1. ATLAS-AFP interlock validation
Sune Jakobsen (EP-UAT) on behalf of ATLAS-AFP
148th MPP

2. AFP Interlock validation - outline
Outline Injection Permits LVDT-to-limit comparison Reaction to flags LVDT-bypass box Buttons Conclusion Settings for 2017
AFP Interlock validation - outline
Test of Injection Permits
Test of response to the LVDT-to-limit comparison
New in 2017
Test of USER_PERMIT and automatic extraction as a function of all input flags
Test of the LVDT-bypass box
Test of hardware and software buttons
Conclusion of interlock tests
Reminder of settings for 2017
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
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3. AFP Interlock validation – Injection Permits
Purpose: Check that the Injection Permit is removed if a Roman Pot is out of garage position.
Test sequence:
1. All Roman Pots at HOME position.
2. Observe that the AFP inputs to the ATLAS injection permit are TRUE.
3. Move in the Roman Pot to be tested.
4. Observe that the AFP to the ATLAS injection input for the correct beam is FALSE.
5. Move the Roman Pot to be tested to HOME.
6. Observe that the AFP inputs to the ATLAS injection permit are TRUE. 1 3 5 4
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
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4. AFP Interlock validation – Injection Permits result
Test performed separately on each Roman Pot on (details in collimation logbook).
All worked correctly.
Summary table:
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
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5. AFP Interlock validation – LVDT-to-limit comparison
Purpose: Check of the automatic extraction and loss of USER_PERMITs when a limit is violated.
Test sequence:
Not possible to move to illegal position, therefore:
1. Move in the Roman Pot to be tested.
2. Make position illegal by changing limit.
3. Observed automatic extraction and (not for WARNING) loss of USER PERMIT for the beam affected.
4. When extracted beyond the limit, observe the return of the USER PERMIT.
5. “Ringing” observed for several Roman Pots (not a problem for safety, but not nice for the log). 4 5 5 1 3 3 2
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
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6. AFP Interlock validation – LVDT-to-limit comparison result
Test performed separately on each Roman Pot on (details in collimation logbook).
All worked correctly.
Summary table:
“Ringing” for the USER PERMIT observed for several Roman Pots
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Sune Jakobsen
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7. AFP Interlock validation – Reaction to flags
Purpose: Check of the reaction to SMP flags and the override key.
Test sequence (simplified):
1. Cycle though STABLE_BEAM, UNSTABLE_BEAM and ADJUST and observed extraction and loss of USER PERMITs.
2. Observe correct behavior to LVDT-to-limit comparison in all relevant combinations.
3. Repeat with OVERRIDE in place.
STABLE BEAM
ADJUST
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
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8. AFP Interlock validation – Reaction to flags
Test performed for one Roman Pot per beam on (details in collimation logbook).
All worked correctly.
Summary table on the right:
“Ringing” for the USER PERMIT observed for several Roman Pots.
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
8/12 8

9. AFP Interlock validation – LVDT-bypass box and results
Purpose: Check that the LVDT-bypass box force the LVDT comparison TRUE while simultaneously disabling the motors.
Fake situations (full definitions in EDMS note):
TEST1: Failure with AFP Roman Pots inserted.
Beam dump and then insure LHC operation without AFP Roman Pots.
TEST2 (The forbidden use case): Problem with AFP Roman Pot inserted. Recovery without beam dump.
TEST3 (Holiday mode): Insure LHC operation without AFP Roman Pots when manpower is not available to react fast.
TEST4: Failure with AFP Roman Pots in garage.
Beam dump and then insure LHC operation without AFP Roman Pots
Test performed for one Roman Pot per beam on (details in collimation logbook).
Result: All worked correctly.
PXI OFF
PXI OFF
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
9/12 9

10. ATLAS SLIMOS hardware panel
AFP Interlock validation – Test of buttons
Purpose: Check functionality of hardware and software buttons.
ATLAS SLIMOS hardware panel
Tests:
Hardware emergency extract: Hardware disable of power to all motors => Extraction (no change in USER PERMITs).
Software extract per Roman Pot: Extraction via DCS command to PXI (no change in USER PERMITs).
Test performed for one Roman Pot per beam on (details in collimation logbook).
Result: All worked correctly.
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
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11. AFP Interlock validation – Conclusion
Full serious of all the test originally performed for TOTEM and ALFA has now also been performed for the final AFP movement and interlock systems.
All is working correctly.
Some “ringing observed” on the USER PERMITs, but has no influence on safety aspects.
EDMS note in preparation:
Does the signature list need updating?
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
11/12 11

12. Reminder for setting for 2017
Previously agreed settings:
General Roman Pot setting: TCT + 3 σnominal mm = 12 σnominal mm
Minimum 1.5 mm (not relevant for AFP).
Extra margin for new system for startup phase: TCT + 3 σnominal mm mm = 12 σnominal mm
Settings for AFP in startup phase:
Ultimate settings for AFP:
AFP suggests to move to the ultimate settings in the middle of the summer (e.g. after MD2).
Important to make the change to the ultimate settings no later than in TS2.
Suggested margin to WARNING LIMIT: 0.2 mm.
Suggested margin to DUMP LIMITs: 0.3 mm.
ATLAS-AFP interlock validation th MPP
Sune Jakobsen
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