1. Trust and Distrust in Civil-Military Relations
The Case of Israel and the OT
Institute for Human and Social Sciences
National Defense Academy
Vienna, Austria
November 2013
Daniel Beaudoin

2. It is challenging to create trust between the military and civilian sectors
Military instrument of evil
Disciplined vs. lax
Purposeful vs. scattered
Since the early 1990s, Civil-Military Cooperation makes part of a heated debate within the civilian, humanitarian and military community regarding their relationship with each other.
Today’s military operations take place in complex environments. The military, multiple civilian and humanitarian institutions have to face a challenging and broader range of issues.
In various cases the military has been confronted with tasks that are not precisely 'military' in nature.
This has increased the importance of managing the civil-military interface, predominantly the one between the military and the humanitarian organisations.
And yet, it is argued, and experienced, a distrust between the…

3. Civil military coordination is a necessity
In complex emergencies  
Logistic support
Security to aid missions
When humanitarian needs exceed the capacity of a single agency.
To the humanitarian aid network provides efficiency in terms of cost, labor and resources for the aid organizations. A significant impetus behind efforts towards humanitarian coordination.

4. CIMIC in Israel and the OT

5. Who are the actors in the aid network in the OT?
EUROPEAN UNION, EUROPEAN COMMISION
WORLD BANK
EMBASSIES
TIPH
(Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Italy, Turkey)
OCHA
(Coordinator of Hum. Affairs)
UNSCO
(UN Special Coordinator)
UNRWA
(UN Relief and Works)
WHO
(World Health Org.)
UN Organizations
UNDP
(UN development program)
UNICEF
WFP
(World Food Program)
The OpT is characterized by a significant humanitarian network, and a developed civil military coordination mechanism
Many org’s representing a variety of agendas: some practical and solution oriented, some which are not: Political motivations, naming and shaming….
U.S.A.I.D
ANERA
CRS
SAVE THE CHILDREN
CARE
WORLD VISION
ICRC
MSF
(Doctors without Borders)

6. Israeli CIMIC structure - COGAT
Prime Minister
Minister of Defense
Chief of General Staff
Head of COGAT
The unit remains stable and mode of operation does not change with the change of political leadership.
Includes representatives of all the relevant government offices, in order to serve the Palestinian population in all civilian sectors in an efficient manner.
Short chain of command from the soldier at the checkpoint to the Minister of Defense.
Strikes the balance between the civilian needs of the Palestinian population and the security necessities of the State of Israel.
Long term accumulated knowledge of the population – at all levels (merchants, tribal affiliations, academic and social leadership, etc).
Intimate knowledge and understanding of the region’s religious and cultural characteristics and traditions.
Professional training facilities which includes: language, regional mentality and specific responsibilities.
Civil servants from the different government offices are represented and are subordinate to the unit.
In addition to coordinating and conveying messages to the Palestinian side, COGAT is qualified to ease tensions at the field level due to it’s professional experience working on a daily basis with the Palestinian side and direct contacts within the Palestinian population.
que coordination mechanism on three main issues
The humanitarian situation in the OT is coordinated between COGAT and the international community; not a situation of military intervention to safeguard the humanitarian need and human rights of the Palestinian population
COGAT reports directly to the Israel MOD, and also works together with the IDF, but is not subordinated to it. This is unlike the NATO and other models in Afghanistan, Iraq where the cimic officers report directly to their military superiors, and not the MOD.
The only Major General in the IDF, other than the COS directly reporting to the MOD
Much emphasis on persuasion with the military; although in uniform, COGAT does not receive its evaluation from the military, but from the COS.
Gaza Strip Coordination & Liaison Administration
West Bank
Civil
Administration
Coordination & Liaison
School
9 D.C.L’s

7. The unique civil military interface in the OT Palestinian Authority
Israel Military (IDF)
Government ministries
Settlement authorities
Police
International organizations,
NGO’s and foreign
reps
COGAT
Palestinian Authority

8. West Bank: CIMIC liaison
Tulkarem
Jenin
Qalqilya
Nablus
Ramallah
Jericho
Jerusalem DCL – seam zone challenges, agriculture, olive groves
LTCs Arabic speakers
Much more direct contact and cooperation with counterparts from the PA on civilian issues (water, electricity, education and health)
Bethlehem
Jerusalem
Hebron

9. The military security regime in the OT
Checkpoints spread across the West Bank
Ambulances transporting terrorists
Weapons and information flow

10. The aid community demands free access within and out of the OT
The delivery of food and medical supplies
Movement of project equipment
Movement of aid staff

11. Balancing the needs
COGAT
Security
Aid

12. Coordination and trust
UN reform 1997 and the need to "act coherently“ and with "unity of purpose" (Report of the Secretary General, A/51/950, 14 July, 1997)
Coordination: "systematic utilization of policy instruments to deliver humanitarian assistance in a cohesive and effective manner" (Minear L, Chelliah UBP, Crisp J et al, 1992).

13. Trust is the basis for CIMIC
“Our interest encapsulates or includes the other because we wish to maintain our relationship with the other” (Cook, 2005).
If we value maintenance of a particular relationship, we will behave in a trustworthy manner toward the other, and if the other recognizes our interest in being trustworthy, the other will trust us.

14. The distrust cycle Confusion Unreliable perception Suspicion + +
Lack of coordination
Mission instability
Daniel Beaudoin

15. The trust cycle Trust Reliable perception Clarity + + Coordination
Mission stability
Daniel Beaudoin

16. The various faces of trust
UNRWA
ICRC
Advocacy operational
Technical operational
Public naming and shaming
Discrete
Asymmetric
Balanced
Political
Apolitical
Onus of responsibility on Israel, alibi for future financial problems
Heavy financial burdens due to the “emergency” conditions in Gaza
The word “Hamas” is mentioned in passing, “tucked away in the back”
Arab-Israeli conflict – basically a code name for Israeli imposed restrictions
Financial projections and difficulties not projected onto one party
Acceptance and reputation of prime concern

17. Thank you
Daniel Beaudoin

18. Gaza strip – main crossings
In the case of military operations, the GS may be divided into operational areas. This division can potentially compromise the ability of the IAOs to distribute aid and medicine. Liaison officers mediate between the international community and military, at all of the command levels, from company to brigade and battalion. Issues that are not solved in the field are raised to Southern Command and to Central HQ.
Daniel Beaudoin

19. Fighting an enemy that deliberately hides it’s fighters and munitions among civilians presents complex operational and ethical dilemmas.
Military operations become even more complex when combat can easily result in civilian casualties, drawing charges of unethical behavior and of the disproportionate or/and indiscriminate use of force
Daniel Beaudoin

24. The OpT is characterized by a significant humanitarian network, and a developed civil military coordination mechanism
Many org’s representing a variety of agendas: some practical and solution oriented, some which are not: Political motivations, naming and shaming….