1. Veto Players
Brintnall- “one enabling factor for the climate of seeming failure was the academic environment of critical evaluation that had focused on what did not work rather than what might move results forward.”

2. Policy and Indicators Opportunities and Challenges in the Policy Realm
Danger that evidence will be used selectively or ignored to support an a priori policy decision;
Loss of control over how the information might be used and Intellectual property issues, tied to funding and related issues;
Figuring out where your research fits into the policy cycle. Is it to evaluate or support policy in the beginning, midstream or end of a cycle?
Translating complex ideas into meaningful policy application – speaking the language;
Overcoming “political will” ;
Assessing Impact and evaluating causal effects;
End user may not know what they want (or need);
Knowing your end user – capabilities, resources, entry points.

3. Types of Policy Relevant Indicator Research
Almost all research can be said to be policy relevant so what do we mean by relevant?
Evaluations that focus on process and performance such as the effects of a programme – eg. country level aid programmes at the sectoral or programme level;
Decision support to help decide what decisions need to be made and information that is relevant to that decision – analysis of a particular risk in a region, country or globally – eg global warming;
Responsive – stakeholder analysis to help understand the needs of a particular group or “client” - eg a survey of NGOs working in the field who are part of the Peace build Group

4. What do we find?
When we look at the number of indicator based projects available we find that:
They are working on different assumptions regarding cause and effect;
They generate different policy prescriptions;
They are not deeply imbedded as decision-support tools.

5. Transparency International
CIFP
World Bank
Economist
IDEA
Transparency International
UNDP
Rule of Law ü
Political Stability & Violence
Democratic Participation
Government & Market Efficiency
Government Transparency & Accountability
Human Rights

7. What is Fragility?
Development
World Bank, DFID, USAID etc
Conflict
Fund for Peace, International Crisis Behaviour,
Stability
Political Instability Task Force
All generate similar lists

8. Correlation Matrix (Developing Countries: 2006)
Key Findings
Correlation Matrix (Developing Countries: 2006)
Marshall-Goldstone
Fund for Peace
Brookings
LICUS
CIFP
1.00
0.62
-0.88
-0.71
-0.58
-0.56
0.76
0.80
0.69
-0.84
-0.59

9. Correlates of Fragility: Democracy
The next two slides show some interesting findings evident from examining CIFP’s structural dataset.
Countries with highly functional democratic processes are indeed stable, but then so are deeply entrenched repressive regimes.
CIFP fragility risks rise on the vertical scale, while Polity IV measures of democracy rise from left to right
The most unstable countries are those with moderate levels of democratic performance.
This presents a challenge to efforts to move repressive regimes toward more open and participatory forms of governance.
It is important that efforts to do good don’t in fact cause more harm than they reduce. This point reiterates this handbook’s earlier idea that accurate analysis is of the utmost importance.
This graph, outlining the relationship between fragility and regime type, approaches the problem from a different perspective. It plots the average fragility index scores for countries at each of the 21 points that make up Polity IV’s Democracy-Autocracy index. In other words, we took all the states scoring 10 in the most recent year of the Polity dataset, and averaged their fragility scores, then did the same for all states scoring 9, 8, and so on down the line. According to Polity, a score of -10 indicates a total autocracy, while a score of 10 indicates a fully functional democracy. Though the graph clearly exhibits a relationship of some type, it is not a linear one; indeed, the two correlate at -0.48, far below the level observed for development indicators. Instead, the relationship seems to resemble the inverted ‘U’ relationship that various writers have observed between conflict and regime type.
The trend line provides a 2 degree polynomial bivariate regression of the relationship. Clearly, the full democracies are the most stable – states with a score of 10 in the most recent year of the Polity index averaged 3.7 on the fragility index. At the other end of the scale, full autocracies averaged 5.1. States between these two extremes tended to be more fragile; indeed, states scoring between -5 and 5 on Polity’s index averaged a fragility score of 6.5, far above the average for both total autocracies and full democracies. The implication would seem to be that, while established democracies and entrenched autocracies tend to be relatively stable, states caught between those two extremes, termed anocracies by some writers, tend to be more fragile.
Again, this type of insight must have implications for programming choices when planning aid in autocratic or “anocratic” states – in states with indeterminate governing institutions, CIDA cannot simply program “around” the fragility, to borrow a phrase from development in conflict – the stability of the state must become a core goal of any development program. 9

10. Pakistan’s Entry Points for Programming: Governance, Economics, Security and Crime, Human Development, Demography and the Environment 10

11. The State of the World: Fragility Increasing Over Time