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IAEA Approach to the Safety Case and Safety Assessment for Predisposal Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources and Radioactive Waste INT9176.

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Presentation on theme: "IAEA Approach to the Safety Case and Safety Assessment for Predisposal Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources and Radioactive Waste INT9176."— Presentation transcript:

1 IAEA Approach to the Safety Case and Safety Assessment for Predisposal Management of Disused Sealed Radioactive Sources and Radioactive Waste INT9176 INTERREGIONAL WORKSHOP Application of the IAEA Methodology and SAFRAN Tool for the Safety Case and Safety Assessment for Predisposal Management of DSRS Monika Kinker, WES/NSRW

2 INT9176 “Mediterranean Project”
Objectives Improved capacities and capabilities for the cradle to grave management of SRS Staff of RBs & DSRS management organizations trained in … SA methodologies and tools Key Activities Implemented: Safety Demonstration Implementation in SAFRAN Tool of a Generic SC & SA for Predisposal Management of DSRS Provision of Assistance in the development of SC and SA for DSRS end of life management options Original MSs : Slovenia, Croatia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cyprus, Greece, Malta, Montenegro, Turkey, Lebanon, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia. Joined the project in 2012: Ghana, Tanzania, Nigeria, Jordan, and The Frmr.YugRep. of Macedonia Did not join yet, but invited: Algeria, Israel, Syria

3 Waste Management at the IAEA
Department of Nuclear Safety and Security Nuclear Installation Safety Radiation, Transport and Waste Safety Waste and Environmental Safety Section Department of Nuclear Energy Nuclear Power Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Waste Technology Waste Technology Section overview of safety standards

4 Activities of the Division
Safety Standards Development Support for International Conventions Joint Convention, Code of Conduct Application of Standards: Information Exchange (e.g. Conferences, workshops, meetings, ...) Technical Cooperation Training & Education Appraisals, Peer Reviews overview of safety standards 4

5 Vision for the IAEA Safety Standards
Outcome: A harmonized high level of protection for people and the environment worldwide based on the IAEA safety standards as the global reference Output: Global reference for protecting people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation. Integrated, comprehensive and consistent Up-to-date, user friendly, fit-for-purpose and high quality Provide for a worldwide harmonized high level of protection for people and the environment from harmful effects of ionizing radiation.

6 Strategies Clear categories of safety standards consistent with Member States’ needs and use Clear, logical and integrated structure based on a unified philosophy of safety Consensus at the highest level on what constitutes a high level of safety and the related best international practices Transparency and rigour of the process Effective feedback mechanisms User - friendliness Manageable number of safety standards Clear scope: areas covered and level of detail Harmonized terminology

7 Safety Standards Categories
Fundamental Safety Principles Requirements – Legal, Technical, & Procedural Safety Imperatives Safety Fundamentals Guidance on Best Practice to Meet Requirements Safety Requirements Safety Guides

8 Safety Fundamentals Safety Fundamentals Safety Requirements
Policy document of the IAEA Safety Standards Series: States the basic objectives, concepts and principles involved in ensuring protection and safety Comprised of 10 safety principles Principle 7: Protection of present and future generations. People and the environment, present and future, must be protected against radiation risks Safety Fundamentals Safety Requirements Safety Guides overview of safety standards 8

9 Safety Requirements Elaborate on the basic objectives and concepts of SF-1 as they apply to a specific activity or facility Should be concise and reflect the ‘What’ and ‘Who’ of safety management  associated explanatory text should describe ‘Why’ the requirements exist Use “shall” statements Safety Guides Safety Requirements Safety Fundamentals overview of safety standards 9

10 Safety Guides Focus on ‘How’ safety requirements can be met
Guidance on best practices to meet requirements Use “should” statements Safety Guides Safety Requirements Safety Fundamentals overview of safety standards 10

11 Status of Safety Standards
IAEA Safety standards are Binding for IAEA’s own activities Not binding on the Member States (but may be adopted by them) EXCEPT in relation to operations assisted by the IAEA: Integrated Regulatory Review Service Technical Cooperation Fund work States wishing to enter into project agreements with the IAEA overview of safety standards

12 Development of Safety Standards
Outline and work plan Prepared by the Secretariat Review by the Safety Standards Committees and the Commission on Safety Standards Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) Nuclear Safety Standards Committee (NUSSC) Radiation Safety Standards (RASSC) Waste Safety Standards (WASSC) Transport Safety Standards (TRANSSC) Drafting or revising of safety standard by the Secretariat and Consultants Review by the Safety Standards Committee(s) Member States Review period: about every 5 years Endorsement by Commission on Safety Standards Approval by the IAEA’s Director General or BoG * * Safety Requirements approved by BoG * Safety Guides approved by DG overview of safety standards

13 Current status of development of IAEA Safety Requirements
2010 Under development Under development Published in Published in 2011 Under development 2009 Under development 2009 Published in 2011 Under development Published in 2012 Under development

14 Life Cycle of a Radiation Source
The parts of the lifecycle in which RS are most under control (for commercial reasons) include - Manufacturing (production of radionuclide, encapsulation, equipment manufacturing) - Distribution to users (transportation, storage) - Application period (medical therapy, industry, etc) The parts of the lifecycle during which control becomes weaker, with the potential that control is lost (resulting in sources becoming orphan sources) include the “transition period(s)” when they are not under a dedicated WMO system, and when they become disused or spent The transition period includes: Transportation, Temporarily out of use, Waiting for another application/user, or are Taken out of use but no plans for further management/disposition

