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Figure 1. Characteristics of Policy Outcomes and Multi-level Governments. From: What Are the Areas of Competence for Central and Local Governments? Accountability.

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Presentation on theme: "Figure 1. Characteristics of Policy Outcomes and Multi-level Governments. From: What Are the Areas of Competence for Central and Local Governments? Accountability."— Presentation transcript:

1 Figure 1. Characteristics of Policy Outcomes and Multi-level Governments.
From: What Are the Areas of Competence for Central and Local Governments? Accountability Mechanisms in Multi-Level Governance J Public Adm Res Theory. 2016;27(1): doi: /jopart/muw048 J Public Adm Res Theory | © The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please

2 Figure 2. Comparison of the Hierarchical Chains: Local Versus Central Government.
From: What Are the Areas of Competence for Central and Local Governments? Accountability Mechanisms in Multi-Level Governance J Public Adm Res Theory. 2016;27(1): doi: /jopart/muw048 J Public Adm Res Theory | © The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please

3 Figure 3. Average Number of Citizen Complaints and Water Supply Efficiency Yearly Average Number of Citizen Complaints Yearly Average Levels of Water Supply Efficiency. From: What Are the Areas of Competence for Central and Local Governments? Accountability Mechanisms in Multi-Level Governance J Public Adm Res Theory. 2016;27(1): doi: /jopart/muw048 J Public Adm Res Theory | © The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please

4 Figure 4. Impacts of the Change in Governance from Local to Central Government: Trends of Geoje and Synthetic Geoje Impacts on the Number of Complaints Impacts on the Amount of Leakage. From: What Are the Areas of Competence for Central and Local Governments? Accountability Mechanisms in Multi-Level Governance J Public Adm Res Theory. 2016;27(1): doi: /jopart/muw048 J Public Adm Res Theory | © The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please

5 Figure 5. Impacts of the Change in Governance from Local to Central Government: Gaps and Placebo Gaps Impacts on the Number of Complaints Impacts on the Amount of Leakage. From: What Are the Areas of Competence for Central and Local Governments? Accountability Mechanisms in Multi-Level Governance J Public Adm Res Theory. 2016;27(1): doi: /jopart/muw048 J Public Adm Res Theory | © The Author Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc. All rights reserved. For permissions, please

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