1. The Acceptability of War and Support for Defense Spending
Evidence from Fourteen Democracies,
Richard C. Eichenberg
Tufts University
Richard J. Stoll
Rice University
Prepared for delivery to the Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2014.

2. Let me begin with two quotes
Secretary of defense Robert Gates (2011):
"In the past, I've worried openly about NATO turning into a two-tiered alliance… Between those willing and able to pay the price and bear the burdens of alliance commitments, and those who enjoy the benefits of NATO membership – be they security guarantees or headquarters billets – but don't want to share the risks and the costs. This is no longer a hypothetical worry. We are there today. And it is unacceptable“
President Obama in Rome last week:
“we can’t have a situation in which the United States is consistently spending over three percent of our GDP (Gross Domestic Product) on defense – much of that focused on Europe, (and) potentially more, if we end up having ongoing crises within Europe – and Europe is spending, let’s say, one percent. The gap becomes too large…. We need to make sure that everybody is doing their fair share,” he said.

3. Is this cajoling likely to change anything?
One hint comes from Michael Howard, who argued that governments must engage in “reassurance” in addition to deterrence:
"The object of deterrence is to persuade an adversary that the costs to him of seeking a military solution to his political problems will far outweigh the benefits. The object of reassurance is to persuade one's own people, and those of one's allies, that the benefits of military action, or preparation for it, will outweigh the costs" (Howard 1982, 317).

4. …and scholarly work on citizen support for defense spending reinforces Howard’s argument
Domestic and international changes of post Vietnam period have made war and military force more controversial and perhaps lowered citizen estimates of their utility and/or acceptability
Scholarly work on defense spending more narrowly reinforces this view: Bartels interesting study on US finds that support for defense spending above all related to fundamental attitudes towards military force

5. Summary of data and estimates
However, little work on countries other than US, including the Europeans mentioned above
Here: German Marshall Fund Transatlantic Trends (war) and 2004,08, on support for increased defense spending (Y)

6. Today I will just report the results on support for increased defense spending
Basic values, beliefs, and life experience (war, LR ideology, gender) are the most consistently significant influences…US, East and West Eur, and Turkey
Short-term threats affect support more sporadically, but at least one everywhere
In Europe: support for NATO and US leadership increases support for defense spending (but in US independence from Eur)

7. How will this affect things after events in Ukraine (Europe)?
Probably modest increase (threat, NATO, US leadership)
But will not close gap between US and Europe, because:
Average European is to the left of average American ideologically, in some places far to the left
Americans are far and away most accepting of war as instrument of policy

8. Percent of population agree "war is sometimes necessary"