1. Estimating Staffing Needs for Public Health Exit Screening of Travelers at Select U.S. International Airports
Andre D. Berro1, Shah Roohi1, Andrew D. Plummer1, Priscilla Golden2, C. Lee Smith2, and Todd Wilson1
1Division of Global Migration and Quarantine, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA; 2Global Health Sector, SRA International, Atlanta, GA
METHODS, cont.
RESOURCES
BACKGROUND
Estimated Minimum Staffing Needed for Public Health Exit Screening
Estimated 8 minutes per passenger in secondary screening
Estimated core time as the time needed per terminal, per hour, to complete secondary screening.
Allocated staffing to each terminal based on core time required per hour.
Adjusted staffing shifts and positions to prevent gaps and overlap in coverage
Estimated percentage of time the secondary screeners would interact directly with referred passengers to be the total core time divided by the sum of hours for all staff positions.
Multiplied estimates of staffing by a 1.15 relief factor to correspond to 1 day off per week for each staff person’s 3-week deployment.
City
Airport
Positions Needed
Staff Needed*
Anchorage
ANC 2 3
Los Angeles
LAX 37 43
Atlanta
ATL 20 23
Miami
MIA 24 28
Boston
BOS 11 13
Minneapolis
MSP 7 9
Dallas
DFW 8 10
Chicago
ORD 29 34
Detroit
DTW
Philadelphia
PHL 15
Newark
EWR 18
San Diego
SAN
Honolulu
HNL
Seattle
SEA 12
Washington, DC
IAD 14
San Francisco
SFO 27
Houston
IAH 17
San Juan
SJU
New York
JFK 42 49
The 2005 International Health Regulations (IHR) provide a global framework for developing and maintaining core public health capacities to protect people from the international spread of disease. In a public health emergency of international concern, the World Health Organization (WHO) Director-General can issue temporary recommendations for public health response, such as measures regarding sanitary and quarantine requirements.
As an IHR signatory, the United States may screen departing international travelers for illness during a disease outbreak considered a public health emergency of international concern, if affected countries are requested by WHO to do so.
Should U.S. exit screening become necessary, the process could consist of a limited primary health screening for all outbound international passengers and a more comprehensive secondary screening for passengers suspected of having a communicable disease. Our study estimates the human resource requirements and staffing needs for secondary screening at 19 U.S. international airports.
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Travelers’ H1N1 Portal:
U.S. Pandemic Flu Web Portal:
World Health Organization’s International Health Regulations:
Official Airline Guide, Aviation Solutions Schedules iNet
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
CDC Quarantine and Border Health Services Branch Preparedness and Response Team (Conan Link)
CDC Division of Global Migration and Quarantine Migration Mapping Team (Nancy Gallagher and Kevin Liske)
CDC Quarantine and Border Health Services Branch Science, Policy, and Clearance Reviewers (Clive Brown, Jennifer Brooks, Nicole Cohen, David McAdam Nabiha Megateli-Das, and Ava Navin)
CDC San Francisco Quarantine Station Staff
* “Staff Needed” data incorporates an estimated 1.15 relief factor, rounded up
RESULTS
LIMITATIONS
Scheduled seats were used to forecast departing passenger volume instead of actual number of passengers.
Flights and passengers dynamics vary from day to day.
Although data on departing flights by terminal were integrated, the configurations of the terminals were not analyzed.
The true proportion of passengers referred to public health secondary screening during a severe pandemic could be greater or less than 3%, and could vary over time and by airport, depending on disease epidemiology.
292 public health exit screeners estimated to staff 19 U.S. airports.
A 3-week deployment would require 347 public health screeners.
Public health screeners would likely spend an average of 38% of their time interacting directly with passengers referred to secondary screening.
Minimum Number of Public Health Officers for Secondary
Public Health Exit Screening at 19 U.S. Airports
OBJECTIVES
CONCLUSIONS
Estimate minimum staffing needs to conduct secondary public health exit screening at 19 select U.S. airports.
Identify challenges in estimating public health personnel requirements for secondary exit screening.
Inform federal plans about staffing requirements for secondary exit screening.
This study provides an approach to estimate staffing needs for secondary exit screening during a public health emergency of international concern.
Implementing public health exit screening for all departing international passengers at 19 selected U.S. airports would be resource intensive.
Staffing demands for exit screening would vary by airport, terminal, and time of day, as would the utilization rate of the public health screeners
Up to 62% of public health screeners’ time could be devoted other public health exit screening duties beyond interacting with referred passengers.
Resource requirements and operational planning needs for exit screening should be informed by live exercises and drills at select U.S. airports.
Future analysis should incorporate additional data elements, including the variance in flight departure times, actual numbers of passengers traveling on flights, distances between terminals, as well as the number and status of TSA exit screening checkpoints.
Geographically based and customizable public health exit screening may be a more effective option than uniform, nationwide public health exit screening.
METHODS
Retrieved data for commercial departing international flights for 19 high-volume U.S. airports for a single day (May 18, 2009) from the Official Airline Guide’s Schedules iNet software.
Stratified data on departure times by hour of day, departure terminals, and available scheduled seats for each departing flight.
Estimated percentage of the number of screened passengers in exit screening by total scheduled seats per hour of day.
Estimated percentage of passengers who might be referred to secondary screening to be 3% of total screened passengers.
Disclaimer: The findings in this poster are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the Centers of Disease Control and Prevention.