1. Animal Rights

2. In this lecture… Speciesism Are humans unique? Marginal cases
Do animals have rights?

3. Speciesism
We do not treat non-human animals in the same way we treat human beings. We kill animals for food, keep them confined and use them in painful experiments.
What is the relevant difference between humans and non-animals that justifies this difference in treatment?

4. Speciesism
It is wrong to punch people because doing so hurts them. If that is enough of a reason not to do it, why do we think that we are morally justified in causing pain and suffering to non-human animals?

5. Speciesism
Speciesism is a prejudice for one’s own species and against other species. It involves assigning different moral status, value or rights to different beings on the basis of their species membership.

6. Speciesism
The ‘moral status’ of a being or entity answers the question whether the being or entity is morally considerable.
To have moral status is to be the kind of being towards which moral agents have, or can have, moral obligations.

7. Speciesism
Speciesism assumes that non- human animals have lower moral status, or no moral status at all. From the standpoint of speciesism, it is not morally wrong to abuse or exploit non-human animals, or to treat them as mere objects for human use.

8. Speciesism
Speciesism, in other words, entails unequal treatment of humans and non-human animals.
According to the principle of formal equality, however, unequal treatment is not justified unless it can be shown that some relevant difference exists.

9. Speciesism
Some believe that speciesism (and the unequal treatment of humans and non-human animals that it entails) can be justified because humans are superior to non-human animals in morally significant ways.

10. Speciesism
If we value the lives and interests of human beings more than the lives and interests of non-human animals, this is because we value certain characteristics or capacities that are uniquely ‘human’ (i.e. not possessed by other animals).

11. Speciesism
The most obvious property shared among all human beings that excludes all non-human animals is our membership of a particular biological group: the species Homo sapiens.

12. Speciesism
However, from an ethical point of view, group membership (group identity) alone has no moral significance.
Like racism and sexism, speciesism involves unequal treatment on the basis of species membership, which is not morally justified.

13. Speciesism
People who oppose speciesism argue that a difference of species is not a morally relevant difference – in the same way that a difference of race (or sex) is not a morally relevant difference between human beings.

14. Speciesism
It can be argued, however, that while racism and sexism are wrong because there are no morally relevant differences between the sexes or races, there are significant differences between humans and non-human animals.

15. Speciesism
For example, it is wrong to deny educational opportunities to blacks or women on the grounds that they are incapable of benefitting from those opportunities.
But the same reasoning cannot be applied to non-human animals such as cows, or dogs, or even chimpanzees.

16. Speciesism
Furthermore, speciesists may argue that we humans are more self-aware, and more capable of choosing our own actions than other animals. This enables us to think and act morally, and so entitles us to a higher moral status and full moral rights.

17. Speciesism
Another argument in favor of speciesism is that it is ‘natural’ to treat one’s own species favorably.
Almost all animals treat members of their own species better than those of other species.

18. Speciesism
Faced with a difficult choice between saving a human and saving a non-human animal, most people would probably react in a speciesist way.
A child and a dog are trapped in a fire. You can only save one of them. Which one will you save?

19. Speciesism
Suppose you live in Germany in the 1930s under the rule of Hitler and the Nazi Party. An earthquake happens, and you notice that the Germans are willing to help other Germans but unwilling to help Jews. Does this observation of yours lend justification to the cruel treatment of Jews by the Nazis? 19

20. Speciesism
If the assertion ‘it is natural for us to treat members of our group more favorably than members of other groups’ cannot be used to justify racism or sexism, can it be used as a justification for speciesism? 20

21. Are humans unique?
‘Anthropocentrism’ is a form of speciesism. It is the belief that we humans are the central or most significant species on the planet (in the sense that we humans are the only species that have moral status and intrinsic value).

22. Are humans unique? The term ‘anthropocentric’ means ‘human-centered.’
The basic assumption of anthropocentrism is that the natural world (i.e. plants, animals, rivers, mountains, etc.) has value only insofar as it serves human needs or human interests.

