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Collective and State Violence During the Second Intifada: The Limits of Rational Choice Theory Robert Brym SD Clark Professor of Sociology University of Toronto Presented at the University of Siena, Italy 19 May 2016
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Monthly trends for Israeli and Palestinian deaths, January 1987 - December 2007
Ratio of Palestinian to Israeli deaths (avg. = 4.3:1) 9.9: : : :1 r = 0.629
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Suicide bombing in the second intifada: causal mechanisms by type (in percent)
causal type causal mechanism Reaction to specific Israeli acts of violence Initiative aimed at achieving tactical/ strategic goal Total Bomber motive 71 30 101* Organizational rationale 59 41 100 Event precipitant 82 18 *Does not equal 100 because of rounding.
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Explaining violent action in three stages
Utility-maximizing principle(s) 1 2 Variation in violent action Subjectively good reason(s) 3 Historically contingent circumstance(s)
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Political assassinations during the second intifada
Name Org Date Jewish Deaths, Suicide Attacks, Preceding Month (avg. = 2.4) Thabit Thabit Fatah Jamal Salim Hamas 2 Jamal Mansur Abu Ali Mustafa PFLP 15 Jihad Ahmed Jibril PFLP-GC 17 Salah Shehadeh 1 Ibrahim al-Maqadma 14 Ismail Abu Shanab 25 Ahmed Yassin 18 Abdel Aziz al-Rantissi Izz al-Din Khalil
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Explaining state-directed assassination
deterrence and compellence Utility-maximizing principle(s) state-directed assassination of operatives and political leaders 1 2 Variation in violent action Subjectively good reason(s) preventing the formation of a non-subservient palestinian state 3 Historically contingent circumstance(s) low u.s. pressure to descalate; low internal pressure to deescalate
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Explaining state-directed assassination
deterrence and compellence Utility-maximizing principle(s) state-directed assassination of operatives and political leaders 1 2 Variation in violent action Subjectively good reason(s) preventing the formation of a non-subservient palestinian state 3 Historically contingent circumstance(s) low u.s. pressure to descalate; low internal pressure to deescalate
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