1. Dr. Darren McKnight Integrity Applications, Inc.
Orbital Debris and Breaking Cognitive Biases 4 May 2016 FISO Telecon Presentation
Dr. Darren McKnight
Integrity Applications, Inc.

2. Plan of Attack Orbital Debris Cognitive Biases Orbital Debris
Introduction
Cognitive Biases
Identify & Combat
Orbital Debris
Think “Out of the Box”

3. Orbital Debris: LEO vs GEO
High relative impact velocities (~10km/s)
Collisions more likely at extreme latitudes
~18,000 cataloged objects (>10cm)
Peaks at 790km and 850km
~500,000 lethal nontrackables (~<5mm)
GEO
Low relative impact velocities (~500m/s)
Collisions more likely during “rush hours”
~1,500 cataloged objects (>1m)
Peaks at 75°E and 105°W
~1,000 lethal nontrackables (~<50cm)
Over 200 satellite breakups, four collisions of trackable objects, and ~15 impact-induced anomalies – most of these are in LEO

4. Functional Families of Cognitive Biases
Emotional
(High Touch)
Analytical
(High Tech)
Inertia
Tendency to move in same direction (time, space, and topics)
Wishful Thinking
(or Anti-WT)
Unfounded optimism or pessimism
Correlation
“See” things that do not exist
Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR)
Cannot see trends due to distractions

5. Combating Cognitive Biases
Inertia
Correlation
SNR
Wishful
Thinking
PROBLEM
Cognitive Biases
Analytical
Emotional
SOLUTION
Defenses
Keep Fresh
Awareness
Cognitive
Diversity
Multiple
Reviews
Rules/
Checklists
RESULT
Good Decisions?

6. In-Flight Anomalies Reported for each NASA Space Shuttle Mission (1981-2010)
Anomalies begin to be ignored and deemed as successes rather than indicators of vulnerability, so lulls operators into false sense of security …
Challenger
Columbia
The overall downward trend in reported in-flight anomalies is undoubtedly due, in part, to a decrease in the number of near-misses actually occurring during flights as technology matured. However, it is unlikely that the spikes reflect an increase in true near-miss frequency. Rather clear failures (Challenger, Columbia) trigger an initial burst of attention to searching for near-misses but this vigilance decreases over time so that near-misses are less noticed because of the follow-on successful outcomes.
With Exponential Trendlines Added for the Periods before, between, and after the Challenger and Columbia Disasters
Spacecraft Anomalies and Failures Workshop, Chantilly, VA, 2015

7. Space Flight Safety > Environment Sustainability
Sustainability1: “development which meets the needs of current generations without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”
Are our current initiatives sufficient to insure sustainability of the space environment in LEO?
Could one “massive collision” compromise space flight safety without creating a runaway environment?
Deterioration of space flight safety may happen well before the environment becomes visibly unstable or a significant number of breakups occur.
Examine event(s) that could push the lethal nontrackable (LNT) collision risk beyond an unacceptable threshold.
0.8%/yr
Estimated Peak LNT Collision Risk
@860km
1.5%/yr
Annual Orbit Failure Rate For All Factors Used by Space Insurance (SI) 1 2 3
LNT Collision Risk (%/yr)
2.5%/yr
Threshold For LNT Collision Risk
10y  9.0y
+3x of current max
+60% above SI limit
Summarize the facts of the investigation and motivate people to understand that you do not need a cascading of satellite breakups to have a flight safety situation that is challenging, if not untenable.
Selected the 2.5%/yr LNT threat as a quantifiable “line in the sand” that would equate to a reduction to 9yrs of ten year lifetime.
0.8% LNT risk equates to 9.6 years for 10 year lifetime but do not see actual reduction in lifetimes so must consider relative to overall effects… overestimating effects of impacts onto operational spacecraft or using too large of a collision cross-section for disrupting operations?
1Sustainability, 1987 “Our Common Future” by Brundtland Commission of UN.

