1. JOHN DWYER / CLOUDBURST GROUP
LAND USE RIGHTS, LAND GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS, AND TENURE SECURITY INDICATORS IN A PASTORAL COMMUNITY: EVIDENCE FROM A BASELINE STUDY IN THE AFAR REGION, ETHIOPIA
KATE MARPLE-CANTRELL1, AIDAN SCHNEIDER1, CALEB STEVENS2, HEATHER HUNTINGTON1
1The Cloudburst Group, 2USAID
March 22, 2017

2. LAND ADMINISTRATION TO NURTURE DEVELOPMENT (LAND) PROJECT IN AFAR, ETHIOPIA
Improve the security of land use rights of pastoralist communities to reduce land expropriations through focused community land use rights formalization process
Development of Afar Region Pastoralist Land Use Rights Regulation to acknowledge customary systems as the basis for the formalization of land use rights
Confirmation of pre-existing Afar grazing system resource and boundary maps for grazing units and institutionalization of databases within sustainable Knowledge Management System
Demarcation, surveying, registration, and certification of grazing units once confirmed with customary institutions and government authorities
Governance capacity building and land use planning within the pastoral communities among each of the grazing systems and coordination among different players in securing pastoral land tenure

3. RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS
Scholarship on Afar limited and empirical data on land use rights in Afar difficult to collect
Need to better understand health of the pastoral land use systems and prevalence and severity of land access challenges in Afar
Competing land uses for customary pastoral land
Mobility and land and water access challenges for pastoralists
‘Push’ factors away from pastoral livelihoods and towards sedentary living
Potential for increased inter-ethnic competition over limited resources
AIDAN SCHNEIDER / CLOUDBURST GROUP

4. IMPACT EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
Quasi-experimental Difference-in-Difference (DD) study
Compares two LAND treatment sites in Chifra and Amibara woredas to matched control areas in the Afar region (Gewane, Delucha, Telalak, and Dewe)
Baseline data was collected in the first half of 2016; a second round of data collection is tentatively scheduled for early 2019
This is an exploratory paper that draws upon this rich source of baseline data to explore related findings surrounding land governance and tenure security in the study area

5. BASELINE DATA COLLECTION
Quantitative and qualitative data collection in 300 treatment and control gantas (or villages)
March – June 2016 5

6. BASELINE DATA SOURCES
Six primary sources of community and household level data:
Large-N household survey (N=2987);
Wives survey administered to a subset of wives in male-headed households (N=1467);
Ganta leader survey with one leader of each ganta (N=263);
Focus group discussions with women, youth, and/or agro-pastoralists (N=132);
Key informant interviews with customary clan leaders and local government officials (N=128); and
Participatory mapping exercise with herders and scouts in 50 gantas.

7. Q: Q: RESEARCH QUESTIONS
What is the customary land governance context in the study area, and what are the perceived strengths and weakness of these customary land governance systems to navigate tenure security pressures?
Are specific outside actors (the government, private sector investors, and other ethnic groups) perceived to potentially pose a threat to tenure security? In practice, what is the prevalence and severity of land access challenges for pastoralists? Q:

8. FINDINGS: LAND GOVERNANCE CUSTOMARY LAND GOVERNANCE FAIRLY STRONG
Clan Leader (kedo abba) is the primary rule-maker in most cases (~60%) and the primary rule enforcing body in every case.
According to households, customary leaders are most likely to punish a rule breaker (65%,1670).
Household heads believe the rules that govern their household’s grazing land (69%, 2051) and water use (74%, 2213) are fair.
Households are also generally satisfied with methods and processes used by customary leaders to protect their grazing lands (67%, 1998) and water (69%, 2064).
The majority of households believe that customary leaders’ decisions about customary land (67%, 2011) and water (69%, 2047) access are fair and transparent.

9. FINDINGS: LAND GOVERNANCE OVERLAPPING CUSTOMARY & FORMAL REGIMES
Leaders who do not indicate that the kedo abba is the primary decision maker about their land mostly identify kebele government officials as the primary decision makers (Kedo Abba 67%,174; kebele officials 12%, 31).
According to leaders, government officials have less decision-making power about ganta land management than traditional authorities but more than women or youth
There is no dominant way that households report acquiring their farmland, contrary to responses from leaders that land is acquired from traditional authorities.
Minor and local conflicts are commonly resolved by customary leaders, more serious conflicts between clans are solved by the government.

10. FINDINGS: TENURE SECURITY SECURITY OF LAND RIGHTS
<10% of household heads believe their wet or dry season grazing areas are likely to be encroached upon by any actor, including customary leaders, investors, or members of outside clans.
Restrictions on gantas’ ability to access wet and dry season grazing areas are incredibly rare.
Of the 263 ganta leaders, only eight (3%) reported that their gantas lost access to any grazing areas, wet or dry season.
Only 5% (137) of households report any areas used for grazing or water access being reallocated as farmland
Of those households, just 38% (52) report the reallocation affecting their household’s grazing or water use patterns.
28% (71) of ganta leaders have themselves experienced or know of a conflict with outside actors
Most often village level conflicts involved other gantas (17%, 44), followed by other clans (15%, 37) and other ethnic groups (11%, 27).

11. VISUALIZING CONCERN ABOUT ENCROACHMENT BY NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
[DATE]

12. FINDINGS: TENURE SECURITY INVESTORS, CONFLICTS UNCOMMON
Investors—largely cotton and sugar farming operations—have small presence in study area (16%, 479).
56% (267) of households report investors held meetings with their community
Meetings were held with the community as a whole in 17% (46) of those cases.
Households divided about transparency of negotiations with investors—49% (236) believe process is transparent.
65% (310) of households with investors think they brought benefits to community;
11% (52) believe investor presence had negative impacts on community.
Conflicts between the ganta and investors (3%, N=8) are rare.

13. VISUALIZING INVESTORS AND CONFLICTS

14. KEY MESSAGES
Data confirm reports that involvement in everyday land matters by all levels of the Ethiopian government is increasing and producing variation in land allocation and management responsibilities.
Severity of land access challenges for some Afar pastoralists less pervasive than previously suggested by studies reliant on smaller sample sizes and in different areas of Afar.

15. CONCLUSIONS
Land and resource tenure systems are dynamic, requiring policy and programs to aim at a moving target.
Profound shifts currently underway in study areas, including sedentarization, governance formalization, and evolving investor activities.
Without thoughtful and flexible policy, shifts could lead to increased conflicts and tenure insecurity.
Work to strengthen pastoral communities’ use rights best undertaken before widespread encroachments rather than after the fact.
Need for LAND Afar governance interventions to promote pastoralist confidence, awareness, and organization in anticipated negotiations with the government and investors.

16. ANTONIO FIORENTE
THANK YOU
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