1. Klaus Deininger, Daniel Ayalew Ali, Tekie Alemu 05 March 2009
Impacts of Land Certification on Tenure Security, Investment and Land Markets: Evidence from Ethiopia (Amhara Region)
Klaus Deininger, Daniel Ayalew Ali, Tekie Alemu
05 March 2009

2. Policy environment
Evolution of Ethiopia’s rural land policy environment
Feudalist structure followed by nationalization and collectivization in 1975
1995 constitution w. guaranteed access
1997 decentralization of responsibility to regions
Reasons for high tenure insecurity
1997 Amhara redistribution; current debate in Tigray
Urban and agro-industrial expansion (flowers)
Leasing still restricted everywhere except in Amhara region
Will lose land if find off-farm job with permanent income
Ethiopia as an interesting case
Huge program (25 mn plots) quite rapidly implemented; with little outside assistance
Turns conventional wisdom on its head
Participatory local process - rather than expert driven
Rights are not alienable - and plenty of remaining policy restrictions
No spatial reference at all – contrary to surveyors 5

3. Program characteristics
Main features
Democratically elected LAC has responsibility
Field-based adjudication process (elders to resolve conflict)
Certificates with holders’ pictures but no map (to be added in 2nd stage)
Very cost-effective ‘1st stage’ (< 1 US$/parcel)
Process characteristics (from nation-wide survey)
Public meetings held, LACs with members from most sub-kebeles
High share of field-based adjudication
Only 5% of unresolved conflicts (vs. 20%+ in Thailand)
Case study/survey evidence on possible impact
High willingness to pay to replace certificate
Reduction of conflict
Gender (women’s pictures, awareness where stored); polygamy 5

9. Data and general approach
Data sources
4-round panel (1999, 2001, 2004, 2007) from East Gojam
Some 900 households with 4,000 plots in each round
3 rounds before implementation, some certified in 4th round
Identification strategy
Define villages as treated if certified > 12 months ago
Control for household specific effects
Verify that there is little difference in time-varying effects
Conservative estimate for two reasons
Even in treated villages not all households have certificates
Many households in untreated ones had certificates
Expected short-term impacts
Perceived tenure security
Land-related investment (soil conservation measures)
Rental market participation 5

14. Outcome variables considered
Perception of admin. land size change next 5 years
Recent land redistribution (1997)
(Un)compensated expropriation for urban expansion
Both loss and increases are relevant (political pressure)
Question included in all 4 rounds
Investment in soil & water conservation structures
Should see a direct investment effect
Existence and new construction
No of hours spent in maintaining/constructing
Land rental market participation
Amhara the only region where no constraints in terms of length
Both participation and area transferred 5

16. Risk of land loss
Equation to be estimated
use Chamberlain’s method

18. Investment & rental market
Plot-level investment equation
Household-level rental market participation

23. Policy implications for Ethiopia
Ensure sustainability of impacts
Establish mechanisms for regular updating (computerization)
Add spatial element (satellite imagery)
Systematically include CPRs
Demarcation & dealing with encroachment
Rules for internal management
Enforcement mechanisms
Enhance benefits through policy changes
Land leasing & off-farm employment
Threat of redistribution/enforcement of LT contracts
External threat from expropriation
Explore longer-term effects
Already benefit much beyond cost
But could be much larger (& very cost-effective)
Especially with policy changes 5