1. Manager Research and Projects INTERTANKO AGM – Open Market Session,
Erik Ranheim
Manager Research and Projects
INTERTANKO AGM – Open Market Session,
Washington, 08 April 2003

2. Supply of tonnage in the aftermath of PRESTIGE
PRESTIGE accident
Current phase out schemes for SH tankers
Proposed EU regulation
Consequences of possible implementation:
Fleet
Other market consequences

3. PRESTIGE (Bahamas) Built 1976, DWT 81,564 Cargo: 77,000 ts HFO
Damaged 13 November and oil leakage increased as ships was forced out to sea and the damage deteriorated
Sunk 19 November 133 miles outside Spain, major pollution
Strong political reactions for stricter regulations – last proposal Brussels, 27‑28 March 2003 TRANSPORT, TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND ENERGY COUNCIL

4. PRESTIGE proposal Market Issues
Unilateral EU requirements from 1st July?
Accelerated phase out of SH tankers
Heavy oils in DH tankers
Stricter controls
Possible followers to EU initiative
Notes
1. Naturally understands the concerns associated with and threats posed by oil transportation, with the reminder that the accidental pollution and incident records have shown very considerable and sustained improvements for more than 10 years.
2. Stresses the imperative that all involved maintain strict adherence to international (maritime) law and review processes.
3. Advocates the conducting and completion of an impartial, comprehensive accident investigation. Stresses the necessity, before any new measures are proposed or introduced, for rigorous analysis and understanding of the risks and consequences involved based on sound technical grounds, and where appropriate encourages a full impact analysis of each such measure.
4. As a matter of principle, rejects unilateral and/or regional, ill-considered, (and frequently expeditious/opportunistic and reactionary) measures.
5. Reminds that shipowners receive only a very small proportion of the economic benefit from oil supply and distribution, and that the principal beneficiaries in this value chain are oil companies and traders.

5. Phase of single hull tankers above 5,000 dwt
mil dwt

6. Phase of single hull tankers above 5,000 dwt
Number

7. Phase of single hull tankers 5,000 - 29,999 dwt
Number

8. Phase of single hull tankers 30,000 - 59,999
Number

9. Phase of single hull tankers 60,000-119,999 dwt
Number

10. Phase of single hull tankers Suezmaxes
Number

11. Phase of single hull VLCCs
Number

12. Phase of single hull tankers above 5,000 dwt
Number
Built year
EU DH
EU SH
EU cand DH
EU cand SH
Non-EU DH
Non-EU SH
Total
1970s 1 44 77 4
552
673
1980s 24 61 18 82 57
542
685
1990s
213 20 67 14
689
277
311
2000s
238
125 86
173
750
1,371
1,669
476
250
172
346
1,500
2,742
3,338

13. EU phase out SH tankers > 5,000
Proposal from EU Transport Council, - implementation 1st July
CAT 1, non-SBT tankers, 40 mil dwt out 2003
CAT 2, SBT tankers, 61 mil dwt out 2010 (-DH/DS)
CAT 3, tankers below 20/30,000 dwt 322 tankers out 2010

14. Modernisation tankers
Notes

15. Conclusion Supply side benefit from two/three tier market
Return to commodity type of market when most SH tankers removed
Vulnerable market with only modern tankers - no pool of old tankers to send to scrapping
Notes
1. Naturally understands the concerns associated with and threats posed by oil transportation, with the reminder that the accidental pollution and incident records have shown very considerable and sustained improvements for more than 10 years.
2. Stresses the imperative that all involved maintain strict adherence to international (maritime) law and review processes.
3. Advocates the conducting and completion of an impartial, comprehensive accident investigation. Stresses the necessity, before any new measures are proposed or introduced, for rigorous analysis and understanding of the risks and consequences involved based on sound technical grounds, and where appropriate encourages a full impact analysis of each such measure.
4. As a matter of principle, rejects unilateral and/or regional, ill-considered, (and frequently expeditious/opportunistic and reactionary) measures.
5. Reminds that shipowners receive only a very small proportion of the economic benefit from oil supply and distribution, and that the principal beneficiaries in this value chain are oil companies and traders.