1. Management control of business units
Henri Teittinen

2. Controlling Business Units
Traditionally large, international corporations
Locations abroad
Different functions, plants, sites, products, business models, etc.
Complexity -> Management control?
Business units, divisions, autonomy

4. Functional and divisionalized organization structures
In a functional structure only the organization as a whole is an investment centre (IC) and below this level a functional structure applies throughout.
A functional structure is where all activities of a similar type are placed under the control of a departmental head.
In a divisionalized structure the organization is divided into separate investment or profit centres (PC ’s) and a functional structure applies below this level.
In a functional structure all centres below the chief executive or corporate level are cost centres (CC ’s) or revenue centres.
In a divisionalized structure divisions tend to be either IC ’s or PC ’s but within each division there are multiple cost and revenue centres.
Divisionalized structures generally lead to a decentralization of the decision-making process whereas managers in a functional structure will tend to have less independence.

7. Divisionalization Advantages of divisionalization
Improved quality of decisions
Speedier decisions
Increases managerial motivation
Enables top management to devote more time to strategic issues
Disadvantages of divisionalization
Suboptimization and may promote a lack of goal congruence.
More costly to operate a divisionalized structure.
Loss of control by top management.
Prerequisites for successful divisionalization
More appropriate for companies with diversified activities.
Relations between divisions regulated so that no division, by seeking to increase its own profit, can reduce the profitability of the company as a whole.

8. Measuring BU performance
Should we evaluate the economic performance of the division, or managerial performance?
The business unit has succeeded very well (profit +50%) because of the global raw material market prices (-50%).
Should we reward the manager based on business unit profit, or based on performance he/she is able to control?

9. Measuring BU performance
Controllable contribution is the most appropriate measure of a divisional manager ’s performance (should be measured relative to budget performance).
Divisional net profit is widely used to evaluate both divisional and managerial performance.

10. Profitability measures
1. Return on investment (ROI)
2. Residual income (RI)
3. Economic value added (EVA)

11. Return on investment Division A Division B Profit 1,0 m€ 2,0 m€
Investment 4,0 m€ 20,0 m€
ROI 25% 10%
Division B earns higher profits but A is more profitable
ROI is a relative measure of performance that can be compared with other investments. It also provides a useful summary measure of the ex post return on capital employed.
A major disadvantage of ROI is that managers may be motivated to make decisions that make the company worse off.

12. Division X Division Y
Investment project available 10,0 m€ 10,0 m€
Controllable contribution 2,0 m€ 1.3 m€
ROI of the project 20% 13%
ROI of divisions at present 25% 9%
The overall cost of capital for the company is 15%
The manager of X would be motivated not to invest and the manager of Y would be motivated to invest.
ROI may also motivate managers to make incorrect asset disposal decisions.

13. Residual income
Controllable residual income = Controllable profit less a cost of capital charge on the investment controllable by the manager.
It is claimed that RI is more likely to encourage goal congruence
Division X Division Y
Proposed investment 10,0 m€ 10,0 m€
Controllable profit 2,0 m€ m€
Cost of capital charge (15%) 1.5 m€ m€
Residual income m€ – 0.2 m€

14. The manager of division X is motivated to invest and the manager of division Y is motivated not to invest.
RI also enables different cost of capital percentages to be applied to different investments that have different levels of risk.
If RI is used it should be compared with budgeted/target levels which reflect the size of the divisional investment.
Empirical evidence indicates that RI is not widely used.

15. Alternative divisional profit measures
Sales to outside customers xxx
Transfers to other divisions xxx
Total sales revenue xxx
Less variable costs xxx
1. Variable short-run contribution margin xxx
Less controllable fixed costs xxx
2. Controllable contribution xxx
Less non-controllable avoidable costs xxx
3. Divisional contribution xxx
Less allocated corporate expenses xxx
4. Divisional net profit before taxes xxx

16. Economic value added (EVA)
EVA is net operating profit after taxes minus a charge for the opportunity cost of the capital invested.
EVA = NOPAT – ((TOTAL ASSETS – CURRENT LIABILITIES) x WACC)
EVA is an estimate of the amount by which earnings exceed or fall short of the required minimum rate of return for shareholders or lenders at comparible risk.