8. Collision Rate Cannot Predict When Next Event Will Occur
PC = VR*SPD*AC*T ~ N (number of objects)
VR is relative velocity
SPD is spatial density, # objects per cubic kilometer
AC is cross-sectional area
T is time considered
Collision rate (CR) is PC of 1-on-N taken for all objects (i.e., N-on-N)
For a cluster: CR ~ N2

9. The Mean is Meaningless Clusters: Higher PC and Consequence1
147
SL-8s
210 Mg
~2,800
~42,000
~18,000
~166,000
~10,000
~96,000
Fragments from Massive Collision
Catalog
LNT
1000
900
800
700
Chance
Over
10 Yrs
1/2500
1/400
1/20
LNT
PC/yr
15m2
1.7%
2.7%
1.5% 2 17
SL-16s
150 Mg
ENVISAT 3 46
SL-8s 74 Mg
147 SL-8 between km for 210K kg AC= 14m2, XC= 58m2
17 SL-16 between km for 150K kg AC= 45m2, XC= 180m2
46 SL-8 between km and ENVISAT for 74K kg AC= 14/50m2, XC= 118m2
XC = [(Ac)0.5 + (Ac)0.5]2
Other clusters by types
20xCosmos P/L(3250kg)=65,000kg
88xIridium(556kg)=49,808kg
33xSL-3s(1440kg)=47,520kg
20xMeteor(2000kg)=40,000kg
Could clearly use distribution of large derelict objects but using same type since they had some clustering due to common operational perspectives and its simplified collision cross-sectional calculations.
Altitude (km)
Cataloged Population Spatial Density Peaks
Highest
Second Highest

10. Collision Rate Non-uniform and Larger Than KTG*-Derived
Year
# of CAs
< 5km
< 1km
Total
PC/yr
Min.
Miss
Dist.
2008
179 6
6.3E-4
115m
2009
166 9
9.6E-5
320m
2010
182 7
1.8E-4
220m
2011
164 8
8.1E-3
44m
2012
157
1.4E-3
50m
Ave.
170
7.5
150m
Cumulative
Encounter-Based
Collision
Probability
Statistical Collision Probability
*KTG = kinetic theory of gases

11. Mitigation and Remediation Debris Remediation ǂ ADR Only
Removal
Avoidance
By Self
-Only for operational objects
By Other
-Variety of options
-Spacebased
-Groundbased
Debris Mitigation
-Deorbit in 25 yrs via propulsion, orbit selection, drag, etc.
-Do not create debris
Collision Avoidance (CA)
-Daily JSpOC Warnings
-All operational payloads
-Typical propulsion
Active Debris Removal (ADR)
-ID-Despin/Grapple-Remove
-Need missions/collision prevented
-Requires large impulse
-Execute over decades
-Manage reentry risk
STRATEGIC - Statistical
Lower half is derelict collision prevention which includes ADR and JCA.
Include ion this spectrum of remediation responses anything that would prevent derelicts from colliding:
Apply something to disintegrate satellite into sizes smaller than would be a risk to operational spacecraft
Salvage the derelicts by some other device to convert the mass into energy or repurposed into new satellites that would preclude the launching of some future mass
???
Just-In-Time CA (JCA)
-ID-Intercept/Move
-Want low false alarms
-Enhanced el set accuracy
-Hourly/daily response
-No reentry risk
TACTICAL - Deterministic
Eliminate Derelict In Situ
-Disintegrate
-Consume
-Salvage
NON-TRADITIONAL

12. Observations
Using averages and considering ADR = remediation constrains thinking and options
Clusters of massive derelicts may have both greater PC and consequence
May also be more predictable
Environment stability analyses do not definitively prove unique efficacy of ADR
Uncertainty of environment evolution not addressed
Investigating three major issues pushing existing paradigm:
Spacecraft Anomalies and Failures Workshop: Characterize negative influence of debris on operational satellites (i.e., degradation of space flight safety) as proxy for debris population
Massive Collision Monitoring Activity (MCMA): patterns of life and better PC determination of “clusters”
Just-in-Time Collision Avoidance (JCA): prevent collisions of derelicts without grappling, detumbling, or managing reentry
But does leave mass in orbit