15 Issues in Long Term management of DSRS
Waste or Resource? Disused Source: “a radioactive source which is no longer used, and is not intended to be used, for the practice for which an authorization has been granted” (Code of Conduct) Radioactive Waste: “Radioactive material in gaseous, liquid or solid form for which no further use is foreseen…, and which is controlled as radioactive waste by a regulatory body under the legislative and regulatory framework …” (Joint Convention)

16 Disused sources in the Safety Standards

17 DSRS Long Term Management Options
Return to Commercial Suppliers Return to Country of Origin (Repatriation) Reuse/Recycle Storage at User Facility Storage in Dedicated (“Centralized”) Facility Decay to clearance levels iaw national regulations Interim storage pending future actions Long Term (between 50 and 100 yr) Disposal

18 Why Storage is not a Sustainable Management Strategy
Not a sustainable option in the long-term On-going financial liabilities Poor or no regulatory control in certain countries Limited expertise or capacity for managing sources Institutional and social stability Potential health and environmental hazard Safety, Security concerns

19 Disposal Options Disposal at Landfill Near-surface Repository Disposal
(with and without engineered barriers) including underground cavities (natural or engineered) at relatively shallow depths Geological Repository Disposal Borehole Disposal Co-disposal might be an option e.g. NSR & BDC

20 Factors Affecting Choice of Disposal Option
Nature of the waste (activity, half-life, toxicity) Quantity and location (volume, where is it?) Site Characteristics (nature of the rock, water flow & chemistry, stability) Preferences concerning repository design and nature of engineered barriers Other Factors (national policy and strategy, availability of resources, stakeholder consensus)

21 Sustainable Management
Requires: Adequate Legal and Regulatory Framework National Policy, Strategies that consider Existing, future inventories COMPLETE lifecycle Adequate Resources and Infrastructure (technical, human, financial) Regulatory Body with well defined responsibilities and functions Authorization through process of licensing 21

22 RWM Licensing, Authorization in the Safety Standards
2010 2013 22 22

23 IAEA Requirements for RW Safety Case, Safety Assessment …
GSR Part 5, GSG-3: Safety Case A collection of arguments and evidence in support of the safety of a facility or activity. This will normally include the findings of a safety assessment and a statement of confidence in these findings. GSR Part 4 , GSG-3: Safety Assessment 1. Assessment of all aspects of a practice that are relevant to protection and safety; includes siting, design & operation of the facility. This normally includes risk assessment and probabilistic SA. 2. Analysis to predict the performance of an overall system and its impact, where the performance measure is the radiological impact or some other global measure of the impact on safety.

24 GSG-3: Safety Guide Proposal to June 2010 WASSC -> CRAFT
Demonstrating the Safety of RWM Safety Case Role, Components, Documentation and Use Safety Assessment Approach, Scenarios, Models, Analysis of Results Specific Issues SC evolution, graded approach, DID, facility lifetime, LTS Regulatory Review Process Annex I Examples of Hazards and Initiating Events Annex II Topical Issues for Review of SC Annex III Template of Regulatory Review Report Annex IV SADRWMS Project Proposal to June 2010 WASSC -> CRAFT NEW!!!

25 GSG-3: Guidance on the SC and SA
Safety Case Safety Assessment Safety Assessment Management System Site and Engineering Non radiological environmental impact Operational Safety Radiological Impact Scenarios Models Calculations 25

26 Elements of Safety Case: GSG-3
INCLUDES: Context; safety strategy; facility description; safety assessment; limits, controls and conditions (LCOs); iteration and design optimization; uncertainty management; integration of safety arguments NOT SPECIFIED but implied: criticality, radiation, hazardous material, surveillance & maintenance, emergency preparedness and response, decommissioning, management systems, interface with LCOs from other facilities (e.g., waste acceptance criteria)

27 CRAFT (Complimentary Safety Reports: Development and Application to Waste Management Facilities)
4 Year Project 1st Plenary May 2011 2nd, 3rd Plenaries 2012, 2013 Final Plenary October 2014 Objectives: APPLY GSG-3, SADRWMS methodology, SAFRAN Tool PROVIDE a forum for application of the methodology and SAFRAN tool DEVELOP, document TECDOCs illustrating application of GSG-3 Facility/process specific Safety Case Process/Regulatory Review 27

28 SADRWMS Project Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions
Long-term Project 1st Plenary Meeting in 2003 Final Plenary in 2010 Objectives: 1. EXAMINE the application of safety assessment methodology (ISAM, ASAM) 2. DEVELOP, document Safety Assessment Methodology Regulatory Review ---> GSG-3 3. INTEGRATE methodology into software tool (SAFRAN)

29 CRAFT Working Methods Radon Type Facility Application Case
develop illustrative test case(s) for applying the IAEA methodology/tools to RADON type facilities (basis: RW retrieval activity at Murmansk RADON); Storage and Processing Facility Apply IAEA methodology/tools to facilities for the storage and processing of RW Central Storage Facility in Slovenia, Waste Processing Facility in Serbia, LTS Facility in Cuba Regulatory Interactions Apply IAEA methodology/tools in regulatory review of WG application cases, and provide recommendations 29

30

31 Generic Safety Assessment (GSA)
A SA undertaken on a site-generic rather than site-specific basis using a synthetic system Can provide useful input to decisions concerning a variety of issues: suitable designs, site characteristics & activity limits Use of the GSA Starting point for the SA of a specific site Worked example that can be used to guide/inform a site-specific assessment Identify key waste and site attributes that need to be characterised

32 Concluding Remarks Although valuable RWM experience has been collected worldwide, we are all still learning This week is a good change for exchange of experiences between participants We are looking for intensive and open discussion! Try to use the presence of this group of experts from different countries to get maximal benefit for your project! overview of safety standards

33 Thank you!


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