1. Chapter 18 Contracts in Writing Chapter 18: Contracts in Writing
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2. Overview LO18-1: What is the purpose of the statute of frauds?
LO18-2: Which kinds of contracts require a writing to satisfy the statute of frauds?
LO18-3: What must a writing contain to be sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds?
LO18-4: What is the purpose of the parol evidence rule?

3. Chapter 18 Hypothetical Case 1
Black Aquifer Construction Company, Inc. contracted with Amalgamated Machining Corporation to erect a commercial building on property owned by Amalgamated in Folkston, Georgia. The written agreement between the parties stipulated that Black Aquifer had six months from the date of the contract's execution to complete the work. Also included in the written agreement was a liquidated damages clause requiring Black Aquifer to pay Amalgamated Machining $2,500 per day for every day the builder was late in the completion of its work. Black Aquifer finished construction of the building in seven months, and Amalgamated Machining now seeks to recover $75,000 in liquidated damages ($2,500 per day multiplied by thirty days). Black Aquifer refuses to pay the $75,000. The company's owner, Richard Black, recalls that in a conversation during the contract's execution, Amalgamated Machining's owner, William Riddell, informed him that his company could have as long as nine months to finish the building. Riddell denies ever having made the statement.
If the dispute goes to court, would a judge allow the jury to consider William Riddell's alleged statement regarding the nine-month completion deadline? Ultimately, does Black Aquifer Construction Company, Inc. owe Amalgamated Machining Corporation $75,000 in liquidated damages?
Chapter 18 Hypothetical Case 1: Black Aquifer Construction Company, Inc. contracted with Amalgamated Machining Corporation to erect a commercial building on property owned by Amalgamated in Folkston, Georgia. The written agreement between the parties stipulated that Black Aquifer had six months from the date of the contract's execution to complete the work. Also included in the written agreement was a liquidated damages clause requiring Black Aquifer to pay Amalgamated Machining $2,500 per day for every day the builder was late in the completion of its work. Black Aquifer finished construction of the building in seven months, and Amalgamated Machining now seeks to recover $75,000 in liquidated damages ($2,500 per day multiplied by thirty days). Black Aquifer refuses to pay the $75,000. The company's owner, Richard Black, recalls that in a conversation during the contract's execution, Amalgamated Machining's owner, William Riddell, informed him that his company could have as long as nine months to finish the building. Riddell denies ever having made the statement.
If the dispute goes to court, would a judge allow the jury to consider William Riddell's alleged statement regarding the nine-month completion deadline? Ultimately, does Black Aquifer Construction Company, Inc. owe Amalgamated Machining Corporation $75,000 in liquidated damages?
[Instructor: See Contracts Falling within the Statute of Frauds and Parol Evidence Rule in Chapter 18]

4. Chapter 18 Hypothetical Case 2
Assume two parties enter into an oral agreement that must generally be in writing in order to be enforceable. The statute of frauds indicates that the following four types of agreements must be in writing: 1) contracts whose terms prevent possible performance within one year; 2) promises made in consideration of marriage; 3) contracts for one party to pay the debt of another if the initial party fails to pay; and 4) contracts related to an interest in land. According to the Uniform Commercial Code, contracts for the sale of goods totaling more than $500 must also be in writing.
From an ethical standpoint, even though the parties have entered into an oral agreement, is it permissible for one of the parties to deny liability based on the statute of frauds or Uniform Commercial Code writing requirement? In your reasoned opinion, should a party honor an oral contract, even though the law technically requires the agreement to be in writing?
Chapter 18 Hypothetical Case 2: Assume two parties enter into an oral agreement that must generally be in writing in order to be enforceable. The statute of frauds indicates that the following four types of agreements must be in writing: 1) contracts whose terms prevent possible performance within one year; 2) promises made in consideration of marriage; 3) contracts for one party to pay the debt of another if the initial party fails to pay; and 4) contracts related to an interest in land. According to the Uniform Commercial Code, contracts for the sale of goods totaling more than $500 must also be in writing.
From an ethical standpoint, even though the parties have entered into an oral agreement, is it permissible for one of the parties to deny liability based on the statute of frauds or Uniform Commercial Code writing requirement? In your reasoned opinion, should a party honor an oral contract, even though the law technically requires the agreement to be in writing?
[Instructor: See Contracts Falling within the Statute of Frauds in Chapter 18]