23. Are humans unique?
From the perspective of anthropocentrism, nature is not an ‘end in itself’ (i.e. it does not exist for any purpose of its own).
The natural world, on this view, does not have intrinsic value. It only has instrumental value for us, i.e. it exists as a means to human ends.

24. Are humans unique?
According to anthropocentric reasoning, non-human animals are part of the natural world and, as such, do not have any intrinsic value. But is it true that we humans are also part of the natural world? What makes us believe that we are separate from the rest of nature?

25. Are humans unique?
The idea that humans are in some way unique or set apart from the rest of nature has its roots in religion, which often depicts man as God’s special creation, the only creature endowed with a soul.

26. Are humans unique?
French philosopher René Descartes ( ) suggested that non- human animals have no moral significance because they have no souls.
For Descartes, animals are automata, or ‘machines of nature’. His view of animals is a classic expression of anthropocentrism.

27. Are humans unique?
According to Descartes, because the soul is necessary to consciousness, non-human animals cannot feel pain or pleasure.
We now know that Descartes was wrong. Many animals do feel pain and pleasure, and many species are ‘conscious’ in the sense that they engage in purposeful behavior.

28. Are humans unique?
From a biological point of view, we humans are different from other animals because we are members of the species Homo sapiens.
But this is irrelevant from the moral point of view. Species membership, as said earlier, is not a morally relevant characteristic.

29. Are humans unique?
Those who believe in Darwinian evolution think of humans as sharing the same ancestor with other animal species.
Geneticists tell us that we humans share much of our DNA with other organisms. The differences between humans and other animals are more a matter of degree than of kind.

30. Are humans unique?
The genetic differences between human beings and our closest evolutionary relatives – chimpanzees – are proportionately very small: human beings and chimpanzees have approximately percent of their genes in common.

31. Are humans unique?
Some believe that humans are morally considerable because of the distinct human capacities we possess.
Capacities such as thinking, planning and reasoning distinguish humans from animals as these capacities are believed to be uniquely ‘human’.

32. Are humans unique?
Most important of all, humans are moral agents in the sense that we can make judgments about what is right and what is wrong.
Non-human animals are not moral agents. They cannot make moral judgments and therefore cannot be held responsible for wrongdoings.

33. Are humans unique?
To sum up, we humans are different from other animals because of our rational nature, our superior mental capacity, and our roles as moral agents. It is because of these characteristics that we humans are regarded as ‘persons’, and only persons possess the real dignity that is deserving of full moral respect.

34. Are humans unique?
Counterargument [1]: Scientific evidence has accumulated that many non-human animals possess mental capacities that once thought were unique to human. Gorillas and chimpanzees, for example, exhibit abstract reasoning powers and have the capacity to communicate through language.

35. Are humans unique?
Counterargument [2]: Many social animals, such as primates, dolphins and whales, have been known to exhibit moral behavior and characteristics: attachment and bonding, cooperation and mutual aid, conflict resolution, and awareness of the social rules of the group.

36. Are humans unique?
There is strong evidence in other animals of reconciliation and consolation after conflict – kissing, embracing and grooming for example, to restore social bonds. Like humans, these animals cooperate and form social ties.

37. Are humans unique?
Some intelligent non-human animals, such as dolphins and chimps, have similar mental capacities as humans. Do you think that these animals should be accorded personhood status? Do you think they should have the same rights as human persons?

38. Marginal cases
Some philosophers argue that while humans are different in a variety of ways from one another and from other animals, these differences do not provide a philosophical justification for denying non- human animals moral consideration.

39. Marginal cases
What is it that really differentiates humans morally from other animals?
Most of us, if asked this question, would initially respond by citing some mental capacities, for example, self-consciousness, rationality, autonomy, ability to use language to communicate, etc.

