1. Initial Capabilities Document Review

2. Exercise Objective Purpose:
Assess an actual JCIDS document to determine its compliance with applicable guidance

3. Two parts to compliance
Format – does the document comply with JCIDS Manual
Content – does the analysis underpinning the document meet the intent of guidance
Capstone guidance for CBAs / ICDs
JCIDS is initiated through the execution of a CBA
CBAs are the analytic basis of JCIDS and identify:
Mission
Required capabilities
Operational characteristics and attributes
Capability gaps
Risks
JROC approval of an ICD validates capabilities required, capability gaps, priorities and risks

4. ICDs will typically support an AoA / materiel solution
ICD must capture the results of a well-framed CBA
ICD summarizes the results of DOTMLPF analysis
ICD describes;
Desired capability
Capability gap
Threat
Expected joint operational environments
DOTMLPF and policy impacts
Constraints
ICD guides the MDD, Tech Dev phase, and MS A decision

5. 1. Concept of Operations Summary
Identify the UCP-assigned assigned mission
OPLAN
CONPLAN
Defense Planning Scenario
JOpsC / CONOPs
Operational outcomes
Integrate into the joint warfighting force
Identify enabling capabilities to achieve operational outcome
Title Page—what stands out ?
Armed Aerial Scout vs Airborne Strategic Deterrence
Solution vs Capability

6. 1. AAS Concept of Operations Summary
Identify the UCP-assigned assigned mission
The fundamental purpose of an Armed Aerial Scout is to conduct armed reconnaissance, security operations, and attack missions in support of full spectrum operations. In doing so, it improves the commander's ability to maneuver and concentrate superior combat power against the enemy at the decisive time and place. The following are descriptions of the mission areas this capability contributes to, what operational outcomes it provides and what effects it must produce to achieve those outcomes.
Operational outcomes
The precise application of combat power and effective synchronization of maneuver and supporting fires require a current and accurate picture of the enemy's current dispositions and activity within a given area of operations. An Armed Aerial Scout plays a critical role in providing this information and provides advantages over other intelligence sources by countering enemy deception efforts, providing improved real-time situational awareness and assessing terrain.
Integrate into the joint warfighting force
???
Identify enabling capabilities
Does this identify a UCP-assigned mission?
What does it provide?
What operational outcomes are provided?
Does the ICD mention a joint fight?

7. 1. ABSD Concept of Operations Summary
Identify the UCP-assigned assigned mission
CDRUSSTRATCOM is the lead combatant commander for strategic deterrence planning and is responsible for executing strategic deterrence operations.” Unified Command Plan, 17 Dec 2008, pg 27
The capabilities identified in this Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) directly contribute to the deterrence mission as identified in USSTRATCOM’s Deterrence Operations Joint Operating Concept (DO JOC), tasks established in the Unified Command Plan and requirements …….
Operational outcomes
(a) assure friends and allies, (b) dissuade potential adversaries from developing or expanding inventories of (c) deter potential adversaries
Integrate into the joint warfighting force
deterrence capabilities complement the joint warfighter’s integrated campaign plan -- preventing the need to escalate to armed conflict.
Does this identify a UCP-assigned mission?
What operational outcomes are provided?
A little challenging with deterrence
Does the ICD mention a joint fight?

8. 1. ABSD Concept of Operations Summary
Identify enabling capabilities to achieve operational outcome
Enabling capabilities required to achieve Assurance, Dissuasion And Deterrence (ADD) include:
an understanding of allied and adversary goals, priorities and values
an effective Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) providing early warning, assessing programs and threats, adversary behaviors and intentions, targeting, and post attack analysis
a secure, survivable Command, Control and Communications
the building and cultivation of strategic partners
the maintenance of a robust and responsive conventional and nuclear industrial base to sustain capabilities over time and
an effective hedge against technical and/or geopolitical uncertainties. C2 BA
Others –deterrence is unique—about “not doing something”

9. 2. Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Cite the applicable JCAs
Range of military operations
Timeframe
Relevant DPSs

10. 2. AAS Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Cite the applicable JCAs
Battlespace Awareness
Force Application
Command and Control
Net-Centric
Range of military operations
Conventional Warfare
Forcible Entry
Unconventional Warfare
Show of Force
Peace Enforcement
Peacekeeping Operations
Normal and Routine Military Operations
Timeframe
timeframe from 2015 through approximately 2024
Relevant DPS’s - ?????
Timeframe of 2015 with a 14 year acquisition cycle
What DPSs??