5. Statute of Frauds Definition: Purposes:
Rule of state law requiring certain types of contract to be in writing in order to be enforceable
Purposes:
Ease contractual negotiations by requiring sufficient, reliable evidence to prove existence and specific terms of contract
Prevent unreliable, oral evidence from interfering with contractual relationship
Prevent parties from entering into contracts with which they do not agree
The statute of frauds is a rule of state law requiring certain types of contract to be in writing in order to be enforceable. The statute of frauds eases contractual negotiations by requiring sufficient, reliable evidence to prove the existence and specific terms of a contract. The statute of frauds also prevents unreliable, oral evidence from interfering with a contractual relationship, and prevents parties from entering into contracts with which they do not agree.

6. Contracts Subject to Statute of Frauds
Contracts that cannot be performed within one year from the date of their making
Promises made in consideration of marriage (prenuptial agreements)
Contracts to pay the debt/default of another party
Real estate contracts
Contracts for the sale of goods valued at $500 or more
Contracts subject to the statute of frauds include agreements that cannot be performed within one year from the date of their making, prenuptial agreements, contracts to pay for the debt or default of another party, real estate contracts, and contracts for the sale of goods valued at $500 or more. These contracts must be in writing in order to be enforceable.

7. Statute of Frauds Writing Requirements
Common Law—Written contract must clearly indicate:
Parties to contract
Subject matter/purpose of agreement
Consideration given by both parties
Significant terms (price, quantity, etc.)
Signature of party plaintiff seeks to hold responsible under contract (i.e., signature of defendant)
According to the common law interpretation of the statute of frauds, a written contract must clearly indicate the parties to the contract, the subject matter and purpose of the agreement, the consideration given by both parties, significant terms such as price and quantity, and the signature of the defendant.

8. Exceptions to Statute of Frauds Writing Requirement
Admission: Statement made in court, under oath, or at some state during a legal proceeding in which defendant admits that oral contract existed (even though contract was originally required to be in writing)
Partial performance: Performance of portions of unwritten agreement can constitute proof that oral contract exists
Promissory estoppel: Legal enforcement of otherwise unenforceable contract due to party's detrimental reliance on contract
Miscellaneous exceptions recognized by Uniform Commercial Code (UCC): Examples—Oral contracts between merchants, oral contracts for customized (specially manufactured) goods
Exceptions to the statute of frauds writing requirement include an admission, representing a statement made in court, under oath, or at some state during a legal proceeding in which the defendant admits that an oral contract existed (even though the contract was originally required to be in writing); partial performance, which is when performance of portions of an unwritten agreement can constitute proof that an oral contract exists; promissory estoppel, the legal enforcement of an otherwise unenforceable contract due to a party's detrimental reliance on the contract; and miscellaneous exceptions recognized by the Uniform Commercial Code, such as oral contracts between merchants, and oral contracts for customized goods.

9. Parol Evidence Rule Definition: Purpose:
Common law rule stating that oral evidence of agreement made before or contemporaneously with written agreement is inadmissible when parties intended to have written agreement be complete and final version of agreement
Purpose:
To prevent evidence that substantially contradicts the agreement in its written form
The parol evidence rule is a common law rule stating that oral evidence of an agreement made before or contemporaneously with a written agreement is inadmissible when the parties intended to have the written agreement be the complete and final version of the agreement. The parol evidence rule is meant to prevent evidence that substantially contradicts the agreement in its written form.

10. Exceptions to Parol Evidence Rule
Contracts that are subsequently modified
Contracts conditioned on orally agreed-upon terms
Contracts that are not final, as they are part written and part oral
Contracts with ambiguous terms
Incomplete contracts
Contracts with obvious typographical errors
Void or voidable contracts
Evidence of prior dealings or usage of trade will provide clarification
Exceptions to the parol evidence rule include contracts that are subsequently modified, contracts conditioned on orally agreed-upon terms, contracts that are not final (as they are part written and part oral), contracts with ambiguous terms, incomplete contracts, contracts with obvious typographical errors, void or voidable contracts, and evidence of prior dealings or usage of trade will provide clarification.

11. Integrated Contracts
Definition: Written contracts within statute of frauds intended to be complete and final representation of parties' agreement
General rule: Integrated contracts prevent admissibility of parol evidence
Integrated contracts are written contracts within the statute of frauds that are intended to be the complete and final representation of the parties' agreement. Generally, integrated contracts prevent admissibility of parol evidence.