17. The effect of performance measurement on capital investment decisions
1. NPV calculations for three projects:
X Y Z
Machine cost (time zero)
Estimated net cash flow (year 1)
Estimated net cash flow (year 2)
Estimated net cash flow (year 3)
Estimated net present value at 10% cost of capital (52)
Ranking on the basis of NPV

18. 2. Estimated ROI and RI/EVA
Profits X Y Z
Year 1 (37) (237)
Year (37) (237)
Year
Total profits
PV of future profits
ROI X Y Z
% % %
Year 1 (4.3) (27.5)
Year (6.4) (41.3)
Year
Average

19. 3. RI/EVA for project X Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Total
Profit before interest (37)
10% interest
RI/EVA (123)
PV of RI/EVA (112)
For projects X, Y, Z for the 1. year:
X Y Z
RI/EVA (year 1) – – 323

20. There is no guarantee that the short-run RI/EVA measure will be consistent with the long-term measure.
Financial performance measures can encourage managers to become short-term oriented and seek to boost short-term profits at the expense of long-term profits.
Approaches for reducing the short-term orientation:
1. Divisional performance evaluated on the basis of economic income (PV of future cash flows).
2. EVA incorporating many accounting adjustments.
3. Lengthen the measurement period.
4. Do not rely excessively on financial measures and incorporate non-financial measures that measure those factors that are critical to the long-term success of the organization.
(i.e.adopt a Balanced Scorecard Approach)

21. The core question of this course:
How do we get others to do what we want them to do
Management control is the process by which managers influence other members of the organization to implement the organization’s strategies.
Management control systems help managers move an organization toward its strategic objectives.
Thus management control focuses primarily on strategy execution.
Anthony & Govindarajan (2001)

22. Harmful side-effects of controls
1. Occurs when controls motivate employees to engage in behaviour that is not organizationally desirable (i.e.system leads to a lack of goal congruence).
2. Results controls:
Encourages individuals to focus only on what is measured, regardless of whether it is organizationally desirable.
Focuses mainly on quantifiable and easily measurable items.
Subject to data manipulation.
Can lead to negative attitudes towards the control system.
3. Action controls:
May discourage creativity
4.Cultural controls:
Lack of goal congruence where group goals do not coincide with firm goals

24. The nature of management control of BU
Two core elements:
1. Formal planning processes (e.g.budgeting and long-term planning) for establishing performance expectations.
2. Responsibility accounting assigns differences from the performance target to the individual who is accountable for the responsibility centre.

25. The controllability principle
Principle advocates that it is appropriate to charge to a responsibility centre only those costs that can be influenced by the manager of the responsibility centre.
Implemented by either eliminating uncontrollables or reporting controllable and uncontrollable items separately.
Types of uncontrollable factors:
1. Economic and competitive factors (Because managers can respond to some of these changes most MACS do not shield managers completely from them).
2. Acts of nature (Managers normally protected from them).
3. Interdependencies where outcomes are affected by other units within the organization.

26. Transfer pricing in divisionalized companies
Purposes of transfer pricing:
1. To provide information that motivates divisional managers to make good economic decisions.
2. To provide information that is useful for evaluating the managerial and economic performance of the divisions.
3. To intentionally move profits between divisions or locations.
4. To ensure that divisional autonomy is not undermined.

27. Alternative transfer pricing methods
1. Market-based
2. Marginal cost
3. Full cost
4. Cost-plus a mark-up
5. Negotiated transfer prices

28. Market-based transfer prices
Where there is a perfectly competitive market for the intermediate product, the current market price is the most suitable basis for setting the transfer prices.

29. Marginal cost transfer prices
Transfer price based on the marginal cost of producing the intermediate product at the optimum output level for the company as a whole will encourage total organizational optimality.
However:
Provides poor information for performance evaluation
MC may not be constant over entire range of output
Measuring MC beyond short-term is difficult
Managers reject short-term perspective

30. Full cost transfer prices
Widely used because managers require an estimate of long-run marginal cost for decision-making.
Traditional costing systems tend to provide poor estimates of long run MC.
Does not enable supplying division to report a profit on goods transferred.
Cost-plus a mark-up transfer prices
Attempts to meet the performance evaluation purpose of transfer pricing (profit allocated to the supplying division)

31. Negotiated transfer prices
Most appropriate where there are market imperfections for the intermediate product and managers have equal bargaining power.
To be effective managers must understand how to use cost and revenue information.
Claimed behavioural advantages.
Limitations:
Can lead to sub-optimal decisions
Time - consuming
Divisional profitability may be strongly influenced by the bargaining skills and powers of the divisional managers.
Inappropriate in certain circumstances (e.g. no market for the intermediate product or an imperfect market exists).

32. Case Quality Metal Service Center
Management control of BU and Group
Motivating managers
Rewarding managers
Transfer prices
One product vs. multiple products
System, policy

33. Case Komas