1. Session 2 Managing the global commons:
The logic of international cooperation and the problem of the free-rider

2. What is private, what is public?
First distinction by Jean-Baptiste SAY: free goods vs economics goods
Private goods are rival and excludable in consumption
> suitable for market transaction
Club goods are excludable but non-rivalrous
Public goods are non-rival and non-excludable in consumption
> unsuitable for market transaction? Market failures?
=> Does that mean that the provision of private goods is regulated by the market, and the provision of public goods by the state?

3. Global public goods
Public goods ‘whose benefits cut across several countries and generations’ (Kaul)
Traditional GPGs, governed by international agreements
New GPGs, requiring concerted policy-making
Concern about publicness of benefits
Concerns about publicness of decision-making
Use of the sky or oceans vs protection of ozone layer

4. Critiques of the definition
Pure public goods are almost impossible to find
Whether a good is private or public is a matter of public policy. Are some goods intrinsically private or public?
Public utility may vary
States are not the only providers of public goods
Suggestions to shift the definition towards:
Inclusiveness: active category, socially constructed
Public provision, participatory decision-making
Fairness and justice, public benefits

5. The logic of collective action
Why do states cooperate?

6. Assumptions States are self-interested
Their interests are often conflicting
There’s no central authority
Cooperation, at the end of the day, is about mutual adjustments to national policies so that a common, desirable outcome can be reached.
Model: Prisoner’s dilemma

7. Conditions for cooperation
Basic conditions:
Reliable information
Reciprocity
Mutual interest
Need for monitoring: role of international organisations as facilitators

8. The tragedy of the commons
Open-access gazing land over-exploited because of self interest and lack of constraints.
The field as a metaphor for common goods: in the absence of regulation and/or property, common goods are overexploited.

9. The prisoner’s dilemma
Self-interest is primary driver
No interest incentive to cooperate on a one-shot basis
Equilibrium can be reached only if the game is repeated (and preferences revealed : role of international institutions)
B silent
B talks
A silent
6 months each
A: 10 years
B: freed
A talks
A: freed
B: 10 years
5 years each

10. The problem of the free rider
Inherent problem of cooperation
How should each member contribute to the provision of the good?
How much can each member benefit from the good?
> Issue of compliance

11. How to define collective preferences from individual preferences?
Collective preferences are not fixed
They’re not always rationnal
They’re not easy to identify and can be contested
> The aggregation of individual preferences can lead to a detrimental collective outcome.