11. 2. ABSD Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Cite the applicable JCAs
ABSD capabilities reside in FA, supporting the Maneuver and Engagement Tier 1 & 2 JCAs
Supporting capability areas include: Battlespace Awareness (BA), Command and Control (C2), Corporate Management (CM), Force Support (FS), Net Centric (NC) and Protection (FP)
Range of military operations
Deterrence capabilities are applicable across the entire Range of Military Operations (ROMO)
Timeframe
a 2020 threat environment.
Relevant DPSs
The ABSD CBA was informed by Defense Planning Scenarios (DPS) 2-4 (Bipolar, Multi-polar and Global Insurgency worlds) . Table 2.1 lists the Steady State Security Posture (SSSP) vignettes

12. 3. Required Capability Describe capabilities required in CBA
Why are they essential for JFC to achieve objectives
Capability is required to comply with OSD, Joint, National policies
Identify JCAs to which capability contributes
Use JCAs to describe capabilities
Prioritize capabilities through SWarFs

13. 3. AAS Required Capability
Describe capabilities required in CBA
the need for an Armed Aerial Scout to enable dominant maneuver for the joint air-ground maneuver force by providing aggressive combined arms reconnaissance.
Why are they essential for JFC to achieve objectives
The Joint Force Commander (JFC) requires a relatively low cost, armed aerial scout platform that requires minimal training support, is supportable within the planned logistics environment, affordable with the planned level of logistics resources throughout the lifecycle, and is interoperable with organic and joint fires systems and manned/unmanned aviation platforms.
How is this a required capability—how do you do an AoA on this?
Since when do JFC’s care about costs? They don’t pay for it. How does this tie to a joint objective?

14. 3. AAS Required Capability
Capability is required to comply with OSD, Joint, National policies
????????
Identify JCAs to which capability contributes
Force Application
Command and Control
Net-Centric
Protect
Use JCAs to describe capabilities
The Armed Aerial Scout capability gap has been repeatedly identified in previous studies and analysis including: …….
current rotary wing aircraft employed by Army aviation in the armed reconnaissance role have shortcomings in performance, lethality, interoperability and survivability.
Prioritize capabilities through SWarFs
AAS “gap” is identified in previous studies dating from —how does this work for a capability to be fielded between 2015 and 2024???
“current shortcomings” in …..what about 2015 and 2024???

15. 3. ABSD Required Capability
Describe capabilities required in CBA
These required capabilities (listed alphabetically) from the CBA formulated the ICD recommendations.
(U) Adaptable
(U) Clear/Visible.
(U) Credible
(U) Effective.
(U) Endurable.
(U) Global in Coverage.
(U) Persistently Present.
(U) Responsive.
(U) Survivable.
(U) Tailorable.

16. 3. ABSD Required Capability
Why are they essential for JFC to achieve objectives
Capability is required to comply w/ OSD, Jt, National policies
above capabilities are essential because they provide credible deterrent tools to the National Command Authority and the Joint Force Commander to achieve military objectives which support Assurance, Dissuasion and Deterrence (ADD).
Identify JCAs to which capability contributes
directly support both Maneuver and Engagement in the Force Application (FA) Tier 1 JCAs.
Use JCAs to describe capabilities
The ABSD capabilities do not apply to any Tier 1 & Tier 2 JCAs that have been prioritized by the SWarF process. The STRATCOM SWarF process identified nuclear strike attributes but did not prioritize JCAs
Prioritize capabilities through SWarFs
These capabilities are rooted in previous USSTRATCOM deterrence analysis and refined in the USSTRATCOM Senior Warfighter Forum (SWarF). A crosswalk of SWarf attributes with ABSD capabilities is found in Appendix I

17. 4. Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies
Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited
Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced
Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies
Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc
Prioritize capability gaps based upon operational risk
Rules for capabilities
Contain operational attributes
General enough to not prejudice outcome in favor of a particular means

18. 4. AAS Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies
Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited
They are not sufficiently deployable to permit rapid concentration of aviation combat power to support a brigade combat team within 96 hours after liftoff, a division within 120 hours, and five divisions within 30 days. They do not have sufficient responsiveness in terms of speed and range to support operations across the entire area of operation forecast for the Division area in the future Modular Force…………
Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced - ???????
Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies
the capability described in this ICD should provide a solution to the armed aerial scout capability gaps resulting from the limitations of currently employed armed reconnaissance helicopters
Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc - ????
Prioritize capability gaps based upon operational risk - ???

19. 4. ABSD Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies
Describe the missions, tasks, and functions that cannot be performed or are unacceptably limited
Capability Gaps. [Remainder of paragraph REDACTED].
Proficiency, Sufficiency, capability does not exist or needs to be replaced
Determination of shortfalls as proficiency or sufficiency
The capability shortfalls discussed above exist now
Identify capability overlaps and / or redundancies
There are no excess deterrence capability overlaps or redundancies in the 2020 timeframe
Link to CONOPs, UCP mission, etc
required capabilities support the Nuclear Response (NR) CONOPS requirement for Force Application…as follows:

20. 4. ABSD Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies
Prioritize capability gaps based upon operational risk
For a prioritized list of shortfalls, linkages to JCAs, metrics and minimum values for each capability, see Table 4.1.

