1. The Dynamics of Risk: Changing Technologies, Complex Systems and Collective Action in Uncertain Environments
Louise K. Comfort, University of Pittsburgh, Center of Disaster Management Thomas W. Haase, Sam Houston State University Gunes Etran, Koc University

2. Agenda Policy Problem Literature Review Research Questions
Data and Methods
Findings and Discussion
Policy Recommendations

3. Policy Problem
Policy Problem: Communities are systems of systems, which are threated by risks, that if actualized, can become cascading failures (Perrow 1984)
Policy Paradox: As size and scope of these risks increase, the capacity of the organizational systems charged to respond to such risks decrease
Differences in terminology, training, expertise, resources and culture
Confusion (and tensions) about roles and areas of responsibility
Challenges of communication, collaboration and coordination
Policy Challenge: To create a response system comprised of organizations from different backgrounds that has a sufficiently common set of skills, knowledge, and capacities to function collaboratively

4. Twin Streams of Relevant Literature
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) Framework (Ostrom, 2005)
Insights into how to build institutions whose interactions endure over time
Considers “nested sets”: smaller units function within graduated sets of larger units
Smaller units benefit from larger units and contribute to system performance
Effective event response requires the mobilization of collective action:
Organizations must manage transition from normal to response operations (Solé, 2011)
Information infrastructure is critical for situational awareness (Comfort, 1988)
Information access facilitates self-organization in artificial systems (Simon, 1962)
Organizational networks can operate as complex adaptive systems (Newman, 2003)

5. Research Questions
Research Proposition: Adjustments to the processes and policies that guide organizational activities and interactions within a disaster response network can affect that network’s capacity to self-organize.
Research Questions: Focusing on two sets of real-world response networks that emerged at two different points in time:
What was the organizational composition of the response networks?
How quickly did organizations in the response networks become active?
To what extent did the structure of the response networks change during the time that passed between two disaster events?
To what extent did adjustments to process and policy after the first disaster event explain the changes detected in the network structures of the response system after the second disaster event?

6. Comparative Case Studies
State of Louisiana
State of Texas
Hurricane Katrina
August 29, 2005, Category 5
$108b damages; ~1500 fatalities
Response failure
Hurricane Gustav
September 1, 2008, Category 4
$6.6b damages; ~112 fatalities
Successful, Katrina lessons learned
Hurricane Rita
September 24, 2005, Category 5
$12b damages; ~125 fatalities
Coordination and evacuation failure
Hurricane Ike
September 13, 2008, Category 4
$37b damages; ~103 fatalities
Organized and Responsive

7. Data Collection and Coding
Articles pushed in Times Picayune, LA and Houston Chronicle, TX
Represented daily local record of events within each response system
Three week period (4 days prior to landfall; ~22 days after landfall)
Also collected SITREPS and after action reports; and
Legal and budget data about disaster management in LA and TX
Network Data Coding
Identified response system organizations and their interactions
ESF Classifications used to determine relevance (FEMA 2004)
Organizations coded by level of jurisdiction and source of funding
Interactions coded as binary, non-directional links

8. Louisiana Response Networks
Hurricane Katrina, 2005
Hurricane Gustav, 2008

9. Texas Response Networks
Hurricane Rita, 2005
Hurricane Ike, 2008

10. Q1 Findings: Network Composition
Total Number of Interacting Organizations
LA: decrease from 372 to 222
TX: increase from 214 to 372
Jurisdictional Involvement (% of total)
LA: increase in county from 16% to 28%
TX: increase in city from 26% to 43%
SOF Involvement (% of total) – not shown
LA: Nonprofit increase, private decrease
TX: Nonprofit increase, public decrease

11. Q2 Findings: Network Activation
Louisiana: Possible improvement detected
Katrina:
Landfall: 24.5% active
Full Activation: 20 days after landfall
Gustav:
Landfall: 25.2% active
Full Activation: 17 days after landfall
Texas: Improvement not detected
Rita:
Landfall: 36.9% active
Ike:
Landfall: 12.6% active
Full Activation: 22 days after landfall

12. Q3 Findings: Network Structure
Louisiana: Possible improvement
Both networks increasingly connected
Katrina network more connected at landfall
Gustav then more connected and stable
Gustav demonstrated change earlier
Fire fighting, debris removal, service distribution
Texas: Improvement unknown
Rita network more connected at landfall
Ike then became much more connected
Ike demonstrated several points of change
Ike network less stable than Rita network

13. Q4 Findings: Policy Change
Federal Government: amended Homeland Security Act of 2002 in 2006
Restored FEMA’s status, and created the National Integration Center (NIC)
Promoted collaboration through training, credentialing and common standards
Office of Emergency Communications created
National Emergency Communications Plan modified
Louisiana: amended Homeland Security & Emergency Assistance and Disaster Act in 2006
Placed GOHSEP under Governor’s office; to coordinate activities among jurisdictions
EOP required to identify agency responsibilities and priorities needed for coordinated response
Invested +$180 million dollars in the development of the Louisiana Wireless Information Network
Texas: amended the Texas Disaster Act of 1975 in 2007
Required appointment of emergency management directors and mandatory training
Established statewide mutual aid system (formal written agreements not needed)
Many provisions did not become active until several months before Hurricane Ike

14. Discussion / Implications
Although our findings are preliminary, this study detected structural change in Louisiana and Texas response networks
Louisiana: possible improvement (faster activation / bigger change at earlier time)
Texas: improvement unknown (slower activation / less stability over time)
While both states initiated policy changes, there are critical differences:
Louisiana’s legal changes were much more extensive
Louisiana’s legal change were enacted earlier than in Texas
These differences likely encouraged a significant transition in emergency preparedness investment and training, particularly at the sub-state levels
Louisiana’s investment in a statewide wireless communications network appears to have improved communications among actors in the network

15. Policy Recommendations
Common recognition of risk is essential for policy change
Must avoid our dependence on focusing events (Birkland 1997; 1998).
System capacity requires learning and adaptation at all levels
Critical to include actors from all jurisdictions and all sectors
Organizational design and training matter
Need both structure (clarity of role) and flexibility (mutual assistance)
Continued investment in information infrastructure is essential
Information collection and dissemination critical, as evidenced in Louisiana

16. Thank You This research made possible due to the financial support of:
Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, University of Pittsburgh
Center for Disaster Management, University of Pittsburgh