1. Grid Security Risks Mike Surridge ms@it-innovation.soton.ac.uk
GGF12, 20 Sep 2004, Brussels

2. Grid Security Risks Connecting to Grids is a risky business
your machine could be cracked
your data may be intercepted or corrupted
your credentials may be compromised
to protect against all this may be too expensive
On the other hand
using any computer network is risky
using Grids can be very advantageous
How can we benefit while managing risks?

3. Asset-Based Security Risk Analysis Risk Management Identify and
value assets
Define risk
management
approach
Identify threats
and risks
Implement
defences
Identify and
cost defences

4. Risk Analysis Value assets based on impact of compromise
high: likely to cause total business failure
med: serious but not fatal impact
low: irritating but not serious
Threats based on likelihood of attack
high: attacks will definitely take place
med: attacks may occur from time to time
low: attacks are unlikely
Analyse risks based on likelihood of success
taking account of existing defences

5. Risk Management Determine appropriate response to threats
acceptance: live with the potential consequences
reduction: introduce defences
avoidance: don’t use the system
Leads to cost-effective security
as much security as you need
not more than you can afford
Application to Grids pioneered by UK STF
A.Sasse, H.Chivers, M.Surridge, etc

6. Case Study: Comb-e-Chem
National Crystallography Service
providing access to experimental steering
delivering data for Grid-based computations
Assets: medium or high value
campus system and network integrity (high)
sample tracking data (med)
experimental result data (low/med)
Threats: high likelyhood
system attacks from outside campus (high)
system attacks from inside campus (med)
compromise of remote user credentials (med)

7. Security Threats

8. Case Study: GEMSS Grid-enabled Medical Simulation Services
for clinical and non-clinical applications
Assets: high or medium value
hospital network and system integrity (high)
privacy of personal data - cf EU D 95/46 or D 2002/58 (high)
hospital reputation (med)
Threats: high or medium likelyhood
compromise of remote systems (high)
interception of personal data (high)
Defences:
operate in accordance with legal constraints
architect against too much dependency

9. Grid Proxies and Trust

10. Conclusion Grid risks can be managed at reasonable cost
asset-based risk assessment
appropriate defences (sometimes risk acceptance)
Most security compromises are not Grid-specific
systems compromised by other means
failure to use best practice in network management
Some problems are Grid-related
risk propagation and inter-site dependencies
Mitigation often involves
conservative Grid architecture
conventional defences
response planning and user training

11. Grid Security Risks Mike Surridge ms@it-innovation.soton.ac.uk
GGF12, 20 Sep 2004, Brussels