21. 5. Threat and Operational Environment
Describe Joint operating environment
Summarize current and projected threat capabilities
Reference DIA validated threat documents
Approved Service intelligence products

22. 5. AAS Threat and Operational Environment
Describe Joint operating environment
An armed aerial scout system will operate in both global and regional conflicts in support of operations ranging from peacetime engagements to conventional, high intensity, conventional or nuclear (general) warfare
Summarize current and projected threat capabilities
Projected threats include small arms, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs), MANPADS and other surface-to-air missiles (SAM), anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), integrated air defense systems (IADS); fixed wing (including UAS) and rotary wing aircraft and associated air-to-air weapons, IADS; nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons; and information warfare.
Reference DIA validated threat documents
Reconnaissance Helicopter / Kiowa Warrior System Threat Assessment Report (STAR) – June 2007, Apache Block III STAR – March 2007, Aerial Surveillance and Reconnaissance Threat Environment Description (TED)
Approved Service intelligence products

23. 5. ABSD Threat and Operational Environment
Describe Joint operating environment
Summarize current and projected threat capabilities
Operational Environment.
Organizational resources..
Projected threat capabilities. [REDACTED].
Reference DIA validated threat documents
Approved Service intelligence products
All threat-based scenarios and excursions were derived from OSD’s analytic agenda and the Steady State Security Postures highlighted in Table 2.1. Greater detail on strategic environments and scenarios used can be found in Appendix J.

24. 6. DOTMLPF Analysis Summarize the results of the analysis
Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency
If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation

25. 6. AAS DOTMLPF Analysis
Summarize the results of the analysis
Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency
Doctrine. Changing current Army aviation doctrine will not eliminate or reduce the Armed Aerial Scout capability gap.  
Organization. The described Armed Aerial Scout capability gap cannot be eliminated or minimized by instituting organizational changes.  
Training. Training and education alternatives cannot address the aircraft performance limitations that comprise a significant portion of the capability gaps.
Leadership & Education. Leadership and education changes …..cannot eliminate the capability gap 
Personnel. Changes to personnel will not eliminate the …capability gap.
Facilities. Facilities changes do not address the capability gap.
If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation

26. 6. ABSD DOTMLPF Analysis Summarize the results of the analysis
Identify any changes that could mitigate any identified deficiency
If one or more non-materiel approaches mitigate the gap, include in final recommendation
Non-materiel solutions did not produce an effective U.S. force component for assurance dissuasion and deterrence thus necessitating the need to seek materiel approaches.
See Appendix H for a detailed description of the Non-Materiel Solutions considered.

27. 7. Final Recommendations
Describe non-materiel approaches
Recommend type of materiel approach
Information systems
Evolutionary development of an existing capability
Transformational Approach
Mandatory Appendices
OV-1
References
Acronyms
Others

28. 7. AAS Final Recommendations
Describe non-materiel approaches
Recommend type of materiel approach
The DOTMLPF Analysis indicates that a materiel solution is required to eliminate the documented Armed Aerial Scout capability gap. The alternative materiel approaches considered during the Functional Solution Analysis (FSA) include the following six alternatives:
New-start Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft.
Upgrade an existing Armed Reconnaissance Aircraft 
Increased Attack A/C & Organizations.
Increased Off-board RSTA Assets.  
Unmanned Combat Armed Rotorcraft.  
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Systems
Mandatory Appendices
OV-1
References
Acronyms
Others

29. 7. ABSD Final Recommendations
Describe non-materiel approaches
Recommend type of materiel approach
Evolutionary development of an existing capability
Evolutionary solutions proved most capable in mitigating ABSD shortfalls
The analysis of the potential materiel solutions yielded two promising options:
A long range penetrating platform was assessed as most promising to mitigate ADD shortfalls
A long range penetrating weapon employed by both legacy and future airborne platforms was also assessed to significantly mitigate ADD shortfalls.

30. ICD Summary
Complies w/JCIDS format – does title / document pre-suppose a solution?
ICD captures results of well-framed CBA
ICD Sections
Section1 - CONOPS Summary – emphasis on Joint warfight—not Service stovepipe
Enabling capabilities identified
Section 2 - Joint Capability Areas (JCAs)
Is timeframe appropriate / logical / beyond FYDP
Are relevant DPSs identified?
Are JCAs appropriate?
Section 3 - Required Capability – where you should see that a CBA was conducted
Why essential for JFC to achieve objectives; SWarF prioritization
Section 4 - Capability Gaps, Overlaps, Redundancies
Describe mission, task, functions limited or unable; ID capability overlaps / redundancies; Capabilities contain operational attributes; General enough so not to prejudice outcome
Section 5 - Threat and Operational Environment: DIA validated threats
Section 6 - DOTMLPF Analysis: Summarize analysis vs how DOTMLPF is affected
Section 7 - Final Recommendation: Non-materiel / Materiel approaches
IT, Evolutionary, Transformational
Mandatory Appendix - OV-1 should reflect operational activities in the CBA