12. Chapter 18 Hypothetical Case 3
On January 2, Wabash Construction Company, a general contractor, executed a written contract with Anderson Brick, Inc., a subcontractor. The contract relates to a major strip mall building project in Morgantown, and Wabash faces a deadline of October 31 in its contract with The Mackie Consortium, L.L.C., the owners of the new mall. In the agreement between Wabash and Anderson, the parties stipulate that time is of the essence in terms of performance of the bricklaying work, and that the deadline for Anderson's completion of the bricklaying work is July 15. There is also a liquidated damages clause in the contract between Wabash and Anderson, indicating that Anderson will pay $2,000 in damages for every day the bricklaying remains incomplete beyond July 15. Anderson does not complete the bricklaying work by July 15. In fact, the project is not finished until August 30, and Wabash now claims liquidated damages from Anderson in the amount of $92,000 (representing 46 days beyond the July 15 deadline, multiplied by $2,000 per day.) Anderson refuses to pay the $92,000, and Wabash sues. At trial, Anderson's attorney seeks to introduce the following evidence: 1) the testimony of Henry Anderson, Anderson's owner, who is willing to testify under oath that at the time of the signing of the contract, Wabash's general manager, Fred Stein, said, "Pay no attention to the July 15 deadline in the contract; if you need more time, all you have to do is ask"; and 2) a crumpled index card, purportedly in Fred Stein's handwriting, indicating that there was "no 'hard and fast' deadline on Anderson Brick's work."
Should the trial court judge admit the foregoing evidence?
Chapter 18 Hypothetical Case 3: On January 2, Wabash Construction Company, a general contractor, executed a written contract with Anderson Brick, Inc., a subcontractor. The contract relates to a major strip mall building project in Morgantown, and Wabash faces a deadline of October 31 in its contract with The Mackie Consortium, L.L.C., the owners of the new mall. In the agreement between Wabash and Anderson, the parties stipulate that time is of the essence in terms of performance of the bricklaying work, and that the deadline for Anderson's completion of the bricklaying work is July 15. There is also a liquidated damages clause in the contract between Wabash and Anderson, indicating that Anderson will pay $2,000 in damages for every day the bricklaying remains incomplete beyond July 15. Anderson does not complete the bricklaying work by July 15. In fact, the project is not finished until August 30, and Wabash now claims liquidated damages from Anderson in the amount of $92,000 (representing 46 days beyond the July 15 deadline, multiplied by $2,000 per day.) Anderson refuses to pay the $92,000, and Wabash sues. At trial, Anderson's attorney seeks to introduce the following evidence: 1) the testimony of Henry Anderson, Anderson's owner, who is willing to testify under oath that at the time of the signing of the contract, Wabash's general manager, Fred Stein, said, "Pay no attention to the July 15 deadline in the contract; if you need more time, all you have to do is ask"; and 2) a crumpled index card, purportedly in Fred Stein's handwriting, indicating that there was "no 'hard and fast' deadline on Anderson Brick's work."
Should the trial court judge admit the foregoing evidence?
[Instructor: See Parol Evidence Rule n Chapter 17]

13. Chapter 18 Hypothetical Case 4
Ginny Sandford agrees to buy a used car from her cousin, Cindy Markham, for $1,500. Although the total amount of the sale requires a contract in writing, Sandford and Markham have only an oral agreement.
Sandford keeps the car for two months and then decides she does not want it after all. She returns the car to Markham and demands her money back. Markham sues, and in court, Sandford says, "Well, just because I said I'd buy the car at one point in time doesn't mean I really wanted it. I didn't sign anything or formally agree to anything. Cindy has no proof that a contract existed."
Who wins?
Chapter 18 Hypothetical Case 4: Ginny Sandford agrees to buy a used car from her cousin, Cindy Markham, for $1,500. Although the total amount of the sale requires a contract in writing, Sandford and Markham have only an oral agreement.
Sandford keeps the car for two months and then decides she does not want it after all. She returns the car to Markham and demands her money back. Markham sues, and in court, Sandford says, "Well, just because I said I'd buy the car at one point in time doesn't mean I really wanted it. I didn't sign anything or formally agree to anything. Cindy has no proof that a contract existed."
Who wins?
[Instructor: See Exceptions to the Statute of Frauds in Chapter 18]