40. Marginal cases
The problem with this response is that, for each of these capacities, there are some human beings who lack it. Does it imply that those human beings who lack these capacities are not entitled to the same moral status and rights as other humans?

41. Marginal cases
If rationality, intelligence and language, etc. are necessary conditions for moral consideration, should human infants, the severely retarded and brain-damaged humans be excluded from moral consideration?

42. Marginal cases
If human infants, the senile, the comatose, and the mentally handicapped have moral status, non-human animals, too, should have moral status because there is no known morally relevant capacity that those ‘marginal humans’ have that non-human animals lack.

43. Marginal cases
The ‘argument from marginal cases’ is a philosophical argument challenging the view that only humans have superior moral status.
If ‘marginal humans’ deserve the same moral consideration as ‘normal’ human beings, why not animals too?

44. Marginal cases
Consider a cow. We ask why it is acceptable to kill this cow for food – we might claim, for example, that the cow has no concept of ‘self’ and therefore it cannot be wrong to kill it.
However, human infants also lack this same concept of ‘self’.

45. Marginal cases
So if we accept the self-concept criterion, then we must also accept that killing human infants is acceptable for exactly the same reason as it is acceptable to killing cows, which is absurd.
So the concept of ‘self’ cannot be a relevant criterion.

46. Marginal cases
For any criterion or set of criteria (e.g. rationality, autonomy, self- awareness) there exists some marginal humans who are mentally deficient in some way which would inevitably entail the exclusion of them form having moral status.

47. Marginal cases
If we are justified in denying moral status to non-human animals, then we are justified in denying moral status to marginal humans.
Since we are not justified in denying moral status to marginal humans, we are not justified in denying moral consideration to non-human animals.

48. Marginal cases
The argument from marginal cases requires us to ‘treat like cases alike’, but babies, the intellectually impaired and the senile currently have rights that non-human animals do not have. Does it imply that non- human animals should enjoy the same rights and protection as ‘marginal humans’?

49. Marginal cases
Counterargument [1]: Most of us believe that society (families, government, charities, etc.) has a duty to take care of the needs of every baby, every mentally impaired person, etc. It does not follow that society has a duty to take care of the needs of every non-human animal.

50. Marginal cases
We feel a special obligation to care for babies and the handicapped members of our own species, who may not be able to survive without such care. In contrast, most non- human animals manage very well on their own, despite their lower intelligence and lesser capacities, and therefore do not require special care from us.

51. Marginal cases
Counterargument [2]: Those who reject the argument from marginal cases may argue that only persons or moral agents can have moral status and moral rights. We grant rights to human infants because they will become moral agents and therefore deserve our respect.

52. Marginal cases
Counterargument [3]: In the case of the mentally disabled, it may be true their mental capacities are no better than those of chimpanzees, but we still regard them as morally considerable because of the web of social relationships that gives special meaning and significance to their existence.

53. Do animals have rights?
There is no denying that humans have rights. The fact that most humans throughout history and throughout the world cannot exercise these rights does not alter our fundamental belief about the universality of human rights.

54. Do animals have rights?
How about non-human animals? Do they have rights too? If non-human animals do have rights, do they have the same rights as human beings? Are we humans violating these rights when we use them for our own purposes?

55. Do animals have rights?
One widely accepted view recognizes persons as beings with superior moral status that entitles them to a complete set of rights.
In the case of non-human animals, while they may have species-specific needs, they are not entitled to the same moral status and rights as human beings.

56. Do animals have rights?
In contrast, proponents of animal rights maintain that non-human animals have rights of the same sort, although perhaps not exactly the same rights, as human beings.
Animal interests are not always the same as human interests. Thus, animals rights may not be exactly the same as human rights.

57. Do animals have rights?
Thus, for example, non-human animals may possess a right to life or a right against suffering, since they can suffer and die.
But they cannot, for obvious reasons, possess political and civil rights such as the right to vote or the right to freedom of speech.

