the Bot Herder (i.e. IRC because its easily programmed, HTTP because it appears like normal web traffic, DNS because its guaranteed to be allowed through a firewall, etc) Bot Herder Creates DNS Control Server Issues Commands to Bots Receives Data From Bots

11 A Brief Aside – BotNets Bot Herder Identifies Candidate Hosts
Step 4 – the Bot Herder identifies hosts to be added to the BotNet. This can be done through vulnerability scanning, social engineering s, etc. In this example, we chose to use a socially engineering which results in a host downloading the BotNet software from the delivery server. The host runs this software, which turns the host into a “zombie” as it joins the BotNet. Bot Herder Identifies Candidate Hosts Sends Baited to Hosts Hosts Download Bot Malware from Server Hosts Become Zombies

12 A Brief Aside – BotNets Bot Herder Identifies Target
01 01 01 Step 5 – Using his new zombies, the Bot Herder decides to launch an attack. Controlling his zombies through the control server, he instructs the zombies to perform port scans looking for a target The zombies scan and report back the results through the control server 01 Bot Herder Identifies Target Issues Command via Control Server Zombies Receive Command from Server Zombies Locate Target Zombies Report Back to Server

13 A Brief Aside – BotNets Bot Herder Launches Attack at Target
01 01 01 Step 6 – having identified a target for a DDoS, the BotHerder starts his attack Using the control server again, he instructs the zombies to attack the target (SYN Floods, pings, web requests, DNS resolutions, etc). The zombies continue to attack the target until they are blocked or the BotHerder issues a stop command through the control server 01 Bot Herder Launches Attack at Target Issues Command via Control Server Zombies Attack Target Bot Herder Issues Stop Command

14 Disruption Hardware disruption attacks can be done remotely, but are easier to pull off with physical access Ease of system administration = vectors for attack Some hardware manufacturers allow remote flashing of system BIOS Physical access = complete control Don’t forget the obvious hammer to the PC trick

15 Disruption Service reconfiguration attacks can be done remotely or locally, but almost always require some sort of access (recall privilege escalation) Overwrite boot files Delete critical OS files Modify or create a hosts file Modify application configuration files Stop or disable MS Windows services System administration tasks can turn into service reconfiguration attacks in the blink of an eye This could be malicious or accidental!

16 Disruption Why are these attacks important to you?
They keep you from offering services to your customers Potentially tarnish your reputation as a service provider These attacks may coincide with other attacks The “loudest” attack usually receives administrator attention Be sure to watch the bigger picture - this may be a smoke screen These attacks will definitely affect your network The intent of the attack is to disrupt your operations

17 - Router Re-Configuration -
Disruption Cyber Attack - Router Re-Configuration -

18 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Your routers perform a critical service to your operation If they don’t work – you can’t provide service to your customers We will assume that you have a malicious user (an administrator) operating on the inside of your network who wants to disrupt the gateway router They have the credentials to conduct this attack

19 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Malicious actors might target your gateway routers: Because they are central points in the network Affecting one usually has broader effects Why? The obvious one: deny service Political statements Demonstrations of “power” Cyber “Riot”

20 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
The components needed for this attack Target IP address, credentials

21 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Recall Our Secure Operations Framework Monitor Detect Respond Recover Analyze Baseline

22 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Establish a Baseline for What’s Normal for Your Network: What are your current router configurations? Are your external links up? (silly question – but you may have authorized outages from your provider) Do you see fluctuations in your links over time? (e.g. poor service quality, satellite link outages, rainstorms, etc) Use this baseline to compare what you currently see to what you expect The key is expectation, if you aren’t expecting it, analyze it!

23 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Attack Demonstration

24 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Monitoring & Detection External Service Availability Router Configuration Monitoring CVS RANCID

25 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Monitoring & Detection Configure your network to monitor service availability and router configuration changes Monitor your detection tool(s) Establish a Baseline EX: Detecting Changes with SWATCH EX: Configuring RANCID

26 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Attack Demonstration (This time you can see how your network views the attack)

27 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Analysis - what did your detection tools report? Is this really an attack? External service availability Router configuration changes Where is the attack coming from? Was your external service availability affected?

28 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Response Actions aka “I’m Under Attack – What Do I Do Now?!” Prioritize – is anything else happening? Reload configuration from known good copy The actions you take: Should focus on restoring service – punish the guilty afterwards!

