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Security “Deep Dive”* Open Discussion * Into shark-infested waters.

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Presentation on theme: "Security “Deep Dive”* Open Discussion * Into shark-infested waters."— Presentation transcript:

1 Security “Deep Dive”* Open Discussion * Into shark-infested waters

2 Q1: Envision a National Research Platform -- are there any “sweeping” statements that we should make about security? (to each their own seems to be punting the issue) Which of the enterprise mechanisms for security are still applicable What is the border? Is there a border anymore? Federated system – What are people’s reasonable expectations of security, e.g. Verify that an AS does source address validation (software exists) Different communities should be reasonably shielded from each other. Compartmentalization (compromise at one point does not compromise others) Allow a centralized system for monitoring SIRTFI (Security incident response …. Federated Identity) Different profiles for “security”? Privacy issues. Keep the physicists out. (Federated Authorization) What can be leveraged that exists already (InCommon, eduroam, ..) Liabilities: Is any of the data regulated? (can we handle data with specific use agreements) Need auditable events. Punt on medical data Security means that there must be a governance structure for an NRP/GRP Identity vs. capability.

3 Big organizations might have deep benches for intrusion detection (and other more specialized tasks),  what can be done improve the situation for those without "deep benches of expertise or people resources"? What’s new? Centers of excellence are possible ways to scale.

4 How 'open' to the network do research platforms really need to be
How 'open' to the network do research platforms really need to be? Could they be mostly "unreachable" as a first line of defense against random probes? Should it be international, too? How to integrate identity management (like eduroam) into gaining accessibility. How does on constrain – Comments from Cees What are we “afraid” of? Put effort in managing connectivity/reachability or energy in blocking “bad actors”? Granting access to something already closed, makes risk managers unhappy. Define set of permitted use models Observe/determine “attack patterns” – Normal PRP/NRP usage might look like DDOS.


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