58. Do animals have rights? Relevant rights for animals may include:
the right to live free in the natural state of their choosing
the right to express normal behavior
the right to life
the right to reproduce
the right to choose their own lifestyle
the right to live free from human induced harm

59. Do animals have rights?
If non-human animals do have rights, we humans would have a duty to honor and respect these rights. This implies that there are certain things that we should not do to non-human animals, because doing so would violate their rights.

60. Do animals have rights?
Accepting the idea of animal rights implies that there should be
no experiments on animals
no breeding and killing animals for food or clothes or medicine
no use of animals for hard labor
no selective breeding for any reason other than the benefit of the animals
no hunting
no zoos or use of animals in entertainment

61. Do animals have rights?
It is generally recognized that non- human animals, like humans, have interests. They pursue their interests and suffer when their interests are not satisfied.
Is the possession of interests a sufficient condition for the possession of rights?

62. Do animals have rights?
Opponents of animal rights may argue that [1] non-human animals cannot make moral judgments, [2] they do not understand duty and therefore cannot take responsibility for their actions, and [3] they are not members of the moral community.

63. Do animals have rights?
As mentioned earlier, if we value the lives of humans more than the lives of non-human animals, this is because we value certain capacities possessed by humans but not by other animals.
One of those capacities is the ability to make moral judgments.

64. Do animals have rights?
We do not expect non-human animals to behave like moral agents.
Most non-human animals pursue their own interests without taking others’ interests into consideration. In other words, they act on their instincts without showing any sense of right and wrong. 64

65. Do animals have rights?
Since non-human animals lack the capacity of moral judgment, they should not be accorded moral status or moral rights.
Rights-holders, on this view, must possess the capacity to make moral judgments, i.e. they must be able to distinguish acceptable from unacceptable conduct.

66. Do animals have rights?
Another argument against animal rights is based on the dictum ‘rights imply duties’.
Since the concepts of rights and duties are distinctively ‘human’, it makes no sense to extend them beyond our own species.

67. Do animals have rights?
Non-human animals cannot take responsibility for their actions. Only humans can be held responsible for what they do.
Why should humans have duties towards animals, if animals do not have duties to other animals or to humans? 67

68. Do animals have rights?
Counterargument: Some human beings (e.g. babies, senile people, people with some severe mental defects and people in a coma) have no sense of duty nor the capacity of rational moral judgment. Does it imply that these marginal humans do not deserve moral treatment?

69. Do animals have rights?
Opponents of animal rights may argue that rights are unique to humans because rights only have meaning within a moral community.
Only humans live in a moral community. Non-human animals are not members of the moral community and therefore cannot have rights.

70. Do animals have rights?
Yet another view suggests that non- human animals can have rights, but animal rights are weaker than human rights.
According to this view, we are morally permitted to treat non- human animals in ways that we are not allowed to treat humans.

71. Do animals have rights?
For example, if rats invade our houses, carrying diseases and biting our children, we cannot reason with them, hoping to persuade them of the injustice they do us. The only thing we can do is to get rid of them, regardless of any rights they might have.

72. Do animals have rights?
What is the difference between killing a stray dog and killing a homeless person? Why do we think that the former is morally justifiable but not the latter?

73. Do animals have rights?
Is it reasonable to accord a lower or weaker moral status – and hence fewer or weaker rights – to non- human animals because they are not moral agents and cannot be held responsible for their actions?

74. Do animals have rights?
Finally, even if animals do not have rights, humans may still have a moral duty not to mistreat them.
The argument that animals should be treated properly can be based entirely on the need for humans to behave morally, rather than on the rights of animals.

75. Do animals have rights?
We may accept that certain things are morally wrong and should not be done – regardless of whether the victim has any rights or not.
For example, many people think that causing pain and suffering is morally wrong, whether the victim is a human being or a non-human animal.

76. Do animals have rights?
Much of our present treatment of animals involves inflicting pain and suffering for no good reason. Is there something intrinsically wrong about cruel treatment of animals?