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An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure

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Presentation on theme: "An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure"— Presentation transcript:

1 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure
Chapter 8 An Economic Analysis of Financial Structure

2 Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

3 Eight Basic Facts Stocks are not the most important sources of external financing for businesses Issuing marketable debt and equity securities is not the primary way in which businesses finance their operations Indirect finance is many times more important than direct finance Financial intermediaries are the most important source of external funds Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

4 Eight Basic Facts (cont’d)
The financial system is among the most heavily regulated sectors of the economy Only large, well-established corporations have easy access to securities markets to finance their activities Collateral is a prevalent feature of debt contracts Debt contracts are extremely complicated legal documents that place substantial restrictive covenants on borrowers Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

5 Transaction Costs Financial intermediaries have evolved to reduce transaction costs Economies of scale – combining the funds of many investors together. For example, the cost of purchasing 10,000 shares of stock is not much greater than purchasing 50 shares of stock. Expertise – for example, computer technology, toll-free numbers, easy access. Liquidity services – easier for customers to do transactions. Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

6 Asymmetric Information
Adverse selection occurs before the transaction Moral hazard arises after the transaction Agency theory analyses how asymmetric information problems affect economic behavior Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

7 Adverse Selection: The Lemons Problem
If quality cannot be assessed, the buyer is willing to pay at most a price that reflects the average quality Sellers of good quality items will not want to sell at the price for average quality The buyer will decide not to buy at all because all that is left in the market is poor quality items This problem explains fact 2 and partially explains fact 1 Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

8 Adverse Selection: Solutions
Private production and sale of information Free-rider problem – when people who do not pay for information take advantage of the information other people have paid for. Government regulation to increase information Fact 5 Financial intermediation Facts 3, 4, & 6 Collateral and net worth Fact 7 Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

9 Moral Hazard in Equity Contracts
Called the Principal-Agent Problem Example of Steve, his venture capital partner and the moral hazard. Page Separation of ownership and control of the firm Managers pursue personal benefits and power rather than the profitability of the firm Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

10 Principal-Agent Problem: Solutions
Monitoring (Costly State Verification) Free-rider problem Fact 1 Government regulation to increase information Fact 5 Financial Intermediation – venture capital firm. Combine resources of many partners. Fact 3 Debt Contracts Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

11 Moral Hazard in Debt Markets
Borrowers have incentives to take on projects that are riskier than the lenders would like Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

12 Moral Hazard: Solutions
Net worth and collateral Incentive compatible – good for both borrower and lender. Security for lender, keeps credit strong. Monitoring and Enforcement of Restrictive Covenants Discourage undesirable behavior – loan can only be used for certain activities. Encourage desirable behavior – example of life insurance or mortgage insurance for house loan Keep collateral valuable – also life insurance or theft insurance for car. Provide information – requiring an audit of company or individual activity. Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

13 Moral Hazard: Solutions
The problem with restrictive covenants is that you cannot completely eliminate the moral hazard problem. Covenants cannot rule out every risky activity. They must be monitored to be effective. Restrictive Covenants are written provisions that are in every debt contract. A lot of legal information protecting borrower. Financial Intermediation Facts 3 & 4 Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

14 Summary The presence of asymmetric information in financial markets leads to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Tools to help solve these problems involve sale of information, government regulation, collateral and net worth to debt contracts and the use of monitoring and restrictive covenants. Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

15 Summary Note that the existence of the free-rider problem for traded securities indicates that financial intermediaries, banks, should play a greater role in financing businesses. Economic analysis of adverse selection and moral hazard has helped explain the basic features of our financial system outlined at the beginning of the chapter. Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

16 Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

17 Conflicts of Interest Type of moral hazard problem caused by economies of scope – so much information that sometime it can be misleading Arise when an institution has multiple objectives and, as a result, has conflicts between those objectives A reduction in the quality of information in financial markets increases asymmetric information problems Financial markets do not channel funds into productive investment opportunities The economy is not as efficient as it could be Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

18 Why Do Conflicts of Interest Arise?
Underwriting and Research in Investment Banking Information produced by researching companies is used to underwrite the securities. The bank is attempting to simultaneously serve two client groups whose information needs differ. Spinning occurs when an investment bank allocates hot, but underpriced, IPOs to executives of other companies in return for their companies’ future business Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

19 Why Do Conflicts of Interest Arise? (cont’d)
Auditing and Consulting in Accounting Firms Auditors may be willing to skew their judgments and opinions to win consulting business Auditors may be auditing information systems or tax and financial plans put in place by their nonaudit counterparts Auditors may provide an overly favorable audit to solicit or retain audit business Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

20 China and Financial Development
What China needs to do to become a legitimate world economic powerhouse: More legal enforcement of financial contracts and new bankruptcy law Better accounting standards and more high-quality information More and better regulation in the banking system Allocate capital more efficiently by improving its financial system Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

21 China and Financial Development
How has China been able to grow so rapidly for 20 years? Extremely high savings rate of 40% Rural to Urban shift of massive pool of underutilized labor from subsistence-agriculture sector to higher-productivity activities that use capital Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

22 Financial Crises & Aggregate Economic Activity
Crises can be caused by (p ) Increases in interest rates – invites more risk Increases in uncertainty – economy downturns Asset market effects on balance sheets – failures of major corporations Problems in the banking sector – bank failures Government fiscal imbalances – too much deficit spending Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

23 SUMMARY CHAPTER 8 There are 8 basic facts about US Financial structure. First four are the importance of financial intermediaries and the unimportance of securities for financing corporations. 5th is bank regulation, 6th only large banks have access to the securities markets, 7th importance of collateral, 8th debt contracts. Financial intermediaries have economies of scale reducing transaction costs. Asymmetric information results in 2 problems: adverse selection & moral hazard Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

24 SUMMARY CHAPTER 8 4. Adverse selection hurts efficient functioning financial markets. Tools to help reduce adverse selection include sale of information, government regulation, financial intermediation, and collateral and net worth. 5. Tools to reduce moral hazard problem in debt contracts include net worth, monitoring & enforcement of restrictive covenants, and financial intermediaries. 6. Conflicts of interest are when financial service providers misuse or hide important information. Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

25 SUMMARY CHAPTER 8 Conflicts of interest reduce the amount of reliable information in financial markets which makes it difficult to channel or move funds to people who have productive investment opportunities. Financial crises are major disruptions or problems in financial markets. Some of these problems are caused by increase in interest rates, uncertainty, problems in the banking sector and government deficits. Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

26 Study/discussion questions
How can economies of scale help explain the existence of financial intermediaries? How do standard accounting procedures help financial markets work more efficiently? Would you be more willing to lend to a friend if she put all of her life savings into her business than you would if she had not done so? Why? Rich people often worry that others will seek to marry them only for their money. Is this a problem of adverse selection. Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

27 Study/discussion questions
5. The more collateral there is backing a loan, the less the lender has to worry about adverse selection. Is this statement true, false, or uncertain? Explain your answer. 6. How can a stock market crash provoke a financial crisis? 7. How can a sharp rise in interest rates provoke a financial crisis? Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

28 Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.

29 Copyright © 2007 Pearson Addison-Wesley. All rights reserved.


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