1. Ownership changes and efficiency on the commercial real estate market: A qualitative analysis of the development in Sweden Hans Lind
It is time to finish the present value mathematics part of the exercises.

2. Introduction
Large ownership changes in last years on the commercial real estate market
Mostly looked upon from investor perspective
But how will it be “the right owner”?

3. A theoretical perspective
Institutional change driven by invention of more efficient structure
Old version (macro) : Marx
New version (micro) : Transaction cost economics based on Coase
Efficient in the sense of better use of resources, possible with pareto-sanctioned changes

4. Who is the right owner? For whom is the value highest?
A cash flow perspective: Higher value if:
Higher revenue
Lower cost
Reduce risk, handle risk better
Better use of real options

5. Ideal type (1): Foreign institutional investors buying new properties
Office properties in good locations
Easily managed
Work with local partner
No big problem from an efficiency perspective
But why own instead of lend?

6. Ideal type (2): Specialised property companies buying hotels and shopping centres
Sellers less specialised
Management intensive properties, strong connection between property and service
Should lead to increased efficiency

7. Ideal type (3): Foreign firms buying mispriced properties
Example: Market does not take contractual structure or risk into account
Temporary owner with small consequences from an efficiency perspective?
Sometimes create more efficient units by breaking up wrongly structured portfolios

8. Ideal type (4): Owner-occupiers selling properties (e. g
Ideal type (4): Owner-occupiers selling properties (e.g. sale-lease back affairs)
Unclear argument: Focus on core business
Problematic feature: Sell in order raise capital, makes long run commitment that reduce flexibility
Sometimes a way to allocate risk to someone who can reduce it

9. Ideal type (5): High-leveraged "opportunistic" actors
Buy because they can raise capital at low cost
Capital providers have mispriced risk
And also try to improve net operating income by reducing maintenance
The most problematic case from a long run efficiency perspective
Just a way to cheat capital providers?

10. Final comments Some of the changes about to be reversed
More long run actors with management skill buying (back) properties?
Local actors buying back properties?
New “innovative ways” to cheat weak capital providers