29 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
BUT WAIT – Dr. Evil has changed your router again – what has he done?? Attack Demonstration

30 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Analysis - what did your detection tools report? External service availability Router configuration changes Where is the attack coming from? Was your external service availability affected? Are there other indications of what occurred? Multi-Source Analysis – what else occurred about the same time as the configuration change?

31 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Response Actions aka “I’m Under Attack – What Do I Do Now?!” Prioritize – is anything else happening? Reload configuration from known good copy Make changes by hand?!

32 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Recovery Actions The attack is over – how do I prevent this again? Ask yourself “What _could_ have happened here?” Use your analysis tools to determine where attack originated from and who may have done it Consider use of a management VLAN or otherwise restrict infrastructure administration to certain IPs Setup automatic alerts for service availability and configuration changes

33 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
What Other Mitigation Steps Would You Take? What is appropriate for your network & resources? DISCUSSIONS

34 Disruption Cyber Attack – Router Re-Config
Attack Discussion Everyone hopes their employees are trustworthy – but history tells us otherwise Other Thoughts Before We Move On? Trust But Verify

35 Disruption Cyber Attack - DoS via DNS Queries -
Full Disclosure – we do not (yet) have traffic generation capabilities to saturate all 8 student group 100 Mbps links – so we will throttle your upstream router connections to demonstrate this attack Your backchannel connection will not be affected by the throttling (or the DoS) so you should be able to see the attack as it happens

36 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Your authoritative DNS servers are open to the world and remotely accessible They _have_ to be, otherwise, what’s the point? We will generate large numbers of DNS queries to saturate your upstream link Note that we are NOT targeting your DNS server! The effect is that external users will not be able to resolve DNS queries to your domain

37 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Malicious actors might target your DNS servers: Because they are remotely accessible You are guaranteed to have them DNS queries are easy to generate Why? The obvious one: deny service Political statements Demonstrations of “power” Cyber “Riot”

38 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
The components needed for this attack Target IP address, DNS query generation

39 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Recall Our Secure Operations Framework Monitor Detect Respond Recover Analyze Baseline

40 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Establish a Baseline for What’s Normal for Your Network: What is your current bandwidth? How much of your bandwidth is normally in use? How many queries do you normally see? Do you see fluctuations over time? (e.g. more queries in the morning than in the evening) Use this baseline to compare what you currently see to what you expect A spike in queries might indicate undue “interest” in you! You don’t want your first indication of an attack to be a customer calling you!

41 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Attack Demonstration

42 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Monitoring & Detection Bandwidth Monitoring Tools External Service Availability Smoke Ping Net Flow

43 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Monitoring & Detection Configure your network to monitor bandwidth and DNS queries Monitor your detection tool(s) Establish a Baseline EX: Configuring NFSen

44 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Attack Demonstration (This time you can see how your network views the attack)

45 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Analysis - what did your detection tools report? Is this really an attack? Bandwidth Usage Queries per second Where is the attack coming from? Was your external service availability affected?

46 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Response Actions aka “I’m Under Attack – What Do I Do Now?!” Prioritize – is anything else happening? Filter at your gateways based on the attack traffic Contact your upstream providers to filter Provision more services (bandwidth, secondaries, etc) The actions you take: Should focus on restoring service to your customers Depend on the extent of attack and where its originating from Depend on your connectivity and where your customers are located Recall establishing an architecture baseline – you don’t want to figure our where your links are while you are being attacked You may determine that you can mitigate the attack by closing your servers to queries from outside your country – your in-country customers are OK

47 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Recovery Actions The attack is over – how do I prevent this again? Ask yourself “What _could_ have happened here?” Provision additional bandwidth over separate links Provision geographically separated secondaries Anycasting Mutual Aid Agreements with other ccTLDs Response procedures for contacting upstream providers Procedures for determining customer priority

48 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
What Other Mitigation Steps Would You Take? What is appropriate for your network & resources? DISCUSSIONS

49 Disruption Cyber Attack – DoS via DNS
Attack Discussion DoS attacks can take many forms; effective monitoring is the only way to detect them External service monitoring (e.g. what does your network look like from the outside) can help too! Other Thoughts Before We Move On?

50 ? Questions? Do you have any questions about … Disruption Attacks
Detecting This Type of Attack Responding & Recovering From This Type of Attack ?


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