1. The Use of Force Why do we use force? What can you do with force?
Answer: attain political goals

2. The Functions of Force Defense Deterrence
Compellence (coercive diplomacy)
Swaggering
Based in part on:

3. Sources
Thomas Schelling. Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960).
Thomas Schelling. Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966).
Alexander George, David Hall, William Simons. The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).
Robert Art. To What Ends Military Power? International Security Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring, 1980), pp
Herman Kahn. On Escalation (NY: Penguin, 1965).

4. 1. Defense

5. Defense at its most complex

6. Defense at its most basic

7. 2. Deterrence Goal: To prevent action Method: Threat
Aimed at influencing an opponent’s decision making
Assumption: rationality

8. Rational Choice Cost Benefit Analysis
Threat: increases perception of costs
Options
Costs
Benefits A ? B C

9. Types of Deterrence
Deterrence by Punishment
Deterrence by
Denial

10. Communication
China and Taiwan
Europe during the Cold War

11. Credibility and Reputation
Capability
Will
A bluff?

12. Extended Deterrence Europe Japan S. Korea Israel Taiwan Australia
New Zealand

13. What to Threaten?

14. Irrationality?
Saddam Hussein
Kim Jong-un

15. If deterrence fails….

16. 3. Compellence (coercive diplomacy)
Goal: To change opponent behavior
To stop an opponent from doing something they are doing
To get an opponent to do something they are not doing

17. Basic Elements Brute force won’t work Assumes rationality
War is bargaining
The power to hurt allows you to enter the bargaining

18. A. Brute force won’t work

19. B. Assumes Rationality Cost Benefit Analysis Options Costs Benefits A? B C

20. C. War is Bargaining

21. D. Entering the Bargaining?
The power to hurt
Capability
Intentions

22. Some Lessons Shadow of the Future It doesn’t always work Commitment
Credibility
Democracies and Compellence
Balance of Commitment
Non-state Actors
Civilians
Uncertainty and Risk
Domestic Politics
Irrationality? Or Politics?

23. a. Shadow of the Future
What coerces?
The promise of future violence

24. b. It doesn’t always work

25. Compellence Success
Cuban Missile Crisis

26. Compellence Failure
F-105s over Vietnam

27. c. Commitment
Berlin Airlift 1948

28. d. Credibility
Continue the pain

29. Credibility Interdependence of credibility and commitment Reputation
Was Vietnam about Europe?
“Doctrine of Credibility”

30. e. Democracies
Poor at compellence?
Vulnerable?

31. f. Balance of Commitment
Vietnam War

32. Balance of Commitment
Ukraine

33. g. Non-State Actors Two Eras Cold War
Insurgencies and Marxist ethno-nationalist terrorists
Vietcong
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO)

34. Non-State Actors B. Post-Cold War:
Network organizations living off of globalization
Not state sponsored
AQAM
Boko Haram
ISIL
Al-Shabab

35. h. Civilians
Dresden, Feb 1945
World Trade Center

36. i. Uncertainty and Risk Competition in risk taking Brinkmanship
“The Threat That
Leaves Something
to Chance”
Escalation
Herman Kahn

37. j. Domestic Politics and Compellence

38. k. Irrationality? Or Politics?
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani
Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei

39. Dilemmas Irratioality Perceiving message
Can the opponent do what you ask?

40. 4. Swaggering
The Great White Fleet 12/07-2/09