1. CIRAS final conference Barcelona transport use case
Katowice, June 8th, 2016
Jose-Ramon Martinez-Salio, ATOS
CIRAS Technical Manager
20 min

2. Rationale of the use case

3. Use case general approach
We decided to use the metro as it is a Critical Infrastructure that have specific threats
Metro systems:
Have been created to be open and accessible
Gather crowds of people at predictable times
Have predictable routes and specific timetables
Are very visible
Any disruption has high impact in day by day life
© Grup TMB All rights reserved

4. Threats considered (1/2) Terrorist threats
Real cases
Terrorist threats
Bomb / Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
During last decade in Madrid, Moscow, London and Brussels
Armed attack: Shooting / Mass shooting
New York 1993 metro shooting (Long Island) and others (usually not connected to terrorist attacks)
Armed attack: Stabbing
London 2015 (terrorist), Taipei 2014 (non terrorist)
Cyber attack
Seoul, South Korea 2014 (non terrorist)
Assault with hostages
None recorded in metro.
Chemical, Biological, and Radiological attack (CBR)
Tokio metro attacks 1995 (Sarin and Zyklon B) (non terrorist)
Employees sabotage
Many. Usually unreported (non terrorist)
Common chemicals attack (e.g. tear gas, pepper spray)
External sabotage (e.g. cut signal cables, arson, etc)
Japan 1984 attack to 34 metro nodes causing major disruption (terrorist)

5. Why Terrorist Threat?
From
Transit systems offer potential terrorists, particularly those willing to embrace high-order violence, with:
Easy-to-exploit target signature
Highly visible and represent government authority
Carry large numbers of people in concentrated spaces along predictable routes
Virtually impossible to secure

6. Threats considered (2/2) Criminal threats
Real cases
Criminal threats
Non Terrorist external sabotage (e.g. cut signal cables, arson, etc)
Madrid Metro strike trains disabled due to train cab windows broken by using slingshots
Theft
Bilbao Metro in Theft of cupper of the overhead line
Robbery
Many
Pickpocketing
Protests and actions
Usually related with strikes
Settling of scores between bands
Many. e.g. Barcelona metro in March 2015
Criminals fleeing using Metro system
Random attacks
January 2016, NY metro - At least six slashing attacks targeting random strangers occur at various subway platforms throughout the city

7. Why Criminal threat?
Metro offers a big target for criminal threats, especially related with low intensity crime
Many potential targets concentrated in a small area that leave the platforms and trains very fast, not to return in many hours
A person to people contact is almost impossible to avoid at certain times and places
Metro systems are created to be open and easy to enter and leave fast, making controls difficult

8. Use cases

9. Terrorist threat scenario (1/2) Bomb in a train during rush hour
This use case covers the threat: “T 1.1 Bomb / IED”
From unattended baggage; baggage; human attached or even placed in bins
Use case 1: Bomb in a train during rush hour
This sub-scenario implies the access to any station with a explosive device concealed
© Grup TMB All rights reserved
© Grup TMB All rights reserved
© Grup TMB All rights reserved

10. This use case covers the threat: “T 1.1 Bomb / IED”
Terrorist threat scenario (2/2) Bomb in train workshop during the night shift
© Grup TMB All rights reserved
This use case covers the threat: “T 1.1 Bomb / IED”
Human attached or left behind
Use case 2. Bomb in train depot/workshop during the night shift (maintenance)
This sub-scenario implies the access to premises during the night shift
© Grup TMB All rights reserved

11. Criminal Threat Scenario
This use case covers the threat: “T 2.8 Random attacks”
We have considered the use case of a random stabbing in metro platform during rush hour.
This scenario implies the use to concealed weapons that can be knifes, machetes or even glass

12. Security measures to consider

13. Security measures to evaluate
We have included 27 security measures from different sources (like
For the use case, these measures have been grouped in five alternatives to be assessed
© Grup TMB All rights reserved

14. Security measures we have considered
Security Operation and Control Centre (SOCC)
CCTV cameras for surveillance
CCTV cameras with video analytics
Intrusion detection sensors
Network separation/firewall
Fences with fiber optics or sensors
CBRN sensors
Private/Public security
Internal training procedures and guidelines
Broadcast of messages Public Address (PA) systems
Solo guards
Patrols
Mobile patrols
Security dogs
Sniffer dogs
Metro TV on Station
SOS interphones
See-through bins
Armed soldiers
Identification of people
Random searches of passengers
Awareness campaigns to passengers and staff
Random baggage search for passengers
Armed police officers
Airport-style metal detectors
Limitation of entry points
Explosive devices analyzer

15. Results

16. CIRAS tool has proven a real success in the selected use cases:
Use case results
CIRAS tool has proven a real success in the selected use cases:
Tool´s flexibility in combining different Security Measures in alternatives
Possibility of recovering previous recorded scenarios
Final report allowing one page summary

17. Acknowledgments

18. Our stakeholders
Use case analysis and execution would have been impossible without the collaboration of our transport use case stakeholders:
Transports Metropolitans de Barcelona (TMB):
Mossos d'Esquadra (Catalonian Police) in its Metropolitan Transport Security Area

19. Thank you for your attention! Jose-Ramon Martinez
Technical Manager
ATOS Spain
Co-funded by the Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and other Security-related Risks Programme of the European Union