1. Effect of Risk Orientation in a Real-time Public Goods Dilemma
Jane M. Y. Fung, Winton W. T. Au, Weipeng Hu, Kan Shi
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

2. Risk preference and cooperation
Risk-seekers cooperate more frequently than risk-averse in a repeated 5-person prisoner’s dilemma (Parks, 2004)
Cooperation is a risky choice in PGD because it may have the player end up with a loss
The effect is more salient when the chance of losing is more likely (i.e. in the “tough” condition)
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

3. Risk orientation and SVO in PGD
Prosocials are likely to cooperate while proselfs are likely to defect (Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009)
Since cooperation in PGD are risky…
Risk orientation affects prosocials’ but not proselfs’ cooperative behaviors
In a simultaneous multi-trial linear PGD, risk-seeking prosocials cooperate more than their risk-averse counterparts
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

4. Risk orientation and SVO in Real-time PGD
When players can observe preceding players’ decisions before making their own…
Decisions are still risky for prosocials, but not for proselfs, at the beginning of the game
Risk-orientation affects prosocials but not proselfs
Time
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

5. Risk orientation and SVO in Real-time PGD
When choice is risky, and information is available, people tend to defer decision and seek additional information (Tversky & Shafir, 1992)
In real-time PGD, this implies…
Prosocial risk-averse wait longer and see more of others’ decisions before making their own
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

6. Consequence of waiting in Linear Real-time PGD
Longer wait means more likely to see others’ cooperative moves
In a linear real-time or sequential PGD, more preceding cooperation could increase the incentive to defect because of greed
Risk-averse prosocials are more likely to defect than their risk-seeking counterparts in linear real-time PGD
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

7. Summary of predictions
In a simultaneous multi-trial linear PGD, risk-seeking prosocials cooperate more than their risk-averse counterparts
Risk-averse prosocials are more likely to defect than their risk-seeking counterparts in linear real-time PGD
This effect is mediated by the number of cooperative choices the player perceives before making the decision
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

8. 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
Experiment
240 college students
Randomly assigned to a group of 4 to 8 in each of the 35 trials
Real-time public good game (30 sec decision time)
All-or-none contribution
Linear payoff
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Defection
Full info
Personal info only
Joint info only
No info
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

9. Real-time PDG – Full info
Participant ID:
Trial number:
Group ID:
Personal account:
Joint account:
Personal account:
Joint account:
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Defection
Full info
Personal info only
Joint info only
No info
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

10. Real-time PDG – Joint info
Participant ID:
Trial number:
Group ID:
Personal account:
Joint account:
Joint account:
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Defection
Full info
Personal info only
Joint info only
No info
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

11. Real-time PDG – Personal info
Participant ID:
Trial number:
Group ID:
Personal account:
Joint account:
Personal account:
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Defection
Full info
Personal info only
Joint info only
No info
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

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Real-time PDG – No info
Participant ID:
Trial number:
Group ID:
Personal account:
Joint account:
60 participants per condition
Cooperation
Displayed
Not Displayed
Defection
Full info
Personal info only
Joint info only
No info
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

13. Measures of individual differences
Social value orientation (SVO) was measured by Ring Measure (Liebrand, 1984)
Risk orientation (RO) was measured by Risk Orientation Scale (Rohrmann, 2004)
Scale of 1 (risk-averse) – 7 (risk-seeking)
12 items
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

14. 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
SVO distribution
Prosocial – 32.3%
Cooperator – 92%
Altruist – 8%
Proself – 67.7%
Individualist – 93%
Competitors – 7%
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

15. Risk orientation distribution
Less risk-seeking
More risk-seeking
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

16. Result – % of cooperative choices
Significant 4-way RO X SVO X Joint info X Personal info
Joint Info
Personal Info
No Info
Full Info
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Result – No Info
Less risk-seeking
More risk-seeking
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Result – Full info
Prosocials who are more risk-seeking are more likely to cooperate
Proselfs’ cooperation behaviors are not affected by their risk orientations
Regression of RO, SVO on % of cooperative choices
Less risk-seeking
More risk-seeking
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

19. Mediator – Number of cooperators perceived
Prosocials who are less risk-seeking are more likely to delay their decisions and see more cooperators
Regression of RO, SVO on number of perceived cooperators
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

20. Mediator – Number of cooperators perceived
Less risk-seeking
More risk-seeking
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas

21. 13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas
Mediation
Number of cooperators perceived fully mediates the effect of SVO and risk orientation on cooperation when full information is provided
# of cooperators
-ve
p < .001
-ve
p < .05
risk-seeking X
prosocial
cooperation
p = .232
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Conclusion
Risk orientation affects prosocials, but not proselfs, in PGD
The more risk-seeking is a prosocial, the more he/she cooperates
Same effect is also found in real-time linear PGD both cooperation and defection information is available
This effect is fully mediated by the number of cooperative decisions made by preceding players
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References
Balliet, D., Parks, C., & Joireman, J. (2009). Social value orientation and cooperation in social dilemmas: A meta-analysis. Group Processes Intergroup Relations, 12,
Liebrand, W. B. G. (1984). The effect of social motives, communication and group size on behavior in an N-person multi-stage mixed-motive game. European Journal of Social Psychology, 14,
Parks, C. D. (2004). Risk preference as a predictor of cooperation in a social dilemma. In R. Suleiman, D. V. Budescu, I. Fischer, & D. M. Messick (Eds.), Contemporary research on social dilemmas (pp ). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Tversky, A. & Shafir, E. (1992). Choice under conflict: The dynamics of deferred decision. Psychological Science, 3,
13th International Conference on Social Dilemmas