1. Fig. 1. Timing framework of decisions and outcomes for the nth R&D firm.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

2. Fig. 2. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under PVP and patents. (A) PVP and (B) patents.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

3. Fig. 3. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under patents minus aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under PVP. (A) Three-dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

4. Fig. 5. Equilibrium net benefits to society (excluding profits to R&D sector) under patents minus equilibrium net benefits to society (excluding profits to R&D sector) under PVP. (A) Three-dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

5. Fig. 6. Equilibrium profits to R&D sector under PVP and patents
Fig. 6. Equilibrium profits to R&D sector under PVP and patents. (A) PVP and (B) patents.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

6. Fig. 7. Equilibrium profits to R&D sector under patents minus equilibrium profits to R&D sector under PVP. (A) Three-dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

7. Fig. 4. Equilibrium net benefits to society (excluding profits to R&D sector) under PVP and patents. (A) PVP and (B) patents.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

8. Fig. 9. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under patents with licensing minus aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under patents without licensing. (A) Three-dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

9. Fig. 8. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under 5-year patents minus aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under 10-year patents. (A) Three-dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please

10. Fig. 10. Aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under patents with licensing minus maximum aggregate equilibrium genetic improvement under all other regimes. (A) Three-dimensional representation and (B) two-dimensional representation.
From: Intellectual property in plant breeding: comparing different levels and forms of protection
Eur Rev Agric Econ. 2015;43(1):1-29. doi: /erae/jbv007
Eur Rev Agric Econ | © Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. For permissions, please