1. Comparative political economics
Lecture 3
Paolo Graziano

2. Two-Party vs. Multiparty Systems
unit of analysis: political party in the legislative and/or governmental arena
‘clear’ vs. ‘unclear’ choice between alternatives political programs
moderating vs. ‘radicalizing’ effect
prerequisite for single-party vs. coalitional cabinets

3. How can we count parties? I
Sartori (1976): number of parties in Parliament, over a certain percentage threshold, with coalition (size criterion) or blackmail (ideological criterion) potential
Blondel (1968): attention to power relations within the political system; both number and size are relevant
Laakso and Taagepera (1979): ‘effective’ number of parties index

4. How can we count parties? II
Power relations among parties: the role of (durable) close alliances in electoral competitions, Parliamentary groups, Cabinets
Power relations within parties: the role of factions
Lijphart solution: closely allied parties and factionalised parties count 1,5 parties...

5. Partisan conflict dimensions
socioeconomic dimension: role of the State in the economy
religious dimension
cultural-ethnic
urban-rural
regime support
foreign policy (ex. EU) dimension
materialist vs. postmaterialist dimension

6. Single-party vs. coalition cabinets
single-party majority cabinets
minimal winning cabinets: only those parties that are necessary to reach majority
oversized cabinet: larger coalition cabinets
minority cabinet: not supported by a parliamentary majority

7. Why oversized cabinets?
‘information effect’
policy preferences
nature of the cabinet’s political program: ‘national unity’ or ‘national solidarity’
institutional/constitutional features
political features: overcome factions

8. Why minority cabinets? constitutional/institutional features
party system structure
legislative structure (ex. strenght of Parliamentary committees)
‘majority governments in disguise’: possible pro tempore situation that will lead to a different majority